--- title: "BEDEX 2027 — Brussels | Model Diplomat" description: "BEDEX 2027 - Brussels European Defence Exhibition & Conference is a professional conference in Brussels, Belgium, Apr 12–14, 2027." url: "https://modeldiplomat.com/conferences/professional/bedex-2027-brussels-european-defence-exhibition-conference-2027" --- # BEDEX 2027 - Brussels European Defence Exhibition & Conference Apr 12–14, 2027[Brussels, Belgium](https://www.google.com/maps/search/?api=1\&query=Brussels%2C%20Belgium)In-person [Registration open](https://bedex.brussels/) The BEDEX 2027 – Brussels European Defence Exhibition & Conference is a significant event for stakeholders in European defense. Held in Brussels, BEL, the conference and exhibition serve as a platform for discussions and showcases related to the future of European security and defense capabilities. It brings together industry leaders, policymakers, and military representatives to explore advancements and strategic directions in the sector. ## Committees & topics - Topics European Defence: Rebuilding Industrial Capacity and Strategic Autonomy · European Security Architecture After the Russia–Ukraine War · Defence Innovation and Dual-Use Ecosystems · Emerging and Disruptive Technologies in Defence · Cybersecurity and Hybrid Threats to the Euro-Atlantic Area · Space Security and the Militarization of Orbit · Securing Critical Raw Materials for Defence and Energy Transition ## Why it matters This event is crucial for understanding the evolving landscape of European defense. As geopolitical dynamics shift, the need for robust and integrated defense strategies within Europe becomes increasingly apparent. The conference provides a forum for nations to align on common goals, foster collaboration, and address shared security challenges. Discussions at BEDEX often influence procurement decisions, research and development priorities, and the overall direction of defense policy across the continent. The exhibition component offers a direct view into the latest technological innovations and defense solutions. For industry, it's an opportunity to present cutting-edge products and services, while for defense ministries, it's a chance to assess options for modernizing their forces. The convergence of these elements in Brussels, a central hub for European political and economic activity, underscores the strategic importance of this gathering for the continent's security future. ## How to prepare To effectively engage with the BEDEX 2027, participants should undertake a thorough \stakeholder mapping\ exercise. Identifying key decision-makers from various European defense ministries, industry leaders, and relevant international organizations will be paramount. Understanding their priorities, existing defense capabilities, and potential areas of collaboration or competition will inform more effective \engagement strategies\. Delegates should also prepare an \dynamic analysis\ of current European defense initiatives and challenges. This includes understanding the impact of recent global events on European security doctrines and identifying emerging threats that will likely shape discussions at the conference. Consideration should also be given to \[hidden stakeholders](https://modeldiplomat.com/learn/lessons/hidden-stakeholders)\, such as non-governmental organizations or academic institutions, who may influence public opinion or policy debates surrounding defense. A comprehensive understanding of these factors will enable participants to contribute meaningfully to the discourse and advance their objectives. ## Country perspectives Where the most-relevant 5 countries stand on the core issues in play. Click through for the full country profile. [Belgium](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/belgium) [As the host nation, BEL plays a central role in facilitating European defense cooperation and showcasing its own contributions to regional security.](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/belgium) [Role in topic](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/belgium) [BEL, as the host of the event in Brussels, provides the logistical and political backdrop for discussions on European defense. Its position at the heart of European institutions means it often plays a mediating role in fostering defense collaboration among member states.](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/belgium) [France](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/france) [FRA is a leading proponent of European strategic autonomy and a major defense industrial power, advocating for stronger European defense capabilities.](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/france) [Role in topic](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/france) [FRA is a key driver of European defense initiatives, often advocating for increased European strategic autonomy and greater investment in indigenous defense capabilities. Its defense industry is a significant player, and its perspectives will heavily influence discussions on procurement and technological development.](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/france) [Germany](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/germany) [DEU is a significant economic power with a growing commitment to strengthening its defense posture and contributing to European security.](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/germany) [Role in topic](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/germany) [DEU's increasing focus on defense spending and its industrial capacity make it a crucial participant in shaping the future of European defense. Its emphasis on multilateral cooperation and technological advancement will be central to many discussions.](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/germany) [United States](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/united-states) [The USA maintains a