Where is the Egypt Defence Expo held?

The Egypt Defence Expo is held in Cairo, EGY.

What is the primary focus of the Egypt Defence Expo?

The expo focuses on showcasing the latest advancements in defense, security, and military technology, bringing together key stakeholders from governments, armed forces, and the defense industry.

When does the Egypt Defence Expo take place?

The Egypt Defence Expo is scheduled to take place in December.

Egypt Defence Expo 2027

Name: Egypt Defence Expo 2027
Start: 2027-12-06T00:00:00Z
End: 2027-12-09T00:00:00Z
Location: Cairo

Dec 6–9, 2027Cairo, EgyptIn-person

Registration open

The Egypt Defence Expo is an international defense exhibition and conference held in Cairo, Egypt. This event serves as a significant platform for showcasing the latest advancements in defense, security, and military technology. It brings together key stakeholders from governments, armed forces, and the defense industry to foster collaboration and address contemporary security challenges.

Committees & topics

Security Council 1 (UNSC)
The Situation in Sudan
Security Council 2 (UNSC)
Cybersecurity and the Protection of Critical Infrastructure
Committee on Digital Affairs & Sovereignty
Digital Sovereignty, Cross-Border Data, and the Governance of Frontier AI
Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC)
Sovereign Debt Distress and Financing the SDGs
UNESCO
Protection of Cultural Heritage in Armed Conflict
UN Environment Programme (UNEP)
Plastic Pollution and the Negotiation of a Global Plastics Treaty
World Health Organisation (WHO)
Implementing the Pandemic Agreement and Reforming the IHR
Human Rights Council (HRC)
Human Rights, Generative AI, and Algorithmic Accountability

Why it matters

The expo's location in EGY, a country with a pivotal geopolitical role in North Africa and the Middle East, underscores its importance. EGY's strategic position and its ongoing efforts to modernize its defense capabilities make this event a critical forum for regional security discussions and partnerships. The gathering facilitates direct engagement between international defense manufacturers and regional decision-makers, offering insights into emerging defense needs and technological trends.

This event is particularly relevant for understanding the evolving landscape of defense procurement and strategic alliances in a region marked by complex security dynamics. It provides a unique opportunity for participants to engage in high-level dialogues, explore potential collaborations, and contribute to the development of robust defense strategies. The focus on innovation and technological exchange is crucial for addressing multifaceted threats and enhancing collective security.

How to prepare

Delegates preparing for the Egypt Defence Expo should undertake a thorough analysis of the current geopolitical climate in the region, paying close attention to EGY's defense priorities and strategic partnerships. Understanding the specific security challenges and defense modernization goals of EGY will be paramount for effective engagement. Research into the types of defense technologies and solutions that are most relevant to the region's needs will also be beneficial.

Effective participation will require a nuanced approach to international relations and defense diplomacy. Delegates should consider how their contributions align with broader regional security objectives and EGY's national defense strategy. Utilizing frameworks such as "Dynamic Analysis" and "Engagement Strategies" can help in preparing for discussions and identifying key areas for collaboration. Additionally, understanding the various "Hidden Stakeholders" involved in defense procurement and policy-making will be crucial for navigating the event successfully.

Country perspectives

Where the most-relevant 1 countries stand on the core issues in play. Click through for the full country profile.

Egypt

Host and key participant, seeking to modernize its defense capabilities and foster international defense partnerships.

Role in topic

As the host nation, EGY plays a central role in facilitating dialogue and showcasing its defense needs. The expo provides EGY with an opportunity to engage with international defense industries, explore advanced military technologies, and strengthen its strategic alliances to enhance national security and regional stability.

Topics & background

The background behind each topic and the actors that shape it.

