Timeline
18 July 2005
Bush in Washington on , in which India committed to "identifying and separating civilian and military nuclear facilities and programs in a phased manner" in…
2 March 2006
The Plan itself was finalised during President Bush's visit to New Delhi on and was formally tabled before the Indian Parliament by the Prime Minister on 7…
7 March 2006
The Plan itself was finalised during President Bush's visit to New Delhi on 2 March 2006 and was formally tabled before the Indian Parliament by the Prime Mi…
6 September 2008
Hyde United States–India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act of 2006, the 123 Agreement of 2007, the India-specific IAEA safeguards agreement (INFCIRC/754…
1 August 2008
The IAEA Board of Governors in Vienna approved the India-specific safeguards agreement on , and the NSG, after intense plenary sessions in Vienna, granted In…
22 July 2008
The "in perpetuity versus fuel supply" linkage proved contentious during the 2007–2008 negotiations, nearly collapsing the deal when the Left parties withdre…
Positions at a glance
Supporters
Controversy attended the Plan from its inception. Domestic critics, including nuclear scientists and opposition parties, argued that voluntary safeguards constrained India's strategic autonomy and could cap future weapons production. Non-proliferation advocates in the United States countered that India's retention of the breeder programme and unsafeguarded military fuel cycle left a loophole permitting continued fissile-material production for weapons. The "in perpetuity versus fuel supply" linkage proved contentious during the 2007–2008 negotiations, nearly collapsing the deal when the Left parties withdrew support from the United Progressive Alliance government, triggering a confidence vote that Singh survived on 22 July 2008. Implementation has lagged the original phasing, and the commercial promise of large reactor imports has been hampered by the unresolved tension with India's Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Act of 2010.
Opponents
A defining feature of the Plan was India's insistence on "India-specific safeguards in perpetuity" coupled with assurances of an "uninterrupted supply" of nuclear fuel. India conditioned its acceptance of permanent safeguards on the corresponding permanence of international fuel supply, securing the right to take "corrective measures" should foreign fuel supplies be disrupted—language that was later embedded in the preamble of INFCIRC/754. India also reserved the right to build a strategic reserve of nuclear fuel to guard against any future cut-off. Military facilities, the dedicated military fuel cycle, naval propulsion reactors, and facilities associated with weapons research at the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre remained wholly outside the safeguards regime and outside any inspection.
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On 2 March 2006 in New Delhi, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and President George W. Bush finalised the Separation Plan, under which India agreed to place 14 of its 22 reactors under IAEA safeguards by 2014.
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