Cali Fund (Digital Sequence Information)

The Cali Fund is a global benefit-sharing instrument created under the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) to channel monetary contributions arising from the commercial use of digital sequence information (DSI) on genetic resources. Its legal foundation rests in Article 1 of the CBD, which names the fair and equitable sharing of benefits from the utilization of genetic resources as a core objective, and in the Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework (GBF) adopted at COP15 in 2022, whose Target 13 commits Parties to substantially increase benefit-sharing including from DSI. The Fund was formally established by decision of the Sixteenth Conference of the Parties (COP16) held in Cali, Colombia, in late 2024 and early 2025, from which it takes its name. It addresses a gap left by the Nagoya Protocol (2010), which governs physical access to genetic material but does not squarely capture the sequenced, digitized genetic data that increasingly drives research in pharmaceuticals, agriculture, cosmetics and synthetic biology.

The operational logic of the Cali Fund is to decouple benefit-sharing from the bilateral, transaction-by-transaction model of the Nagoya Protocol and replace it with a multilateral pooled mechanism. Because DSI, once uploaded to open databases such as GenBank, the European Nucleotide Archive or the DNA Data Bank of Japan, can be downloaded and used by anyone without tracking the country of origin, COP16 opted for a system in which large commercial users contribute to a common fund rather than negotiating individual access agreements. The COP decision sets out indicative contribution rates for companies in sectors that benefit commercially from DSI: an indicative figure of one percent of profits or 0.1 percent of revenue. These rates are voluntary in the first instance, with the expectation that sectors including pharmaceuticals, nutraceuticals, cosmetics, animal and plant breeding, biotechnology, and laboratory equipment and information services would be the principal contributors.

A defining structural feature is the earmarking of disbursements. The COP16 decision specifies that at least half of the Fund's resources should be allocated to the self-identified needs of Indigenous Peoples and local communities (IPLCs), recognizing their role as custodians of biodiversity and traditional knowledge associated with genetic resources. The remainder flows to developing-country Parties to support implementation of the GBF, with priority for the least developed countries, small island developing States and countries that are megadiverse. Eligibility, governance and the precise modalities for receiving contributions were assigned to a steering structure operating under the authority of the COP, and the Fund is hosted administratively in partnership with United Nations bodies including UNEP and UNDP, with the Multi-Partner Trust Fund Office providing fiduciary services.

The Fund was launched operationally on 25 February 2025 in a ceremony associated with the resumed COP16 session held in Rome after the Cali meeting was suspended for lack of quorum on the financing package. Colombia, as COP16 president under Environment Minister Susana Muhamad, championed the mechanism, and the host-country symbolism of Cali was deliberate. Early commitments and engagement were sought from multinational firms, and the launch positioned sectors that have historically drawn on genetic databases—major pharmaceutical and seed companies headquartered in capitals from Basel to Indianapolis—as the intended contributor base. The resumed session in Rome in February 2025 also adopted the broader strategy for resource mobilization within which the Cali Fund sits.

The Cali Fund must be distinguished from the Global Biodiversity Framework Fund (GBFF), a separate financing vehicle established in 2023 under the Global Environment Facility to support GBF implementation generally; the Cali Fund is narrower, dedicated specifically to DSI benefit-sharing. It is also distinct from the Nagoya Protocol's bilateral access-and-benefit-sharing (ABS) regime, which it complements rather than replaces—physical genetic resources remain governed by access permits and mutually agreed terms, while sequence data is routed through the multilateral pool. Practitioners should further separate it from the access-and-benefit-sharing mechanism under the WHO Pandemic Influenza Preparedness Framework and from the High Seas Treaty (BBNJ) regime for marine genetic resources beyond national jurisdiction, each of which handles sequence-derived benefits under its own legal architecture.

Several controversies attend the mechanism. The voluntary character of contributions is its principal vulnerability: without binding obligations, the Fund depends on corporate goodwill and reputational pressure, and forecasts of revenue remain speculative. Defining which companies fall within scope, how "use" of DSI is measured when sequence data is ubiquitous and untraceable, and whether the one-percent and 0.1-percent benchmarks are calibrated correctly were all left for further negotiation. Industry groups have warned that overly broad triggers could burden firms that use public databases only incidentally, while developing countries and civil society have argued that voluntary rates risk underfunding the regime. The relationship between the Fund and any future move toward mandatory, treaty-based contributions remains the central open question heading into subsequent COP cycles.

For the working practitioner, the Cali Fund represents the first concrete multilateral attempt to monetize the most intangible form of genetic value—digital data—and to redirect part of that value to biodiversity stewards. Desk officers handling environment and biodiversity portfolios, particularly in megadiverse states such as India, Brazil, Colombia and Indonesia, must track its capitalization, its disbursement criteria and the IPLC allocation rule, because these determine real fiscal flows. For India specifically, the Fund intersects with the Biological Diversity Act and the National Biodiversity Authority's ABS framework, making it directly relevant to GS3 environment preparation and to negotiators positioning their states within the post-2025 biodiversity finance landscape.