Security Council 1 (UNSC)

The Situation in Sudan

Sudan has been engulfed in civil war since April 2023, when fighting erupted in Khartoum between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) under General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) under Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo ('Hemedti'). The war shattered the fragile civilian-military transition that had followed the 2019 ouster of Omar al-Bashir and the 2021 coup. Combat has spread from the capital to Darfur, Kordofan, and Gezira, producing the world's largest displacement crisis, with more than ten million people uprooted internally and across borders into Chad, South Sudan, and Egypt. Famine conditions have been formally declared in parts of Darfur, and credible reports of ethnically targeted killings by the RSF in West Darfur have prompted renewed ICC scrutiny. The Security Council's primary instrument remains the Darfur-focused sanctions regime under Resolution 1591 (2005), including an arms embargo that monitors and panel reports describe as routinely violated, with weapons flowing through neighboring states and Gulf intermediaries. Council action has been constrained by divisions among the P5 and by competing mediation tracks led by Saudi Arabia and the United States in Jeddah, the African Union, IGAD, and more recently Egypt. A draft resolution demanding a Ramadan ceasefire was vetoed by Russia in late 2024, and humanitarian access remains episodic. The Council now faces the question of whether to broaden the embargo beyond Darfur to all of Sudan, strengthen monitoring of external sponsors, refer additional cases to the ICC, and authorize a protection presence for civilians and aid convoys — all against the backdrop of a conflict increasingly shaped by foreign drones, mercenaries, and gold revenues.

Key players

Security Council 2 (UNSC)

Cybersecurity and the Protection of Critical Infrastructure

Cyber operations against critical infrastructure have moved from theoretical risk to recurring feature of international security. Incidents over the past decade — NotPetya (2017), the Colonial Pipeline ransomware attack (2021), repeated intrusions into Ukrainian power and telecommunications networks, and persistent campaigns against water utilities, hospitals, and undersea cables — have demonstrated that civilian systems are now routine targets and that attribution and proportionate response remain deeply contested. The Security Council has historically been hesitant to legislate in cyberspace, leaving the running to the General Assembly's First Committee processes. The UN Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) reports of 2013, 2015, and 2021 affirmed that international law, including the UN Charter, applies in cyberspace and articulated eleven voluntary norms, including a prohibition on attacks against critical infrastructure. The Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG) on ICTs, running through 2025, has broadened participation but exposed sharp divisions: Western states emphasize implementing existing norms and applying international humanitarian law, while Russia, China, and several non-aligned states push for a new legally binding treaty and a permanent UN mechanism, partly to constrain Western intelligence operations and to legitimize stricter domestic information controls. The Council is now asked to consider whether and how to translate these norms into operational guidance: defining 'critical infrastructure' for Charter purposes, clarifying state responsibility for non-state proxies and ransomware actors, addressing threats to undersea cables and space-based systems, and considering targeted sanctions for the most destructive incidents.

Key players

Committee on Digital Affairs & Sovereignty

Digital Sovereignty, Cross-Border Data, and the Governance of Frontier AI

The concept of 'digital sovereignty' has moved from a niche European policy idea to a central organizing principle of global digital governance. States are simultaneously trying to capture economic value from data, secure supply chains for semiconductors and cloud services, regulate AI systems whose training data and deployment span jurisdictions, and assert legal authority over content hosted by foreign platforms. The result is a thickening patchwork of rules: the EU's GDPR, Digital Services Act, Digital Markets Act, and AI Act; China's Cybersecurity, Data Security, and Personal Information Protection Laws; India's DPDP Act and IndiaStack-style digital public infrastructure; and a proliferation of data-localization mandates across the Gulf, Africa, and Latin America. Multilateral processes have struggled to keep pace. The 2024 Global Digital Compact, adopted as part of the Pact for the Future, committed states to an inclusive, rights-based digital future and to a new International Scientific Panel and Global Dialogue on AI Governance. UNESCO's 2021 Recommendation on the Ethics of AI, the Council of Europe's 2024 AI Framework Convention, and the G7 Hiroshima AI Process offer overlapping but non-binding guardrails. Export controls on advanced chips and lithography tools, particularly between the US, the Netherlands, Japan, and China, have made semiconductor policy an arena of geoeconomic competition. This committee must reconcile competing claims: the protection of fundamental rights and cross-border data flows valued by liberal economies; the security and developmental concerns underpinning data localization; the need for interoperable AI safety standards; and the demand of developing states for meaningful technology transfer, capacity building, and a voice in standard-setting that has so far been dominated by a handful of jurisdictions and firms.