strong interest in European security and NATO, often influencing European defense policy through alliances and technological partnerships.](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/united-states) [Role in topic](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/united-states) [While not a European nation, the USA's role in NATO and its significant defense industry mean its perspective is always relevant to European defense discussions. Its presence often shapes debates around transatlantic cooperation and burden-sharing.](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/united-states) [Poland](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/poland) [POL is a front-line state with a strong focus on enhancing its national defense and advocating for robust collective security within Europe.](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/poland) [Role in topic](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/poland) [POL, due to its geopolitical location, has a strong interest in strengthening European defense and collective security. It is a significant investor in modernizing its military and often advocates for a strong, unified European defense posture.](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/poland) ## Topics & background The background behind each topic and the actors that shape it. 1 ### European Defence: Rebuilding Industrial Capacity and Strategic Autonomy Europe's defence posture has been transformed by Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, which exposed depleted stockpiles, fragmented procurement, and overreliance on non-European suppliers. In response, the EU launched the European Peace Facility, the Act in Support of Ammunition Production (ASAP), the European Defence Industry Reinforcement through Common Procurement Act (EDIRPA), and in March 2024 the European Defence Industrial Strategy (EDIS) together with the proposed European Defence Industry Programme (EDIP). NATO's Defence Production Action Plan, adopted at the 2023 Vilnius Summit, runs in parallel, pushing allies toward the 2% of GDP floor and beyond. The core dispute is how to reconcile national sovereignty over defence procurement with the need for European-scale industrial output, and how much to privilege EU-made systems over interoperable purchases from the United States, United Kingdom, South Korea, and Israel. France has pushed hardest for a 'buy European' approach, while Germany, Poland, and the Nordic-Baltic states have favored fast off-the-shelf acquisition. As of 2025, ammunition production is scaling but still below the one-million-shells-per-year target originally set for 2024, and questions remain over financing — including the debated use of frozen Russian sovereign assets and proposals for joint EU defence borrowing. Key players - [France](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/france) [Leading advocate of European strategic autonomy and a 'buy European' industrial preference](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/france) - [Germany](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/germany) [Largest EU defence spender post-Zeitenwende, central to joint procurement and air defence](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/germany) - [Poland](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/poland) [Fastest-growing NATO defence budget and frontline procurement hub](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/poland) - [United States](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/united-states) [Dominant supplier to European militaries and NATO's principal security guarantor](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/united-states) - [United Kingdom](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/united-kingdom) [Post-Brexit defence partner via the Trinity House Agreement and AUKUS-linked industrial base](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/united-kingdom) - [Belgium](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/belgium) [Host of NATO and EU institutions; key node for transatlantic defence coordination](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/belgium) 2 ### European Security Architecture After the Russia–Ukraine War Europe's security order, built on the Helsinki Final Act (1975), the Paris Charter (1990), and the NATO–Russia Founding Act (1997), has effectively collapsed since 2022. Russia's invasion of Ukraine, the suspension of the New START dialogue, Moscow's withdrawal from the CFE Treaty, and hybrid actions across the Baltic, Sahel, and Western Balkans have driven Finland (2023) and Sweden (2024) into NATO and prompted the Strategic Compass (2022) to define the EU's first common threat assessment. The central question facing European security is what comes after the war: how to credibly deter further Russian aggression, what security guarantees can be extended to Ukraine, and how to manage spillover risks in Moldova, the South Caucasus, and the Western Balkans. Debates also encompass burden-sharing within NATO amid renewed uncertainty about the durability of US commitments, the role of nuclear deterrence (notably French and UK forces in a European context), and the management of hybrid threats — sabotage, GPS jamming, undersea cable attacks, and migration weaponization at the EU's eastern borders. Key players - [Ukraine](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/ukraine) [Frontline state whose security guarantees shape Europe's future order](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/ukraine) - [Russia](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/russia) [Revisionist power whose actions drive the current security crisis](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/russia) - [United States](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/united-states) [Principal NATO security provider, with shifting domestic political