Inside Jordan’s foreign policy.

Jordan’s foreign policy is monarchy-led, security-first, and designed to preserve regime stability by preventing regional wars from spilling across its borders. King Abdullah II remains the decisive foreign-policy actor under the constitution, while Prime Minister Jafar Hassan took office in September 2024 and Ayman Safadi has continued to anchor day-to-day diplomacy as deputy prime minister and foreign minister, which matters because Jordanian external policy is unusually centralized in the palace even when cabinets change The Constitution of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, Reuters, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Expatriates of Jordan. The doctrine is not framed in a single white paper so much as in repeated official themes: support for a two-state solution, protection of Jerusalem’s Islamic and Christian holy sites through the Hashemite custodianship, rejection of forced Palestinian displacement, border security against terrorism and narcotics trafficking, and preference for diplomacy over regional escalation Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Expatriates of Jordan, Royal Hashemite Court. In the interests pyramid, survival means keeping the Syrian and Iraqi fronts from reigniting and avoiding direct entanglement in Iran-Israel or US-Iran conflict; regime security means managing domestic anger over Gaza without rupturing ties to Washington; economic interest means protecting aid, trade corridors, and energy supplies in a country with chronic fiscal and resource constraints World Bank, IMF.

Jordan’s closest strategic relationship is with the United States, but it is not a client relationship in the simple sense often assumed. The two governments signed a 2021 Defense Cooperation Agreement ratified by Jordan in 2024, and Washington committed $1.45 billion per year in assistance for 2023–2029 under the latest memorandum of understanding, giving Amman military financing and budget support that few regional partners match U.S. Department of State, Jordan News Agency Petra. Jordan also remains deeply tied to Gulf monarchies, especially Saudi Arabia and the UAE, for investment, labor-market access, and political backing, while its peace treaty with Israel and security coordination on borders and water continue despite severe diplomatic strain over Gaza and settlement policy Council on Foreign Relations, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Expatriates of Jordan. Egypt is a key Arab coordination partner on Gaza and on the Arab Gas Pipeline framework, and Iraq matters both as an export market and as an energy partner through the Basra-Aqaba and electricity interconnection discussions World Bank, International Crisis Group.

Regionally and multilaterally, Jordan uses memberships less for ideology than for insulation and brokerage. It is active in the Arab League, the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation, and the UN, and it presents itself as a moderate Arab state that can talk to Western capitals, Gulf monarchies, the Palestinian Authority, and sometimes even adversaries when de-escalation is needed United Nations Digital Library, League of Arab States, OIC. Its diplomatic reach rests on political credibility more than hard power: the World Bank estimated Jordan’s population at 11.4 million in 2023 and the IMF put nominal GDP near $56 billion in 2024, while SIPRI estimated military expenditure at 3.5% of GDP in 2023, high by global standards but still modest compared with the scale of threats Jordan faces World Bank Data, IMF World Economic Outlook Database, SIPRI Military Expenditure Database. That combination explains Jordan’s style: it cannot coerce, so it arbitrages access, hosts mediation, and sells reliability to stronger partners.

At the UN, Jordan usually aligns with the Arab bloc on Palestine, Jerusalem, refugees, and occupation, and it has consistently backed resolutions demanding civilian protection in Gaza and defending the legal status of East Jerusalem and UNRWA’s role UN Digital Library, UN General Assembly. It also tends to support sovereignty-based positions on regional conflicts, including support for a political process in Syria while prioritizing refugee burden-sharing and border control UNHCR Jordan, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Expatriates of Jordan. The important break from bloc expectations is that Jordan does not behave like a maximalist rejectionist state: it keeps its peace treaty with Israel in force, preserves security coordination when core border interests require it, hosts US forces, and avoids aligning with Iran-backed “axis” politics even while publicly condemning Israeli military actions in Gaza U.S. Department of State, Royal Hashemite Court, Reuters. That divergence is the key to reading Amman correctly. Jordan’s rhetoric often tracks Arab consensus, but its behavior tracks a narrower hierarchy: prevent Palestinian displacement into Jordan, prevent regional escalation, preserve Western and Gulf support, and keep room to mediate.

The sharpest stress on that model comes from domestic politics. Public opinion is intensely pro-Palestinian, the economy remains burdened by unemployment, debt, and refugee pressures, and the Gaza war has made visible the gap between popular demands for harder rupture with Israel and the state’s need to preserve security arrangements and US ties