Key players

Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC)

Sovereign Debt Distress and Financing the SDGs

A decade of cheap borrowing, followed by the COVID-19 shock, a strong dollar, and post-2022 interest-rate tightening, has pushed dozens of developing economies into debt distress. IMF and World Bank assessments classify more than half of low-income countries as at high risk of, or already in, debt distress, while middle-income borrowers such as Sri Lanka, Ghana, Zambia, and Egypt have undergone or are negotiating painful restructurings. Debt service now exceeds combined spending on health and education in a growing number of African states, directly undermining the 2030 Agenda. The G20 Common Framework for Debt Treatments, launched in 2020, was intended to coordinate restructurings across traditional Paris Club creditors, China, and private bondholders. In practice it has been slow and uneven: Chad, Zambia, Ghana, and Ethiopia each illustrate different failure modes, from creditor coordination problems to disputes over comparability of treatment between official bilateral lenders and private creditors. Calls have grown louder — from the African Union, CARICOM (the Bridgetown Initiative), and the UN Secretary-General's SDG Stimulus — for a UN-anchored sovereign debt workout mechanism, expanded use of SDRs, MDB balance-sheet reform, and credit-rating agency accountability. The Fourth International Conference on Financing for Development (FfD4) in Seville in 2025 placed these issues at the center of the multilateral agenda. ECOSOC is now positioned to advance concrete recommendations on debt transparency, climate-resilient debt clauses, the architecture of any new restructuring mechanism, and the alignment of development finance with the SDGs and the right to development.

Key players

UNESCO

Protection of Cultural Heritage in Armed Conflict

From the deliberate destruction of Palmyra and Mosul by ISIS, to shelling damage at sites in Ukraine including Odesa's historic centre, to strikes on heritage and religious sites across Gaza, Lebanon, Yemen, and Sudan, the past decade has demonstrated that cultural property remains both incidental and intentional collateral of contemporary warfare. UNESCO's mandate to safeguard heritage sits at the intersection of the 1954 Hague Convention and its two Protocols, the 1970 Convention on illicit trafficking, the 1972 World Heritage Convention, and the customary international humanitarian law principles affirmed in the ICC's landmark Al Mahdi conviction in 2016 for the destruction of mausoleums in Timbuktu. In parallel, looting and trafficking of antiquities have continued to finance armed groups and to feed legitimate art markets in Europe, North America, and the Gulf. UNESCO's emergency 'enhanced protection' lists, no-strike databases shared with militaries, and capacity-building programs through ICCROM and INTERPOL have expanded, but enforcement depends on the political will of states parties. Climate change, urbanization, and the underwater heritage of the Mediterranean and Red Sea pose parallel, slower-moving threats. The committee is asked to consider strengthening the 1954 Hague regime, mainstreaming heritage protection into peacekeeping mandates and military doctrine, regulating the online antiquities trade, and operationalizing reparations and reconstruction frameworks consistent with the rights of affected communities.

Key players

UN Environment Programme (UNEP)

