What is the primary focus of this conference?

The conference's primary focus is on modern CHN and its multifaceted interactions and influence across the Eurasian region.

When does the conference take place?

The conference is scheduled to run for two days in the fall.

VII Eurasian Research on Modern China and Eurasia Conference

Name: VII Eurasian Research on Modern China and Eurasia Conference
Start: 2026-12-04T00:00:00Z
End: 2026-12-05T00:00:00Z
Location: Yerevan

Dec 4–5, 2026Yerevan, ArmeniaIn-person

Registration open

The VII Eurasian Research on Modern China and Eurasia Conference is an academic gathering focused on the multifaceted interactions and developments within the Eurasian region, with a particular emphasis on the role and influence of CHN. Hosted in Yerevan, ARM, this conference provides a platform for scholars to present research, engage in critical discussions, and foster collaborative networks. It aims to deepen understanding of the complex geopolitical, economic, and cultural dynamics shaping this pivotal part of the world. The conference addresses a broad spectrum of topics, reflecting the intricate relationships between CHN and the diverse nations of Eurasia. Participants will explore contemporary issues, historical perspectives, and future trajectories, contributing to a comprehensive analysis of regional transformations. The event is designed to facilitate robust academic exchange, encouraging new insights and interdisciplinary approaches to studying modern CHN and its Eurasian context.

Committees & topics

Topics
Foreign Affairs and the Shifting Balance of Power in Asia · The Balance of Power in Asia · Geostrategies of Asian States · Military Capabilities and Defense Development in Asia · Artificial Intelligence and High-Tech Industries in Asian States · Transportation Infrastructure, Energy Corridors, and Oil and Gas Pipelines in Asia · Geoeconomic Interconnectivity Projects in Asia · Competition Among Great, Middle, and Small Powers in Asia

Why it matters

This conference is particularly significant given the increasing global prominence of CHN and its expanding engagement across Eurasia. The region, stretching from Eastern Europe to Central Asia, is a critical nexus for trade, security, and cultural exchange, making the study of CHN's influence here essential for understanding broader international relations. The insights generated at this event can inform policy-making, academic curricula, and public discourse on the evolving global order.

The geographic location of the conference in Yerevan, ARM, is strategically relevant. ARM, situated at the crossroads of Europe and Asia, offers a unique vantage point for examining these dynamics. The discussions will likely touch upon CHN's Belt and Road Initiative, its economic partnerships, security implications, and cultural diplomacy efforts across various Eurasian states. Understanding these interactions is crucial for assessing regional stability and the future of multilateral cooperation.

Furthermore, the conference provides an opportunity to analyze the diverse perspectives within Eurasia regarding CHN's rise. From the economic opportunities presented to potential geopolitical challenges, the range of experiences and opinions across countries like RUS, KAZ, and IRN will be vital to explore. Such detailed regional analysis is indispensable for a nuanced comprehension of CHN's global impact and the responses it elicits from different actors.

How to prepare

To effectively engage with the themes of the VII Eurasian Research on Modern China and Eurasia Conference, participants should undertake thorough preparatory work. A foundational understanding of CHN's foreign policy objectives, particularly its engagement with Eurasian countries, is paramount. This includes familiarity with key initiatives and bilateral agreements that shape CHN's regional presence.

Delegates should also familiarize themselves with the historical and contemporary geopolitical landscape of Eurasia. This involves understanding the diverse political systems, economic structures, and cultural sensitivities of countries such as ARM, RUS, KAZ, and IRN. A strong grasp of regional complexities will enable more insightful contributions to discussions and a deeper appreciation of the research presented.

Consider utilizing frameworks such as the 'power-interest grid' (see: /learn/lessons/power-interest-grid) to analyze the various stakeholders involved in CHN-Eurasia relations, including state actors, international organizations, and non-state entities. Additionally, exploring 'dynamic analysis' (see: /learn/lessons/dynamic-analysis) can help in understanding the evolving nature of these relationships over time. Preparing specific questions or points of discussion related to ongoing research in the field will also enhance the conference experience.

Country perspectives

Where the most-relevant 5 countries stand on the core issues in play. Click through for the full country profile.

Armenia

ARM serves as a host nation, providing a regional context for discussions on Eurasian dynamics.

Role in topic

As the host country, ARM offers a unique perspective from the South Caucasus, a region with historical ties to both Europe and Asia, and increasing engagement with CHN. Its position allows for insights into how CHN's influence is perceived and integrated within a diverse geopolitical landscape.

China

CHN is the central subject of the conference, with its modern role in Eurasia being the primary focus.

