Inside Eswatini’s foreign policy.

Eswatini’s foreign policy is conservative, monarchy-centered, and built around regime security before any wider regional project. King Mswati III remains head of state and the decisive actor in external affairs under Eswatini’s absolute-monarchical system, while Prime Minister Russell Dlamini has led government since his appointment in November 2023, replacing Cleopas Dlamini; the foreign minister is Pholile Shakantu as confirmed on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs site Government of Eswatini, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation. There is no published grand strategy comparable to larger states’ doctrine papers; in practice, policy is framed through royal speeches, the foreign ministry, and regional diplomacy, with the palace setting the hard limits on recognition, security cooperation, and responses to criticism of domestic governance Government of Eswatini, Freedom House. The interests pyramid is clear: survival and regime continuity come first, especially after the 2021 unrest and the government’s continuing emphasis on stability and public order; trade access, customs revenue, and external development finance come next; status matters mainly through sovereign recognition and the monarchy’s diplomatic space rather than ideological leadership Freedom House, World Bank, African Development Bank.

Regionally, Eswatini behaves like a small, highly dependent state seeking insulation rather than confrontation. It is a member of the African Union, SADC, SACU, COMESA, the Commonwealth, and the UN, and its economy is tightly bound to South Africa through customs revenues, transport routes, and trade flows, which sharply constrains any foreign-policy autonomy that would threaten Pretoria or the Southern African regional market African Union, SADC, SACU, UN Digital Library. South Africa is by far Eswatini’s most important bilateral partner for commerce and practical connectivity, while Mozambique matters for corridor access and neighborhood security management Observatory of Economic Complexity, World Bank. The United Kingdom remains relevant through Commonwealth ties, but Eswatini’s most distinctive bilateral relationship is with Taiwan: it is the only African state that still maintains formal diplomatic relations with Taipei, and both sides publicly reaffirmed those ties in 2024–2025 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of China (Taiwan), Government of Eswatini.

That Taiwan relationship is Eswatini’s clearest and most consequential break from its regional bloc. Most African states, including Eswatini’s immediate neighbors and the African Union as an institution, recognize the People’s Republic of China; Eswatini does not, and Beijing has repeatedly linked the absence of relations to Mbabane’s stance on Taipei Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of China (Taiwan). This is not symbolic only. It narrows Eswatini’s room inside African diplomatic consensus, limits access to Chinese state financing available elsewhere on the continent, and makes recognition policy a regime-security choice: the palace values a loyal, high-visibility partner that does not condition ties on democratization over the larger material opportunities that could come from switching to Beijing Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Freedom House. For MUN purposes, that means Eswatini will often sound regionally conventional on sovereignty, non-interference, and development, but it carries a structural divergence on China representation that can surface in procedural positioning, coalition-building, and side diplomacy.

At the UN, Eswatini generally aligns with Global South positions on development, decolonization, and sovereignty, reflecting its memberships in the African Group and G77, but its voting pattern is less activist than that of larger African states and often follows consensus language rather than agenda-shaping leadership Group of 77, United Nations Digital Library. Its public diplomacy stresses peace, dialogue, and respect for national ownership, and that language tracks the monarchy’s preference for external norms that blunt scrutiny of domestic repression Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, UN Human Rights Council, Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review: Eswatini. The gap between stated principle and behavior is most visible on governance: Eswatini endorses multilateral cooperation and AU/SADC peace language, yet resists external pressure over political freedoms at home and favors diplomatic handling over public accountability mechanisms Freedom House, Amnesty International. In practice, Eswat