What is the primary focus of IMDEC?

IMDEC primarily focuses on maritime security and defense, bringing together stakeholders to discuss challenges and solutions in the global and African maritime domains.

IMDEC - International Maritime Defence Exhibition & Conference 2027

Name: IMDEC - International Maritime Defence Exhibition & Conference 2027
Start: 2027-07-06T00:00:00Z
End: 2027-07-07T00:00:00Z
Location: Accra

Jul 6–7, 2027Accra, GhanaIn-person

Registration open

The International Maritime Defence Exhibition & Conference (IMDEC) is a significant event for stakeholders in maritime security and defense. Hosted in Accra, GHA, it brings together international and regional actors to discuss critical issues facing global and African maritime domains. The conference serves as a platform for dialogue, collaboration, and the showcasing of advanced technologies pertinent to naval defense and maritime safety.

Committees & topics

Topics
Defense and Armament: Trends in Naval Weapons Procurement · Security and Risk Management in the Maritime Domain · Shipping Engineering and the Decarbonization of Global Fleets · Port and Airport Industries: Infrastructure, Trade, and Strategic Competition · Maritime Security in Contested Waters · Naval Warfare: Doctrine and Technology in a Multipolar Era · Maritime Surveillance Systems and Domain Awareness · Unmanned Maritime Assets and the Future of Naval Autonomy

Why it matters

IMDEC addresses the growing complexities of maritime security, which are vital for global trade, resource exploitation, and geopolitical stability. The event's focus on the African maritime domain highlights the continent's strategic importance and the unique challenges it faces, including piracy, illegal fishing, and illicit trafficking. These issues have far-reaching implications, affecting not only coastal states but also international shipping and global supply chains. By fostering collaboration and sharing best practices, IMDEC contributes to the development of robust maritime defense strategies that are essential for safeguarding economic interests and regional security.

The conference provides a crucial forum for military leaders, government officials, industry experts, and technology providers to converge. This interdisciplinary gathering facilitates the exchange of ideas on emerging threats and innovative solutions. The discussions often revolve around enhancing naval capabilities, integrating surveillance technologies, and developing coordinated responses to maritime crimes. The outcomes of such deliberations can influence policy decisions and investment priorities in maritime defense, making IMDEC a key event for understanding the future trajectory of naval power and security in strategically important waters.

How to prepare

To effectively engage with the discussions at IMDEC, participants should undertake a thorough preparatory process. Begin by conducting a comprehensive stakeholder mapping exercise, as outlined in the lesson on 'what-is-stakeholder-mapping', to identify key actors, their interests, and their potential influence within the maritime defense sector. This includes understanding the motivations of naval forces, defense contractors, international organizations, and regional bodies.

Further, a 'dynamic-analysis' of current maritime threats and geopolitical shifts is essential. This involves examining recent incidents of piracy, illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing, and maritime terrorism, particularly in the Gulf of Guinea and other critical African waterways. Consider how these threats intersect with broader international security concerns and the interests of major global powers. Understanding the 'hidden-stakeholders' and their roles, as discussed in the relevant lesson, can provide a more nuanced perspective on the underlying dynamics at play. Finally, developing 'engagement-strategies' tailored to different stakeholder groups will be crucial for effective participation and achieving desired outcomes at the conference.

Country perspectives

Where the most-relevant 3 countries stand on the core issues in play. Click through for the full country profile.

Ghana

Committed to enhancing regional maritime security and combating illicit activities in its territorial waters and the wider Gulf of Guinea.

Role in topic

As the host nation, GHA plays a central role in organizing and facilitating IMDEC. It is a key proponent of regional cooperation in maritime security, actively participating in joint operations and advocating for increased international support to address issues like piracy and illegal fishing in the Gulf of Guinea. Its perspective emphasizes the need for capacity building, technology transfer, and collaborative strategies to protect its extensive coastline and vital shipping lanes.

United States

Supports international efforts to ensure freedom of navigation and combat maritime threats globally, including in African waters.

Role in topic

The USA is a significant global maritime power with substantial interests in maintaining secure sea lanes for trade and military projection. Its involvement in IMDEC would likely focus on promoting interoperability with regional navies, sharing intelligence, and offering technological solutions for maritime surveillance and defense. The USA's perspective often highlights the importance of international partnerships and adherence to international law in addressing shared maritime security challenges.

China

Expanding its maritime presence and influence globally, including through naval deployments and infrastructure investments in Africa.

Role in topic

CHN's growing economic and strategic interests necessitate secure maritime routes. Its participation in IMDEC would likely underscore its commitment to contributing to global maritime security, potentially through naval diplomacy, anti-piracy operations, and offering defense equipment and training to African nations. CHN's perspective often emphasizes win-win cooperation and mutual development in the maritime domain.

Topics & background

The background behind each topic and the actors that shape it.

