Zambia.

Zambia’s foreign policy is transactional, debt-aware, and region-first. Under President Hakainde Hichilema, who has served as both head of state and head of government since winning the August 2021 election, Lusaka has tried to restore credibility with Western lenders and investors while preserving working ties with China and its neighbors; Foreign Minister Mulambo Haimbe took office in September 2023 after a cabinet reshuffle [Electoral Commission of Zambia](https://www.elections.org.zm/), [Presidency of Zambia](https://www.statehouse.gov.zm/), [Reuters](https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/zambia-president-reshuffles-cabinet-appoints-new-foreign-minister-2023-09-19/). The decision structure is highly presidential: State House sets the line on strategic external issues, while the Ministry of Foreign Affairs executes it, especially on SADC, AU, and UN business [Presidency of Zambia](https://www.statehouse.gov.zm/), [Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation of Zambia](https://www.mfa.gov.zm/). Zambia does not publish a sharply ideological grand strategy; its official language instead stresses peaceful coexistence, non-interference, good-neighborliness, economic diplomacy, and support for multilateralism and international law [Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation of Zambia](https://www.mfa.gov.zm/), [UN General Assembly](https://gadebate.un.org/en/78/zambia).

Its core interests stack clearly. Survival and regional security come first: Zambia is landlocked, borders eight states, and treats stability in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Mozambique, and the wider southern African corridor as a direct national interest because conflict disrupts trade routes, energy access, and border security [SADC](https://www.sadc.int/), [African Development Bank](https://www.afdb.org/en/countries/southern-africa/zambia). Regime and state capacity come next through debt restructuring and macroeconomic recovery. Zambia became the first African state to default in the COVID era in 2020, then reached a debt restructuring agreement with official creditors under the G20 Common Framework in 2023 and an agreement in principle with bondholders in 2024; that makes relations with the IMF, World Bank, Paris Club members, and China central to foreign policy, not just finance policy [IMF](https://www.imf.org/en/Countries/ZMB), [Reuters](https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/zambia-reaches-debt-restructuring-deal-with-creditors-2023-06-22/), [Reuters](https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/zambia-says-agreement-principle-restructure-13-bln-eurobonds-reached-2024-03-25/). Economic interests then center on copper, cobalt, power, and transport corridors. Mining dominates exports, so Lusaka’s diplomacy is designed to attract capital from the US, EU, Gulf states, and China while also backing projects such as the Lobito Corridor that diversify export routes away from single-channel dependence [World Bank](https://data.worldbank.org/country/zambia), [U.S. Department of State](https://www.state.gov/u-s-support-for-the-lobito-corridor/), [UNCTAD](https://unctadstat.unctad.org/CountryProfile/en-GB/index.html).

Zambia’s bilateral map is deliberately diversified. China remains indispensable because it is a major creditor, investor, and infrastructure partner, even as the Hichilema government has tilted rhetorically toward transparency, Western capital, and IMF-backed reform [Reuters](https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/china-zambia-reach-debt-deal-breakthrough-2023-10-26/), [SAIS-CARI](https://chinaafricaleader.ship.edu/countries/zambia/). The United States has gained ground through investment diplomacy, governance support, health financing, and backing for the Lobito transport corridor; Hichilema’s participation in the 2022 U.S.-Africa Leaders Summit and repeated emphasis on private-sector partnership fit that line [The White House](https://bidenwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/12/13/u-s-africa-leaders-summit/), [U.S. Department of State](https://www.state.gov/u-s-relations-with-zambia/). South Africa is a major commercial and transport partner, while Tanzania matters through the TAZARA corridor and Indian Ocean access; the DRC is economically vital because Zambian logistics and mining strategy are tied to the Central African Copperbelt [International Trade Administration](https://www.trade.gov/country-commercial-guides/zambia-market-overview), [SADC](https://www.sadc.int/member-states/zambia), [UNECA](https://repository.uneca.org/handle/10855/47535). That mix explains why Zambia avoids hard alignment. It wants Western money, Chinese financing, and regional stability at the same time.

In regional and multilateral forums, Zambia is a conventional African multilateralist with a few useful distinctions. It is active in the African Union, SADC, COMESA, the Commonwealth, the UN, and the Group of 77, and it routinely frames positions through sovereignty, development finance, climate justice, and peaceful dispute resolution [African Union](https://au.int/en/member_states), [SADC](https://www.sadc.int/member-states/zambia), [COMESA](https://www.comesa.int/), [United Nations](https://www.un.org/en/about-us/member-states/zambia). At the UN, Zambia broadly aligns with the African Group and G77 on decolonization, development, debt relief, and calls for reform of the international financial architecture [UN General Assembly](https://gadebate.un.org/en/78/zambia), [Group of 77](https://www.g77.org/doc/). On Ukraine, however, Zambia has often been closer to the sovereignty-and-territorial-integrity line advanced by Western states than some governments in southern Africa. Zambia voted in favor of the 2 March 2022 General Assembly resolution condemning Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, joining many African states but not the more Russia-sympathetic posture seen in parts of the region [UN Digital Library, ES-11/1 Roll Call](https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/3959039?ln=en). That matters because SADC is not uniform on Russia, and Zambia’s vote signaled a legalist rather than bloc-loyal reading of the war.

The most analytically useful divergence is that Zambia presents as non-aligned