A derivative action (or derivative suit) is a procedural device that allows one or more shareholders to sue in the name of the corporation when those who normally control it—usually the board of directors—refuse or fail to do so. Any recovery generally flows to the company, not to the suing shareholder, because the underlying claim belongs to the corporation as a legal person.
The mechanism exists primarily to police breaches of fiduciary duty: duty of care, duty of loyalty, self-dealing, waste of corporate assets, or insider trading by directors and officers. Without it, wrongdoing insiders could effectively veto any lawsuit against themselves.
Key doctrinal features vary by jurisdiction but typically include:
- Standing requirements: the plaintiff must have been a shareholder at the time of the alleged wrong (the "contemporaneous ownership" rule in U.S. practice) and must fairly represent similarly situated shareholders.
- Demand requirement: the shareholder must first ask the board to bring the suit, or plead with particularity why such a demand would be futile. Delaware's framework, articulated in Aronson v. Lewis (1984) and refined in Rales v. Blasband (1993) and United Food & Commercial Workers Union v. Zuckerberg (Del. 2021), governs demand futility for most large U.S. public companies.
- Special litigation committees: boards may appoint independent directors to evaluate whether the suit serves the corporation's interest, reviewed under standards such as Zapata v. Maldonado (Del. 1981).
- Settlement approval: courts must approve any settlement or dismissal to prevent collusive deals.
In the United Kingdom, derivative claims are now codified in sections 260–264 of the Companies Act 2006, replacing the older common-law rule in Foss v. Harbottle (1843). Civil-law jurisdictions—Germany (§148 AktG), France, Japan—have analogous but generally narrower mechanisms, often with higher shareholding thresholds.
Derivative actions are distinct from direct (or class) actions, where shareholders sue for harm to themselves, such as misleading disclosures affecting share price.
Example
In *In re Caremark International Inc. Derivative Litigation* (Del. Ch. 1996), shareholders sued Caremark's directors derivatively over compliance failures, producing the influential "Caremark duty" requiring boards to maintain adequate oversight systems.
Frequently asked questions
The corporation, not the suing shareholder, receives any monetary recovery, though the plaintiff's attorneys are typically awarded fees from that recovery.
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