signals](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/united-states) - [France](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/france) [EU nuclear power and proponent of a European pillar within NATO](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/france) - [Germany](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/germany) [Logistical and financial anchor of European support to Ukraine](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/germany) - [Poland](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/poland) [Eastern flank leader and largest troop contributor on NATO's frontier](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/poland) 3 ### Defence Innovation and Dual-Use Ecosystems Defence innovation in Europe has historically lagged behind the United States, China, and Israel due to fragmented R\&D budgets, risk-averse procurement cycles, and limited venture capital appetite for dual-use technologies. The European Defence Fund (EDF), launched in 2021 with €7.95 billion through 2027, and the NATO Defence Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic (DIANA) together with the NATO Innovation Fund (€1 billion, 2022) were designed to close this gap by accelerating start-up engagement, dual-use research, and rapid prototyping. The Ukraine war has acted as a live laboratory, demonstrating that low-cost drones, software-defined warfare, and rapid commercial iteration can outperform legacy platforms. The core debate is how to restructure procurement for speed: shorter contracts, more SMEs, and acceptance of higher failure rates, while preserving export controls and protecting sensitive intellectual property. Tensions persist between traditional prime contractors and disruptive entrants, and between EU-only funding eligibility rules and the reality that much frontier innovation involves UK, Norwegian, US, and Israeli partners. Key players - [France](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/france) [Home to major defence primes and a growing dual-use start-up base](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/france) - [Germany](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/germany) [Industrial heavyweight pushing software-defined defence and Helsing-style firms](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/germany) - [Estonia](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/estonia) [Punches above its weight in defence software, cyber, and unmanned systems](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/estonia) - [United States](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/united-states) [Benchmark for defence venture capital and rapid acquisition pathways](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/united-states) - [Israel](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/israel) [Reference model for civil-military innovation transfer](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/israel) - [United Kingdom](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/united-kingdom) [Major non-EU partner via DIANA and bilateral innovation pacts](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/united-kingdom) 4 ### Emerging and Disruptive Technologies in Defence NATO's 2021 Emerging and Disruptive Technologies (EDT) strategy identified nine priority areas — AI, autonomy, quantum, biotech, hypersonics, space, novel materials, energetics, and human enhancement. Since then, the operational use of loitering munitions in Nagorno-Karabakh and Ukraine, the deployment of AI-enabled targeting systems, and Chinese and Russian hypersonic tests have shifted EDTs from a long-horizon concern to an immediate capability question. The EU's 2023 Roadmap on Critical Technologies for Security and Defence further tightened the link between economic security and defence technology policy. The core disputes concern governance and export control. The 2023 REAIM summits in The Hague and Seoul, the US-led Political Declaration on Responsible Military Use of AI, and ongoing CCW discussions on lethal autonomous weapons systems reveal deep divisions over whether binding rules, voluntary norms, or simply national doctrine should govern military AI. Parallel debates concern technology transfer to non-NATO partners, the protection of quantum and semiconductor supply chains, and the integration of EDTs into existing command structures without creating capability gaps among smaller allies. Key players - [United States](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/united-states) [Leader in military AI and shaper of responsible-use declarations](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/united-states) - [China](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/china) [Principal strategic competitor in AI, quantum, and hypersonics](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/china) - [France](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/france) [Architect of EU technology sovereignty agenda](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/france) - [Germany](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/germany) [Key driver of EU quantum and AI defence programs](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/germany) - [Netherlands](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/netherlands) [Hosts ASML and leads on semiconductor export-control coordination](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/netherlands) - [United Kingdom](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/united-kingdom) [AUKUS Pillar II partner on quantum, AI, and undersea capabilities](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/united-kingdom) 5 ### Cybersecurity and Hybrid Threats to the Euro-Atlantic Area Cyber operations have been a constant feature of the Russia–Ukraine war, from the Viasat KA-SAT hack on 24 February 2022 to repeated waves of wiper malware and attacks on European