Defense and Armament: Trends in Naval Weapons Procurement

Global naval armament has entered a period of rapid recapitalization, driven by renewed great-power competition, the war in Ukraine, and contested sea lines of communication in the Indo-Pacific, Red Sea, and Eastern Mediterranean. NATO members have raised defense budgets above the 2% GDP threshold, while China has commissioned the world's largest navy by hull count and is rapidly fielding new destroyers, carriers, and hypersonic anti-ship missiles. Russia, despite battlefield losses, continues to prioritize submarine and missile modernization, and middle powers from Australia to India to Turkey are investing heavily in indigenous shipbuilding and missile programs. The core dispute centers on how to balance deterrence and arms control as long-range precision strike, hypersonic glide vehicles, and loitering munitions blur the line between conventional and strategic weapons. Export controls under the Wassenaar Arrangement and the Missile Technology Control Regime are increasingly contested, with new suppliers entering markets traditionally dominated by the United States, France, and Russia. Debates over AUKUS submarine transfers and the diffusion of anti-ship missile technology illustrate how alliance politics now shape armament flows. Today the question is less whether navies will rearm than how that rearmament will be governed. Industrial base bottlenecks, particularly in munitions and shipyard capacity, have exposed the fragility of Western supply chains, while non-Western suppliers expand market share. Delegates must weigh procurement strategy against transparency, interoperability, and the risk of regional arms races.

Key players

Security and Risk Management in the Maritime Domain

Maritime risk management has become a central concern as more than 80% of global trade by volume moves by sea, and chokepoints such as the Strait of Hormuz, Bab el-Mandeb, the Suez Canal, the Strait of Malacca, and the Taiwan Strait have all seen elevated threat levels in recent years. Houthi attacks on Red Sea shipping from late 2023, the Nord Stream pipeline sabotage, undersea cable cuts in the Baltic, and recurring piracy in the Gulf of Guinea have together transformed insurance, routing, and crew-safety calculations across the industry. The risk environment combines state-backed threats, non-state actors, cyber intrusions on shipboard and port systems, and climate-related hazards. The IMO's adoption of the ISPS Code after 9/11 and subsequent guidelines on cyber risk management (MSC-FAL.1/Circ.3) provide the baseline framework, but enforcement varies widely and private actors — flag states, classification societies, P&I clubs, and security contractors — fill significant gaps. The use of dark fleets to evade sanctions on Russian and Iranian oil has further complicated regulatory oversight and accident liability. Today the debate focuses on how to integrate physical, cyber, and geopolitical risk into coherent maritime governance. Questions include the role of naval escorts versus private armed guards, information-sharing through bodies like the IMB and MSCHOA, and the responsibility of flag states for substandard vessels operating in shadow fleets.

Key players

Shipping Engineering and the Decarbonization of Global Fleets

Shipping engineering is being reshaped by the IMO's revised 2023 GHG Strategy, which targets net-zero emissions from international shipping by or around 2050, with indicative checkpoints of 20–30% reduction by 2030 and 70–80% by 2040. This has accelerated work on alternative fuels — LNG, methanol, ammonia, and hydrogen — as well as wind-assisted propulsion, air lubrication, and nuclear concepts revived by several major shipbuilders. The EU's inclusion of shipping in its Emissions Trading System and the FuelEU Maritime regulation have added regional pressure on top of global IMO rules. The core engineering disputes concern fuel availability, bunkering infrastructure, crew training under the STCW Convention, and the safety of novel propulsion systems. Ammonia's toxicity, methanol's lower energy density, and hydrogen's storage requirements each pose distinct design challenges, while classification societies such as DNV, Lloyd's Register, and ClassNK race to publish rules for new vessel types. Shipyards in South Korea, China, and Japan dominate global newbuild capacity and therefore shape which technologies achieve scale. Today the field stands at an inflection point: orderbooks for dual-fuel vessels are at record highs, yet green fuel supply remains a fraction of projected demand. Delegates must address how to align IMO market-based measures, port infrastructure investment, and shipyard capacity to avoid stranded assets and a two-tier fleet.

Key players

Port and Airport Industries: Infrastructure, Trade, and Strategic Competition

Ports and airports sit at the intersection of trade, defense, and geopolitics. Container throughput has more than tripled since 2000, with Asian ports — led by Shanghai, Singapore, Ningbo-Zhoushan, and Shenzhen — now handling the majority of global volumes. At the same time, the Belt and Road Initiative has expanded Chinese operator presence in ports from Piraeus to Hambantota to Djibouti, prompting Western responses such as the EU's Global Gateway and the US-led PGII. Airport infrastructure has followed a similar pattern, with Gulf hubs reshaping global aviation networks. The core disputes concern foreign ownership of critical infrastructure, dual-use risks, cyber resilience, and labor and environmental standards. The 2024 Baltimore Key Bridge collapse, repeated cyber incidents at major container terminals, and disruptions during the COVID-19 pandemic exposed the fragility of just-in-time logistics. Regulatory frameworks remain fragmented across the IMO, ICAO, WCO, and national security review bodies such as CFIUS and the EU FDI screening mechanism. Today's agenda centers on resilience and sovereignty: how to attract investment in port and airport modernization while safeguarding strategic autonomy, and how to align decarbonization, digitalization, and security in facilities that are simultaneously commercial enterprises and national chokepoints.