Role in topic

CHN is the principal actor under examination, with the conference dedicated to understanding its economic, political, and cultural footprint across Eurasia. Research will likely explore CHN's strategic initiatives, bilateral relations, and the implications of its growing power for regional stability and development.

Russia

RUS is a major Eurasian power whose relationship with CHN is a key aspect of regional dynamics.

Role in topic

RUS is a significant player in Eurasia, and its evolving relationship with CHN is a critical component of regional studies. Discussions will likely cover cooperation and competition between the two powers, particularly in Central Asia and other shared spheres of influence.

Kazakhstan

KAZ represents a key Central Asian nation with significant economic ties to CHN.

Role in topic

KAZ is a pivotal Central Asian country, serving as a major transit hub and recipient of CHN's investments, particularly under the Belt and Road Initiative. Its perspective is crucial for understanding the ground-level impacts and opportunities presented by CHN's engagement in the region.

Iran

IRN is a significant Middle Eastern and Eurasian power with developing strategic ties to CHN.

Role in topic

IRN's strategic location and its growing economic and political alignment with CHN make it an important case study within the Eurasian context. The conference may explore the implications of CHN-IRN relations for regional security and energy markets.

Topics & background

The background behind each topic and the actors that shape it.

Foreign Affairs and the Shifting Balance of Power in Asia

Asia's contemporary diplomatic landscape was shaped by the Cold War's bipolar order, the Sino-Soviet split, and the post-1991 expansion of U.S. alliances across the Indo-Pacific. China's rapid economic rise from the 1990s onward, coupled with India's growing weight and Japan's normalization debates, has transformed a once U.S.-dominated regional system into a multi-actor environment. The 2010s saw the pivot to Asia by Washington, Beijing's assertive maritime posture in the South and East China Seas, and the formalization of groupings such as the Quad and AUKUS. Today, foreign affairs in Asia revolve around managing Sino-American strategic competition while preserving room for hedging by middle powers. Flashpoints include Taiwan, the Korean Peninsula, the Line of Actual Control between India and China, and contested waters in Southeast Asia. ASEAN centrality, once a stabilizing diplomatic doctrine, is being tested by intra-bloc divergence over alignment with Beijing or Washington, while Russia's pivot east after 2022 has added another variable to regional diplomacy.

Key players

The Balance of Power in Asia

The Asian balance of power has historically oscillated between Sinocentric tributary orders, European colonial penetration, and Cold War bipolarity. The post-1945 settlement left the United States as the principal offshore balancer through bilateral hub-and-spokes alliances with Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, Thailand, and Australia. China's economic miracle and military modernization since the 1990s have eroded U.S. primacy, particularly in the western Pacific, where anti-access/area-denial capabilities now complicate American power projection. The contemporary balance is characterized by what scholars term multipolarity with bipolar overtones: China and the United States are the principal poles, but India, Japan, Russia, and an integrating ASEAN function as consequential secondary actors. Nuclear deterrence dynamics involving China, India, Pakistan, North Korea, and U.S. extended deterrence further structure stability. Debates center on whether the region is drifting toward a new cold war, a concert of powers, or a fragmented multipolar order.

Key players

Geostrategies of Asian States

Asian states have developed distinct grand strategies responding to geography, regime type, and threat perception. China's strategy emphasizes peripheral stability, control of the first and second island chains, and Eurasian connectivity through the Belt and Road Initiative launched in 2013. India pursues strategic autonomy, multi-alignment, and a Neighbourhood First doctrine, balancing partnerships with Washington, Moscow, and the Global South. Japan, under successive National Security Strategies (2013, 2022), has shifted toward counterstrike capabilities and proactive Indo-Pacific engagement. Middle and smaller powers calibrate hedging strategies: Vietnam practices bamboo diplomacy, Singapore promotes inclusive multilateralism, South Korea oscillates between alliance reinforcement and engagement with China, and Central Asian republics pursue multi-vector foreign policies among China, Russia, the EU, and Turkey. Pakistan's geostrategy remains India-centric while leveraging the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor. These overlapping strategies generate both cooperation and friction across maritime, continental, and digital domains.

Key players

Military Capabilities and Defense Development in Asia

Asia is now the world's largest regional theater of military spending, having overtaken Europe in absolute defense outlays. China's People's Liberation Army has undergone sweeping reforms since 2015, fielding a blue-water navy, expanded nuclear forces, hypersonic systems, and integrated joint commands. India is modernizing across services with a mix of Russian, French, Israeli, and indigenous platforms, while Japan announced in 2022 a near-doubling of defense spending toward 2% of GDP and acquisition of long-range strike capabilities. South Korea has become a major arms exporter, and Australia's AUKUS pact provides a path to nuclear-powered submarines. Beyond conventional buildups, nuclear modernization by China, India, Pakistan, and North Korea, alongside missile proliferation and the growing role of cyber and space capabilities, has compressed escalation timelines. Arms control architecture in the region is thin, with no binding regional regime comparable to European frameworks. Defense industrial cooperation, technology transfer restrictions, and dual-use export controls are increasingly central to alliance and partnership management.

