Where is V2 Security Copenhagen held?

The V2 Security Copenhagen conference is held in the city of Copenhagen, DNK.

What is the primary focus of V2 Security Copenhagen?

The conference focuses on critical aspects of cybersecurity, including the protection of critical information infrastructure and addressing evolving cyber threats, held in Copenhagen.

Who should attend V2 Security Copenhagen?

Professionals interested in cybersecurity, particularly those involved in securing digital infrastructure and responding to cyber threats, will find the conference in Copenhagen relevant.

V2 Security Copenhagen 2026

Name: V2 Security Copenhagen 2026
Start: 2026-05-06T00:00:00Z
End: 2026-05-06T00:00:00Z
Location: Copenhagen

May 6, 2026Copenhagen, DenmarkIn-person

Registration open

V2 Security Copenhagen is an annual conference held in Copenhagen, DNK, focusing on critical aspects of cybersecurity. The event brings together professionals to discuss and share insights on securing digital infrastructure and addressing evolving cyber threats. It serves as a platform for knowledge exchange and networking within the cybersecurity community.

Committees & topics

Topics
Cybersecurity and the Protection of Critical Infrastructure · Information Security and the Governance of the Global Information Environment

Why it matters

In an increasingly interconnected world, the security of digital systems is paramount. Events like V2 Security Copenhagen are crucial for fostering collaboration and disseminating best practices among cybersecurity experts. The discussions and presentations at this conference contribute directly to strengthening global cyber resilience, which is vital for protecting national interests, economic stability, and individual privacy.

The insights shared at V2 Security Copenhagen can inform policy-making and strategic planning in both public and private sectors. By addressing topics such as critical infrastructure protection and advanced persistent threats, the conference helps to equip organizations with the knowledge needed to defend against sophisticated cyberattacks. This proactive approach is essential for mitigating risks and ensuring the continuous operation of essential services.

How to prepare

To maximize the benefit from V2 Security Copenhagen, participants should consider engaging with the content through a lens of strategic foresight. Understanding the current threat landscape and anticipating future challenges, as discussed in sessions, is key. Participants can prepare by reviewing foundational concepts in cybersecurity and considering how new technologies and geopolitical shifts might impact security paradigms.

Delegates should also consider how the topics presented relate to broader international relations and national security frameworks. For example, understanding the implications of cyber warfare and state-sponsored attacks, even if not explicitly discussed, can provide a richer context for the technical presentations. Engaging with other attendees to discuss these broader implications can also enhance the learning experience, fostering a more holistic understanding of cybersecurity's role in global stability.

Country perspectives

Where the most-relevant 1 countries stand on the core issues in play. Click through for the full country profile.

Denmark

As the host nation, Denmark is deeply invested in advancing cybersecurity knowledge and collaboration.

Role in topic

DNK plays a significant role in facilitating international dialogue on cybersecurity, hosting this conference in Copenhagen. Its commitment to digital security is reflected in its efforts to bring together experts and foster discussions on critical infrastructure protection and emerging cyber threats. This event underscores DNK's position as a hub for technological and security innovation in Europe.

Topics & background

The background behind each topic and the actors that shape it.

Cybersecurity and the Protection of Critical Infrastructure

Cybersecurity emerged as a top-tier international security concern in the early 2000s as states, critical infrastructure operators, and private firms became dependent on networked systems. Incidents such as the 2007 attacks on Estonia, Stuxnet against Iranian nuclear facilities in 2010, the 2017 WannaCry and NotPetya campaigns, the 2020 SolarWinds compromise, and the 2021 Colonial Pipeline ransomware attack illustrated how offensive cyber operations can cause strategic-level effects without crossing traditional thresholds of armed conflict. The war in Ukraine since 2022 has further demonstrated the integration of cyber operations with conventional military campaigns, including sustained attacks on Ukrainian energy and communications infrastructure. Multilateral efforts to manage these risks have focused on the UN Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) and the Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG) on ICTs, which since 2015 have advanced eleven voluntary norms of responsible state behavior in cyberspace, including prohibitions on attacking critical infrastructure and CERTs. Despite consensus reports in 2015, 2021, and 2023, deep disagreement persists between states favoring application of existing international law (including IHL) to cyberspace and those pushing for a new binding treaty. Parallel negotiations on the UN Convention against Cybercrime, adopted by the General Assembly in 2024, exposed similar fault lines over human rights safeguards and the scope of state cooperation. Today the core dispute centers on attribution, accountability, and the militarization of cyberspace. Ransomware ecosystems, state-tolerated proxy actors, and the proliferation of commercial intrusion tools complicate deterrence, while differing visions of internet governance — an open, multi-stakeholder model versus a state-sovereignty model — shape every negotiation. Committees must weigh how to operationalize existing norms, strengthen capacity-building for developing states, and reduce the risk that a cyber incident escalates into kinetic conflict.

Key players

Information Security and the Governance of the Global Information Environment

Information security, in the UN context, has long been a contested term. Since Russia's 1998 First Committee resolution on 'Developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of international security,' a bloc of states has framed the issue broadly to include the content of information — propaganda, disinformation, and ideological subversion — while Western states have preferred the narrower term 'cybersecurity,' focused on the integrity of networks and data. This terminological divide reflects a fundamental disagreement about whether the free cross-border flow of information is a right to be protected or a threat to be managed. The issue has gained urgency with the weaponization of social media platforms, documented foreign interference in elections from 2016 onward, large-scale influence operations linked to Russia's war in Ukraine, and the rapid diffusion of generative AI tools capable of producing synthetic media at scale. The 2011 and 2015 Shanghai Cooperation Organisation drafts of an 'International Code of Conduct for Information Security' proposed obligations to curb content deemed to undermine political, economic, and social stability — language Western democracies rejected as a vehicle for censorship. Meanwhile, the EU's Digital Services Act (2022), the UK Online Safety Act (2023), and emerging AI regulations have begun to impose platform accountability domestically, even as global norms remain absent. The contemporary dispute centers on how to address foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI), deepfakes, and algorithmic amplification without legitimizing authoritarian information controls or eroding freedom of expression under ICCPR Article 19. Delegates must navigate the overlap between information security, human rights, electoral integrity, and the governance of AI-generated content, while recognizing that any multilateral instrument will be tested against very different domestic models of speech regulation.

Key players