Plastic Pollution and the Negotiation of a Global Plastics Treaty

Global plastic production has roughly doubled since 2000 to over 400 million tonnes per year, with only a small fraction effectively recycled. Plastic waste accumulates in rivers, oceans, soils, and the human body; microplastics have been detected in placentas, blood, and remote polar ice. Beyond visible marine debris, plastics are now recognized as a climate problem, with the petrochemical sector projected to be the largest driver of oil demand growth over the next two decades, and as a chemicals problem, given thousands of additives of toxicological concern. In March 2022, the UN Environment Assembly adopted Resolution 5/14, launching an Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee (INC) to develop an internationally legally binding instrument on plastic pollution, including in the marine environment. Five INC sessions have exposed a familiar fault line: a 'High Ambition Coalition' led by Norway, Rwanda, the EU, and many small island states pushes for binding caps on primary plastic polymer production and global bans on problematic chemicals and products; a group of major petrochemical producers, including Saudi Arabia, Russia, Iran, and (with caveats) the United States and China, prefers a treaty focused on downstream waste management and national action plans. With the INC having extended its mandate beyond the originally targeted 2024 conclusion, UNEP faces the task of bridging these positions while addressing finance for developing-country implementation, just transition for waste pickers and petrochemical workers, extended producer responsibility schemes, and the regulation of trade in plastic waste under the Basel Convention.

Key players

World Health Organisation (WHO)

Implementing the Pandemic Agreement and Reforming the IHR

The COVID-19 pandemic exposed deep weaknesses in global health security: delayed information sharing, hoarding of vaccines and therapeutics, fragmented surveillance, and politicized disputes over the IHR (2005). In response, WHO Member States launched two parallel processes — amendments to the International Health Regulations and negotiation of a new pandemic instrument under an Intergovernmental Negotiating Body (INB). After missing the original 2024 deadline, the World Health Assembly adopted the WHO Pandemic Agreement in May 2025, alongside a package of targeted IHR amendments. The Agreement establishes principles on equity, prevention, One Health, and a Pathogen Access and Benefit-Sharing (PABS) system intended to link rapid sharing of pathogen samples and genomic sequences with guaranteed access to resulting vaccines, therapeutics, and diagnostics. However, the most operationally important annex — the detailed PABS mechanism — was deferred to a subsequent INB process, and several provisions on technology transfer, financing, and supply-chain transparency remain contested. Some major producer states have signaled reservations regarding voluntary versus mandatory transfer language. The Health Assembly must now move from text to implementation: standing up PABS, aligning it with the Nagoya Protocol, ensuring adequate sustainable financing through the Pandemic Fund and assessed contributions, integrating One Health surveillance with FAO and WOAH, and rebuilding trust eroded by mis- and disinformation during COVID-19. The persistent burden of mpox, cholera, H5N1 in livestock, and antimicrobial resistance underscores that the next emergency will not wait.

Key players

Human Rights Council (HRC)

Human Rights, Generative AI, and Algorithmic Accountability

The rapid diffusion of generative AI systems since 2022 has transformed the human rights landscape. Large language and multimodal models are now used in content moderation, hiring, credit and welfare decisions, predictive policing, border management, and military targeting. The OHCHR's 2021 and 2024 reports on the right to privacy in the digital age, the work of the Special Rapporteurs on freedom of expression and on extreme poverty, and the 2023 B-Tech project outputs have built a body of analysis grounding AI governance in existing instruments — the UDHR, ICCPR (especially Articles 17 and 19), ICESCR, CEDAW, CRC, and the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights. Parallel processes complicate the picture. UNESCO's 2021 Recommendation on the Ethics of AI is the most widely endorsed normative instrument; the Council of Europe's 2024 Framework Convention on AI is the first binding treaty but with limited geographic scope; the EU AI Act creates a risk-based regulatory architecture with extraterritorial effects; and the Global Digital Compact commits states to an international scientific panel and global dialogue. Civil society groups and several states have raised concerns about discriminatory training data, opaque content moderation, non-consensual intimate imagery generated by AI, surveillance exports, and the use of AI in conflict zones, including reports on automated targeting systems. The Council must consider whether to mandate a new Special Rapporteur on AI and human rights, strengthen human rights impact assessments for AI deployment, address the responsibilities of foundation-model developers under the UNGPs, regulate surveillance technology exports, and ensure that low- and middle-income states are not merely rule-takers in an AI governance architecture currently shaped by a handful of jurisdictions.

Key players