Niger.

Niger’s foreign policy is now organized around regime security first and counterterrorism only on terms the junta controls. Since the July 2023 coup, General Abdourahamane Tchiani has held power as Head of State under the National Council for the Safeguard of the Homeland, with Ali Mahaman Lamine Zeine serving as prime minister, and the junta has justified its external posture through the language of sovereignty, anti-intervention, and rejection of foreign military tutelage [Encyclopaedia Britannica](https://www.britannica.com/place/Niger), [Reuters](https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/nigers-junta-names-ali-mahaman-lamine-zeine-prime-minister-2023-08-07/), [African Center for Strategic Studies](https://africacenter.org/spotlight/niger-coup-sets-back-democratic-progress-in-the-sahel/). The practical decision structure is narrow: the military leadership, not the foreign ministry or civilian institutions, sets the line on security partnerships, sanctions diplomacy, and relations with neighbors [International Crisis Group](https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/sahel/niger/after-coup-niger-what-next), [Reuters](https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/niger-junta-strips-french-troops-diplomatic-immunity-2023-10-10/). That makes Niger’s foreign policy less a conventional doctrine than a survival strategy: preserve the junta, deter external pressure, reopen trade routes, and diversify partners so no outside power can dictate terms [BTI Transformation Index](https://bti-project.org/en/reports/country-report/NER), [Atlantic Council](https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/africasource/how-a-crisis-over-a-stockpile-of-uranium-created-an-opening-for-us-reengagement-in-niger/).

Its core interests form a clear hierarchy. Survival and regime security dominate because the junta emerged from a coup, faced threats of ECOWAS intervention in 2023, and still governs amid jihadist violence linked to Islamic State Sahel Province and Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin [ECOWAS](https://www.ecowas.int/communique-final-de-la-deuxieme-reunion-extraordinaire-du-conseil-de-mediation-et-de-securite-de-la-cedeao-au-niveau-des-chefs-detat-major-de-la-defense-sur-la-situation-politique-en-republique-du-niger/), [Council on Foreign Relations](https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/violent-extremism-sahel), [International Crisis Group](https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/sahel/niger/after-coup-niger-what-next). Economic interests come next: Niger is one of the world’s largest uranium producers, and uranium exports are a central lever in relations with France, the EU, and newer suitors, while the country also depends heavily on cross-border trade corridors through Benin and Nigeria for fuel and imports [World Nuclear Association](https://world-nuclear.org/information-library/country-profiles/countries-g-n/niger), [Atlantic Council](https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/africasource/how-a-crisis-over-a-stockpile-of-uranium-created-an-opening-for-us-reengagement-in-niger/), [Reuters](https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/niger-benins-oil-exports-blocked-by-diplomatic-row-2024-06-07/). Status matters too, but mainly as an instrument: Niamey presents itself as a champion of Sahelian sovereignty and helped found the Alliance of Sahel States with Mali and Burkina Faso in 2023, later deepening the arrangement into a confederal project explicitly positioned against ECOWAS pressure [Alliance des États du Sahel](https://www.aes-sahel.org/), [Reuters](https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/mali-burkina-faso-niger-form-confederation-sahel-states-2024-07-06/).

The bilateral map has shifted sharply. France was once Niger’s main Western security partner, but the junta forced out French troops and recast Paris as a threat to sovereignty, ending the security relationship that had anchored Niger’s external alignment for a decade [Reuters](https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/france-withdraw-its-troops-niger-by-end-2023-macron-2023-09-24/), [French Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs](https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/country-files/niger/). The United States has also lost ground after the coup, including the withdrawal of US forces from Air Base 201, though recent reporting suggests both sides have explored limited reengagement driven partly by disputes over uranium and regional security access [U.S. Department of Defense](https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/3844291/statement-on-the-withdrawal-of-us-forces-from-niger/), [Atlantic Council](https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/africasource/how-a-crisis-over-a-stockpile-of-uranium-created-an-opening-for-us-reengagement-in-niger/). In their place, Niger has moved closer to Mali and Burkina Faso politically, strengthened ties with Algeria as a non-ECOWAS regional interlocutor, and signaled openness to Russia, though the Russian relationship still appears more politically useful than structurally transformative compared with Mali’s deeper dependence on Moscow-backed security support [Reuters](https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/niger-mali-burkina-faso-sign-mutual-defence-pact-2023-09-16/), [BTI Transformation Index](https://bti-project.org/en/reports/country-report/NER), [Carnegie Endowment for International Peace](https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2024/02/the-new-geopolitics-of-the-sahel). China remains important less as an ideological partner than as a capital source in oil and infrastructure, including the Niger-Benin oil export pipeline project, which gives Beijing-linked investments enduring relevance regardless of Niamey’s anti-Western rhetoric [Reuters](https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/niger-benins-oil-exports-blocked-by-diplomatic-row-2024-06-07/), [World Bank](https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/niger/overview).

Regionally and multilaterally, Niger is in a contradictory position. It is a member of the United Nations, African Union, Organisation of Islamic Cooperation, ECOWAS, and