logistics, energy, and government networks. Beyond Russia, state-linked Chinese, Iranian, and North Korean actors target European critical infrastructure, while ransomware criminal ecosystems — many tolerated by hostile states — impose billions in annual costs. NATO recognized cyberspace as an operational domain in 2016 and reaffirmed in 2021 that cumulative cyberattacks could trigger Article 5 consideration. The EU has built a layered response: the revised NIS2 Directive (in force October 2024), the Cyber Resilience Act (2024), the Cyber Solidarity Act (2025), and the proposed Cyber Defence Policy. The UN Open-Ended Working Group on ICT continues to negotiate norms of responsible state behavior, but enforcement remains weak. Core debates concern attribution, proportionate response below the threshold of armed conflict, the role of offensive cyber capabilities within NATO, and the protection of undersea cables and energy infrastructure following incidents in the Baltic Sea in 2023–2024. Key players - [United States](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/united-states) [Anchor of allied cyber threat intelligence and offensive capability](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/united-states) - [Estonia](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/estonia) [Hosts NATO CCDCOE and pioneer of national cyber resilience](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/estonia) - [Russia](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/russia) [Primary state-linked source of disruptive cyber operations against Europe](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/russia) - [China](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/china) [Leading actor in cyber-enabled industrial espionage against EU industry](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/china) - [Belgium](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/belgium) [Hosts NATO HQ and EU institutions, frequent target of cyber intrusions](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/belgium) - [France](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/france) [Operates ANSSI, one of Europe's most capable national cyber agencies](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/france) 6 ### Space Security and the Militarization of Orbit Space has shifted from a strategic enabler to an operational domain. NATO declared space an operational domain in 2019, and the EU adopted its Space Strategy for Security and Defence in March 2023. The proliferation of dual-use mega-constellations — most visibly Starlink's role in Ukraine — alongside destructive direct-ascent ASAT tests by China (2007), the United States (2008), India (2019), and Russia (November 2021) have raised the risks of debris, miscalculation, and conflict spillover into orbit. The 1967 Outer Space Treaty remains the cornerstone of space law but does not address ASATs, rendezvous and proximity operations, or commercial dual-use assets. Negotiations on Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS) at the Conference on Disarmament remain deadlocked. A US-led non-binding moratorium on destructive direct-ascent ASAT testing, endorsed by UNGA Resolution 77/41 in December 2022, has been joined by 37 states but rejected by Russia and China. Europe is simultaneously building sovereign capacity through IRIS² (the EU's secure connectivity constellation, contracted in 2024), Galileo, and Copernicus, while debating responses to threats against commercial space services that support military operations. Key players - [United States](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/united-states) [Leading space power and architect of the ASAT testing moratorium](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/united-states) - [China](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/china) [Rapidly expanding military space program and counter-space capabilities](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/china) - [Russia](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/russia) [Demonstrated ASAT capability and reported nuclear anti-satellite programs](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/russia) - [France](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/france) [Leading European space-military power, host of CNES and Space Command](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/france) - [Germany](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/germany) [Major contributor to EU space programs and IRIS²](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/germany) - [India](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/india) [Emerging space power with demonstrated ASAT capability](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/india) 7 ### Securing Critical Raw Materials for Defence and Energy Transition Modern defence systems and the green transition depend on a narrow set of critical raw materials — rare earth elements, lithium, cobalt, nickel, gallium, germanium, and tungsten — where China dominates extraction and especially processing. China controls roughly 60% of rare earth mining and over 85% of refining; in 2023 and 2024, Beijing imposed export controls on gallium, germanium, graphite, and certain rare earth processing technologies, signaling the weaponization of supply chains. The EU adopted the Critical Raw Materials Act in 2024, setting 2030 benchmarks of 10% extraction, 40% processing, and 25% recycling within the Union, and capping single-country dependence at 65%. Parallel initiatives include the US–EU Critical Minerals Agreement negotiations, the Minerals Security Partnership (14 members plus the EU), and bilateral deals with resource-holding states across Africa, Latin America, and Central Asia. Core disputes involve environmental and Indigenous-rights standards for new European mines (notably in Sweden, Portugal, and Serbia), the financing of strategic