Inside Fiji’s foreign policy.

Fiji’s foreign policy under Prime Minister Sitiveni Rabuka is a “friends to all, enemies to none” balancing strategy, but the operative shift since 2022 has been back toward tighter alignment with Australia, New Zealand, and Pacific regional institutions after the more China-open posture of the Bainimarama era Fiji Government, Fiji’s Foreign Policy White Paper Pacific Islands Forum, Members Reuters, Fiji PM says China not welcome to build Pacific policing base. Fiji is a parliamentary republic with President Ratu Wiliame Katonivere as head of state and Rabuka as head of government, and the foreign-policy file is led politically by the prime minister and cabinet, not by an autonomous military establishment despite Fiji’s history of coups Parliament of Fiji, The President Fiji Government, Prime Minister Fiji Government, Fiji’s Foreign Policy White Paper. The White Paper sets the hierarchy clearly: survival means climate security and maritime sovereignty; regime and state security mean domestic stability and a region kept free of destabilising great-power militarisation; economic interests mean tourism, remittances, trade, and climate finance; status means acting as a Pacific diplomatic hub and a voice for small island states Fiji Government, Fiji’s Foreign Policy White Paper IMF, Republic of Fiji: 2024 Article IV Consultation.

That interest pyramid explains Fiji’s bilateral map. Australia and New Zealand are Fiji’s closest security and institutional partners, and ties have deepened through policing, defence cooperation, labour mobility, and budget support after the Rabuka government restored a more openly pro-Forum regional line Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Fiji country brief New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Fiji Reuters, Fiji PM says China not welcome to build Pacific policing base. China remains important economically and diplomatically, especially through infrastructure finance and trade, but Suva has become more explicit about limiting Chinese security penetration; Rabuka said in February 2024 that Fiji would not need China to build a police or military base because Australia and New Zealand were the preferred security partners Reuters, Fiji PM says China not welcome to build Pacific policing base Fiji Government, Fiji’s Foreign Policy White Paper. India is rising in Fiji’s external relations through development finance, health, digital cooperation, and the political resonance of Fiji’s large Indo-Fijian community, while the United Kingdom remains a legacy defence and education partner through Commonwealth and historical links Indian Ministry of External Affairs, India-Fiji Relations UK Government, UK and Fiji.

Regionally, Fiji treats the Pacific Islands Forum as its primary diplomatic arena, uses the Melanesian Spearhead Group to retain influence in subregional politics, and works through AOSIS and the United Nations to push climate finance, loss-and-damage support, and ocean governance Pacific Islands Forum, Members Melanesian Spearhead Group, About MSG AOSIS, Members United Nations, Member States: Fiji. Fiji’s multilateral identity is unusually strong for its size because it has repeatedly turned peacekeeping and climate diplomacy into status assets: it has been a longstanding troop contributor to UN peacekeeping and has chaired major climate negotiations, including COP23 through its presidency in 2017 UN Peacekeeping, Fiji UNFCCC, COP23 Presidency. That matters because Fiji lacks hard-power scale; its leverage comes from agenda-setting, coalition-building among small island states, and its reputation as one of the Pacific’s most internationally networked states Fiji Government, Fiji’s Foreign Policy White Paper.

At the UN, Fiji usually aligns with the broad small-island and Global South preference for multilateralism, decolonisation, climate action, and international law, but its record is not mechanically anti-Western or anti-China United Nations Digital Library, Fiji voting records Fiji Government, Fiji’s Foreign Policy White Paper. The clearest divergence from parts of its Pacific bloc is on great-power security competition: unlike Solomon Islands, which signed a 2022 security pact with China, Fiji has publicly resisted Chinese basing and cast itself as a defender of a Pacific-led regional security architecture anchored in the Boe Declaration and the