Key players

Maritime Security in Contested Waters

Maritime security has returned to the top of the international agenda after a decade in which piracy off Somalia had largely been suppressed. Since 2023, Houthi anti-ship missile and drone attacks in the Red Sea have forced major carriers to reroute around the Cape of Good Hope, adding weeks to voyages and billions in costs. In the South China Sea, China's coast guard and maritime militia continue confrontations with Philippine vessels at Second Thomas Shoal and Scarborough Shoal despite the 2016 PCA arbitral award. Piracy has resurged in the Gulf of Guinea and the Singapore Strait, and undersea cable and pipeline sabotage in the Baltic has opened a new front of grey-zone activity. The governing framework rests on UNCLOS, the SUA Convention, and regional arrangements such as the Djibouti Code of Conduct, ReCAAP, and the Yaoundé Architecture. Yet enforcement depends on national navies and ad hoc coalitions including Combined Maritime Forces, EUNAVFOR ATALANTA and ASPIDES, and Operation Prosperity Guardian. Non-signatories to UNCLOS, contested maritime claims, and the rise of dark fleets complicate enforcement. Today delegates face the question of how to deter state and non-state threats simultaneously, sustain freedom of navigation, and protect undersea infrastructure, all without sliding into uncontrolled escalation in crowded waterways.

Key players

Naval Warfare: Doctrine and Technology in a Multipolar Era

Naval warfare is undergoing its most significant doctrinal shift since the introduction of carrier aviation. The combination of long-range anti-ship missiles, hypersonic weapons, ubiquitous space-based ISR, and uncrewed systems is challenging the survivability of large surface combatants. Ukraine's success in pushing the Russian Black Sea Fleet back from Crimea using shore-based missiles and naval drones has demonstrated that even a state without a conventional navy can contest sea control. In parallel, China's anti-access/area-denial complex and the proliferation of advanced submarines have reshaped planning assumptions for US and allied forces. The doctrinal debate pits distributed maritime operations and mosaic warfare against the traditional carrier strike group model. NATO's renewed focus on the North Atlantic, AUKUS submarine cooperation, and Japan's acquisition of long-range strike capabilities all reflect adaptation to this environment. Arms control mechanisms relevant to naval forces — the New START framework for sea-based nuclear forces, INF's lapse, and tacit understandings on incidents at sea — are increasingly strained. Today the central question is how navies balance mass and exquisiteness: whether to invest in large, capable platforms or in cheaper, attritable systems, and how to integrate them under contested communications. Delegates will also consider the legal and ethical implications of increasingly automated naval combat.

Key players

Maritime Surveillance Systems and Domain Awareness

Maritime domain awareness has become the connective tissue of contemporary naval and constabulary operations. The combination of satellite-based AIS, synthetic aperture radar, radio-frequency geolocation, high-altitude long-endurance UAVs, and underwater sensor networks now enables near-persistent monitoring of the world's oceans. Commercial providers such as Planet, ICEYE, HawkEye 360, and Spire have democratized access to data once held only by major navies, and have been central to exposing dark-fleet activity, illegal fishing, and grey-zone operations near undersea cables. Governance has not kept pace with capability. AIS spoofing and disabling are widespread, particularly among sanctions-evading tankers, while integration of commercial, military, and coast guard feeds is uneven. Regional initiatives such as the Indian Ocean's IFC-IOR in Singapore and Gurugram, the Yaoundé Architecture in West Africa, and the EU's CISE seek to fuse data across jurisdictions, but interoperability and data-sharing rules remain contentious. Concerns over privacy, espionage, and the militarization of commercial constellations are growing. Today delegates must consider how to build trusted, multinational surveillance architectures that support enforcement against IUU fishing, smuggling, and grey-zone threats while respecting sovereignty and avoiding escalation in contested waters.

Key players

Unmanned Maritime Assets and the Future of Naval Autonomy

Unmanned maritime systems have moved from experimentation to operational use with remarkable speed. Ukrainian uncrewed surface vessels have struck Russian warships and infrastructure in the Black Sea, the US Navy's Task Force 59 in Bahrain has demonstrated multi-domain unmanned operations, and China has tested mothership concepts for swarms of USVs. Underwater, extra-large UUVs such as the US Orca and Russia's Poseidon, alongside a growing fleet of commercial AUVs, are reshaping anti-submarine and mine warfare. Civilian applications in offshore wind, hydrography, and scientific research are expanding in parallel. The legal status of these systems remains unsettled. UNCLOS does not clearly define whether a USV or UUV qualifies as a 'ship,' with implications for innocent passage, flag-state responsibility, and liability. The IMO's MASS Code, expected to enter into force later this decade, will provide commercial rules but does not cover warships. CCW discussions on lethal autonomous weapons systems intersect directly with armed unmanned maritime platforms, and incidents such as the 2016 seizure of a US UUV by China highlight unresolved norms. Today the agenda spans technology, doctrine, and law: how to integrate unmanned assets into fleets, how to regulate their civilian use, and how to constrain their most destabilizing military applications, particularly autonomous targeting and nuclear-armed undersea systems.

Key players