Key players

Artificial Intelligence and High-Tech Industries in Asian States

Asia has emerged as the principal arena of global technology competition. China launched its New Generation AI Development Plan in 2017 aiming at world leadership by 2030, supported by industrial policies in semiconductors, quantum, and biotech. The United States and allies have responded with export controls — notably the October 2022 and 2023 U.S. semiconductor restrictions — targeting advanced chips and lithography equipment from firms such as ASML, alongside the CHIPS and Science Act subsidies. Taiwan, through TSMC, and South Korea, through Samsung and SK Hynix, dominate advanced node manufacturing, while Japan retains critical positions in semiconductor materials and equipment. India is building a domestic semiconductor ecosystem and has pursued global AI governance leadership through the GPAI and G20. Smaller Asian economies including Singapore, Vietnam, and Malaysia are integrating into reshuffled supply chains. Regulatory divergence on AI safety, data flows, and frontier model governance — visible in the EU AI Act, U.S. executive orders, China's generative AI rules, and the Bletchley and Seoul AI safety summits — sets the stage for contested standards-setting in Asia.

Key players

Transportation Infrastructure, Energy Corridors, and Oil and Gas Pipelines in Asia

Asia's energy and transport geography is structured by the dependence of major consumers — China, Japan, South Korea, India — on hydrocarbon imports primarily routed through the Strait of Malacca and the Indian Ocean. To diversify, China has built the Central Asia-China gas pipeline from Turkmenistan, the Power of Siberia pipeline from Russia (operational 2019, with Power of Siberia 2 under negotiation), the China-Myanmar oil and gas pipelines, and overland rail links under the Belt and Road Initiative. Russia's redirection of energy exports eastward after 2022 sanctions has accelerated Eurasian pipeline politics. Competing corridors include the International North-South Transport Corridor linking India, Iran, and Russia; the Trans-Caspian Middle Corridor connecting China to Europe via Central Asia and the South Caucasus; and the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) announced at the 2023 G20. Pipeline projects such as TAPI (Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India) remain stalled by security and financing constraints. Maritime chokepoints, Arctic routes, and LNG terminal expansion further shape strategic competition over connectivity.

Key players

Geoeconomic Interconnectivity Projects in Asia

Geoeconomic connectivity has become a central instrument of statecraft in Asia. China's Belt and Road Initiative, launched in 2013, mobilized over a trillion dollars in pledged investments across ports, railways, and digital infrastructure, generating both development gains and debt-sustainability concerns in partner states. In response, the G7 has advanced the Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment, the EU has launched Global Gateway, and the U.S., Japan, India, and Australia coordinate through the Quad. The 2023 IMEC announcement and the EU-Central Asia Investors Forum reflect attempts to offer alternatives. Regional trade architecture is similarly contested. The Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), in force since 2022, links 15 Asia-Pacific economies including China, while the CPTPP — without the United States — sets higher-standard rules and has accepted the UK with applications from China and Taiwan pending. The U.S.-led Indo-Pacific Economic Framework offers a non-tariff alternative. Connectivity competition extends to undersea cables, digital payment systems, and standards bodies, blurring lines between economics and security.

Key players

Competition Among Great, Middle, and Small Powers in Asia

Asia's strategic environment is no longer defined solely by great-power rivalry. While Sino-American competition sets the structural backdrop, middle powers — Japan, India, South Korea, Australia, Indonesia, Turkey — actively shape outcomes through coalition-building, technology partnerships, and minilateral diplomacy such as the Quad, AUKUS, and the Japan-Korea-U.S. Camp David framework launched in 2023. Smaller states from Singapore to Mongolia and Sri Lanka exercise agency through hedging, balancing access agreements, and selective participation in connectivity initiatives. This layered competition complicates traditional alignment frameworks. ASEAN states have largely rejected forced choices between Washington and Beijing, while Pacific Island states have leveraged competition to extract development commitments, as seen after the 2022 China-Solomon Islands security agreement. Central Asian republics convene C5+1 formats with the U.S., EU, China, Russia, India, and Gulf states alternately. The result is a fluid system where small-state choices over basing, ports, 5G vendors, and trade preferences can carry outsized strategic consequences.

Key players