Lex Loci Delicti

Lex loci delicti commissi (Latin: "law of the place where the wrong was committed") is a traditional conflict-of-laws principle directing courts to apply the substantive tort law of the jurisdiction in which the injurious act took place, rather than the law of the forum (lex fori) or the parties' domicile. It long served as the default rule for cross-border torts in common-law systems.

The doctrine was systematized in the United States by the First Restatement of Conflict of Laws (1934), drafted under Joseph Beale, which treated the place of the wrong as creating a "vested right" that other jurisdictions were obliged to recognize. English courts applied a related but distinct double-actionability rule from Phillips v. Eyre (1870) until reform.

From the 1960s, lex loci delicti came under sustained criticism for producing arbitrary results when the locus was fortuitous. The landmark New York case Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473 (1963), replaced it with an "interest analysis" approach, and the Second Restatement (1971) adopted a "most significant relationship" test. Many U.S. states followed, though a minority — including Alabama, Maryland, North Carolina, Virginia, and West Virginia — still apply lex loci delicti.

The rule retains greater force outside the United States. Canada reaffirmed it in Tolofson v. Jensen, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 1022, as the governing rule for both interprovincial and international torts. In the European Union, the Rome II Regulation (Regulation (EC) No 864/2007) adopts as its general rule in Article 4(1) the law of the country in which the damage occurs (lex loci damni) — a refinement that focuses on where injury manifests rather than where the conduct happened, with exceptions for common habitual residence and manifestly closer connections.

Difficulties arise with multi-state torts, internet defamation, environmental harm, and product liability, where act and injury occur in different states.