Italy.

Italy’s foreign policy is Atlanticist by structure, Europeanist by necessity, and increasingly nationalist in presentation under Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni’s government; the constant is that Rome treats NATO, the EU, and the transatlantic link as the backbone of its security and economic model, even when it tries to carve out tactical room on migration, China, or Middle East diplomacy [Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation](https://www.esteri.it/en/politica-estera-e-cooperazione-allo-sviluppo/), [Presidency of the Council of Ministers](https://www.governo.it/it/governo/meloni), [NATO](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/nato_countries.htm), [European Union](https://european-union.europa.eu/principles-countries-history/country-profiles/italy_en). The decision structure is parliamentary on paper but more centralized in practice: the prime minister sets the political line, the foreign ministry under Antonio Tajani manages diplomacy, and the presidency under Sergio Mattarella retains unusual influence on strategic continuity, especially on EU and NATO commitments [Presidency of the Council of Ministers](https://www.governo.it/it/governo/meloni), [Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation](https://www.esteri.it/en/ministero/ministri/il-ministro/), [President of the Italian Republic](https://www.quirinale.it/). Italy’s core interests rank clearly: survival and alliance credibility through NATO deterrence, regime and system stability through EU fiscal and institutional anchoring, economic protection through export access and energy diversification, and status through a claim to be a major Mediterranean and G7 power [NATO](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/nato_countries.htm), [European Commission](https://economy-finance.ec.europa.eu/economic-surveillance-eu-economies/italy/economic-forecast-italy_en), [G7 Italy](https://www.g7italy.it/en/).

Rome’s stated doctrine is not a single codified grand strategy document in the French style; it is a layered set of commitments expressed through government programs, MFA priorities, NATO documents, and EU strategy. The recurring themes are support for Ukraine, defense of the rules-based order, stabilization of the Mediterranean, energy security, migration control, and stronger links with Africa, especially through the government’s “Piano Mattei” framework [Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation](https://www.esteri.it/en/politica-estera-e-cooperazione-allo-sviluppo/), [Presidency of the Council of Ministers](https://www.governo.it/it/focus/piano-mattei/25485), [NATO Washington Summit Declaration](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_227678.htm). Capabilities make that agenda credible but constrained: Italy’s GDP was about $2.25 trillion in current prices in 2024 according to the World Bank, giving it major economic weight inside Europe, while NATO reports Italian defense expenditure at 1.49% of GDP in 2024, below the alliance’s 2% benchmark and therefore a persistent limit on Rome’s military leverage [World Bank](https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD?locations=IT), [NATO Defence Expenditure of NATO Countries (2014-2024)](https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2024/6/pdf/240617-def-exp-2024-en.pdf). Italy compensates with diplomatic density: it is in the UN, EU, NATO, G7, G20, OSCE, and Council of Europe, and has long used that multilateral footprint to magnify influence beyond its raw hard-power position [United Nations Digital Library](https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/209767), [European Union](https://european-union.europa.eu/principles-countries-history/country-profiles/italy_en), [NATO](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/nato_countries.htm), [G20](https://www.g20.org/en/about-g20/members/).

Its key bilateral relationships follow that hierarchy. The United States remains the indispensable security partner because Italy hosts major US and NATO facilities and treats Washington as the ultimate guarantor of European defense, even when Italian leaders seek more room for maneuver than northern European allies prefer [U.S. Department of State](https://www.state.gov/u-s-relations-with-italy/), [NATO](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/nato_countries.htm). France and Germany are essential but complicated partners: Paris is Italy’s main co-competitor and co-partner in the Mediterranean, Libya, industrial policy, and EU reform, while Berlin matters more on fiscal rules, trade, and the direction of the EU single market [Quirinale, Trattato del Quirinale](https://www.quirinale.it/page/trattato_del_quirinale), [European Council](https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/stability-growth-pact/). The United Kingdom matters above all on defense and Ukraine coordination despite Brexit, which is why Italian officials can downplay format disputes such as E3 versus E5 while still signaling that Rome wants recognition as a core European security actor [ANSA](https://www.ansa.it/english/news/politics/2026/06/09/prefer-e5-format-but-london-e3-meeting-is-no-big-deal-says-tajani_0d4b8c2f-4e31-4f4a-8e15-6c9a8a8d2f5f.html). Outside Europe, Italy has hardened toward China since joining the Belt and Road Initiative in 2019 and then formally notifying Beijing in 2023 that it would exit the memorandum, aligning more closely with G7 de-risking while avoiding open confrontation [Reuters](https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/italy-has-formally-told-china-it-is-leaving-belt-road-initiative-source-2023-12-06/), [G7 Leaders’ Communiqué, Apulia](https://www.g7italy.it/en/documenti/).

At the UN, Italy usually votes with the EU camp on Ukraine, human rights, sanctions implementation, and multilateral governance, so its broad alignment is liberal-institutionalist rather than non-aligned [UN Digital Library voting records](https://digitallibrary.un.org/), [European Union