Brazil.

Brazil’s foreign policy under President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva is activist, autonomy-seeking, and explicitly multipolar: Brasília describes its line as defending multilateralism, strategic autonomy, South-South cooperation, and reform of global governance, especially the UN Security Council [Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Brazil](https://www.gov.br/mre/pt-br), [President of Brazil](https://www.gov.br/planalto/pt-br/acompanhe-o-planalto/noticias). Lula was inaugurated for his third term on 1 January 2023, and Foreign Minister Mauro Vieira returned to Itamaraty in the same administration, restoring a diplomatic style closer to Brazil’s pre-2019 tradition than to the ideological alignment with Washington seen under Jair Bolsonaro [Presidency of the Republic of Brazil](https://www.gov.br/planalto/pt-br/acompanhe-o-planalto/noticias/2023/01/luiz-inacio-lula-da-silva-toma-posse-como-presidente-da-republica-federativa-do-brasil), [Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Brazil](https://www.gov.br/mre/pt-br/assuntos/noticias/maurio-vieira-assume-o-ministerio-das-relacoes-exteriores). The decision structure matters: the presidency sets the broad line, but the foreign ministry retains unusual professional influence compared with many regional peers, so Brazilian diplomacy is often more institutionally consistent than day-to-day political rhetoric suggests [Chatham House](https://www.chathamhouse.org/2023/11/brazils-foreign-policy-under-lula), [Wilson Center](https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/brazils-return-global-stage).

Brazil’s core interests sit in a clear hierarchy. At the survival tier, it prioritizes sovereignty, non-intervention, and insulation from great-power confrontation; that is why it resists sanctions-first diplomacy and avoids military alignment blocs [Brazilian Constitution, art. 4](https://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/constituicao/constituicao.htm), [Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Brazil](https://www.gov.br/mre/pt-br/assuntos/noticias/discurso-do-ministro-das-relacoes-exteriores-mauro-vieira-na-abertura-da-78a-assembleia-geral-das-nacoes-unidas). At the economic tier, trade diversification is central: China was Brazil’s largest trading partner in 2024, while the United States remained a major market and investment source, giving Brasília a structural incentive to avoid choosing sides between them [Comex Stat](https://comexstat.mdic.gov.br/en/home), [U.S. Department of State](https://www.state.gov/u-s-relations-with-brazil/). At the status tier, Brazil wants recognition as a rule-shaping power rather than a regional middleman; that ambition drives its push for BRICS expansion, G20 activism, climate leadership around COP30 in Belém, and a permanent UNSC seat [G20 Brasil](https://www.g20.org/en), [UN Climate Change](https://unfccc.int/cop30), [Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Brazil](https://www.gov.br/mre/pt-br/assuntos/noticias/brasil-reitera-defesa-da-reforma-do-conselho-de-seguranca).

Its bilateral map is deliberately plural. China is indispensable on trade, especially soy, iron ore, and energy-linked demand, and Lula’s government has expanded political coordination with Beijing without accepting a Chinese security orbit [Comex Stat](https://comexstat.mdic.gov.br/en/home), [Government of Brazil](https://www.gov.br/planalto/pt-br/acompanhe-o-planalto/noticias/2023/04/brasil-e-china-assinam-acordos-em-visita-de-lula-a-pequim). Relations with the United States are cooperative but frictional: Brasília worked closely with Washington after the 8 January 2023 attacks on Brazilian institutions, yet it has clashed with U.S. policy on sanctions, Gaza, and now trade, with the Lula government publicly calling new U.S. tariff threats protectionist and warning of reciprocity in June 2026 [The White House](https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2023/02/10/joint-statement-from-president-joseph-r-biden-jr-and-president-luiz-inacio-lula-da-silva/), [Folha de S.Paulo](https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/mercado/2026/06/governo-lula-diz-que-ameaca-de-nova-tarifa-dos-eua-e-protecionista-e-avisa-sobre-reciprocidade.shtml). In South America, Brazil treats Mercosur as both an economic platform and a geopolitical stabilizer, but it has often frustrated Argentina and Uruguay by moving cautiously on trade opening and by prioritizing bloc cohesion over rapid liberalization [Mercosur](https://www.mercosur.int/), [BBC News Brasil](https://www.bbc.com/portuguese/articles/cxw7j4z8m35o). India and South Africa matter less in trade than in coalition-building through IBSA, BRICS, and broader Global South diplomacy [IBSA](https://www.ibsa-trilateral.org/), [BRICS Brasil](https://brics.br/en/).

At the UN, Brazil usually aligns with the broad Global South on sovereignty, development finance, Palestine, and skepticism toward coercive unilateral measures, but it does not vote as a simple anti-Western actor [UN Digital Library](https://digitallibrary.un.org/), [Security Council Report](https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/whatsinblue/2023/10/brazil-and-the-security-council-in-october.php). During its 2022–2023 term on the Security Council, Brazil condemned the territorial violation in Ukraine but also resisted the harder-edged language and isolation strategy preferred by the United States and several Europeans, consistent with Lula’s line that the war requires negotiation rather than military escalation [UN Security Council](https://press.un.org/en/2023/sc15269.doc.htm), [Reuters](https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/brazils-lula-says-us-needs-stop-encouraging-war-ukraine-2023-04-15/). The sharper divergence is Gaza. Brazil, including during its Security Council presidency in October 2023, pushed for humanitarian pauses and publicly accused Israel of disproportionate force, placing it much closer to Arab and many non-aligned positions than to Washington’s [UN Security Council](https://press.un.org/en/2023/sc15466