stockpiles, the treatment of recycling versus primary extraction, and the geopolitics of resource diplomacy with the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Chile, Indonesia, and Kazakhstan. Key players - [China](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/china) [Dominant processor of critical minerals and source of export-control pressure](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/china) - [United States](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/united-states) [Partner in the Minerals Security Partnership and IRA-driven supply diversification](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/united-states) - [Germany](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/germany) [Largest EU industrial consumer driving raw materials diplomacy](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/germany) - [Sweden](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/sweden) [Holds Europe's largest known rare earth deposit at Kiruna](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/sweden) - [Democratic Republic of the Congo](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/drc) [World's leading cobalt producer, central to any diversification strategy](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/drc) - [Australia](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/australia) [Key Western-aligned producer of lithium, rare earths, and processing capacity](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/australia) ## Resources News, lessons, and country profiles to prep for BEDEX 2027 - Brussels European Defence Exhibition & Conference. Recent reporting to ground your prep [Arming an archipelago: Is time running out for Europe's oldest DMZ? | Euronews](https://modeldiplomat.com/story/ala-arming-an-archipelago-is-time-running-out-for-europes-oldest-dmz-euronews) [Comprehensive approach to security: Federal Council launches consultation on Switzerland's security policy strategy](https://modeldiplomat.com/story/che-comprehensive-approach-to-security-federal-council-launches-consultation-on) [Georgia Considers Position in New South Caucasus Transit Era - Jamestown](https://modeldiplomat.com/story/sgs-georgia-considers-position-in-new-south-caucasus-transit-era-jamestown) [North Korea's Nuclear Navy Developments](https://modeldiplomat.com/story/north-koreas-nuclear-navy-developments) Lessons Bite-sized lessons to build the basics [Hidden Stakeholders](https://modeldiplomat.com/learn/lessons/hidden-stakeholders) [Engagement Strategies](https://modeldiplomat.com/learn/lessons/engagement-strategies) [Dynamic Analysis](https://modeldiplomat.com/learn/lessons/dynamic-analysis) [Stakeholder Mapping Workshop](https://modeldiplomat.com/learn/lessons/stakeholder-workshop) Courses Guided courses that go deeper on the topic [Advanced Negotiation](https://modeldiplomat.com/learn/courses/advanced-negotiation) [Multilateral Negotiation](https://modeldiplomat.com/learn/courses/multilateral-negotiation) [Policy Brief Writing](https://modeldiplomat.com/learn/courses/policy-brief) [Conflict Resolution](https://modeldiplomat.com/learn/courses/conflict-resolution) The states in play, with the data that shapes their stance [Belgium](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/belgium) [Country dossier](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/belgium) [France](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/france) [Country dossier](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/france) [Germany](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/germany) [Country dossier](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/germany) [Poland](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/poland) [Country dossier](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/poland) [United States](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/united-states) [Country dossier](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/united-states) [United Kingdom](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/united-kingdom) [Country dossier](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/united-kingdom) [Ukraine](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/ukraine) [Country dossier](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/ukraine) [Russia](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/russia) [Country dossier](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/russia) [Estonia](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/estonia) [Country dossier](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/estonia) [Israel](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/israel) [Country dossier](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/israel) [China](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/china) [Country dossier](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/china) [Netherlands](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/netherlands) [Country dossier](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/netherlands) [India](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/india) [Country dossier](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/india) [Sweden](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/sweden) [Country dossier](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/sweden) [Democratic Republic of the Congo](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/drc) [Country dossier](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/drc) [Australia](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/australia) [Country dossier](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/australia) ## Frequently asked questions - - - Free account Save conferences, research any topic with AI, build position papers, and keep your daily prep streak — free. 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