Tshisekedi Tests Congo’s Term Limits With War as Shield
The DRC president is tying 2028 elections to peace in the east while leaving open a referendum-backed third term, shifting leverage back to the presidency.
Félix Tshisekedi is turning eastern insecurity into political leverage. In a press conference in Kinshasa, the Congolese president said he would accept a third term if “the people” wanted it, but only after a referendum, and added that elections due in 2028 may not be possible if war in the east is not ended first, according to 
BBC News Afrique and 
RFI.
What Tshisekedi is doing
The message is calibrated. Tshisekedi did not openly announce a bid to scrap term limits. He said any constitutional change would require popular consultation, and he framed the election calendar around the conflict in North and South Kivu, where the M23 rebellion has seized major ground, including Goma and Bukavu, per the BBC and 
France 24. That gives him two lines of defense: legality, through a referendum; and necessity, through security.
That matters because the presidency holds the initiative. If Tshisekedi can make the case that the east is not stable enough for a credible vote, the burden shifts to the opposition and election authorities to prove otherwise. If he can then push a constitutional review, he gains a path to remain in office without formally breaking the two-term cap.
Who gains, who loses
The immediate winner is Tshisekedi and his UDPS machine, which has been floating constitutional reform for months, according to 
DW. The president can present himself as defending national unity and territorial integrity while keeping his options open.
The losers are the opposition, the Catholic and Protestant churches, and any institution that needs to preserve the credibility of the 2028 timetable. RFI notes that church leaders have already warned against revising Article 220, the clause seen as locking in term limits. Once a president ties a vote to an unresolved war, delay becomes a political instrument, not just a logistical problem.
There is also a regional angle. Tshisekedi again blamed Rwanda for blocking progress and benefiting from Congo’s minerals, echoing the broader diplomatic blame game around the eastern war, reported by France 24 and BBC. That keeps external pressure on Kigali and sustains Kinshasa’s argument that security, not constitutional engineering, is the real obstacle.
What to watch next
The next decision point is not 2028; it is whether Tshisekedi’s camp turns rhetoric into procedure. The March bill to define how a referendum would be organized, cited by the BBC, is the first signal to watch. If that moves, the term-limit debate will shift from speculation to institutional maneuver.
Also watch the eastern front. Any progress in peace talks with Rwanda or the M23 weakens the case for postponing elections. Any setback strengthens Tshisekedi’s hand.
For the bigger political pattern, this sits squarely in 
Global Politics and the Conflict space: a leader using war to widen his room to maneuver at home.
