--- title: "A Pivotal Year 2026 — Budapest | Model Diplomat" description: "A Pivotal Year: Israel, the Middle East, the US, and Europe Come 2026 is a professional conference in Budapest, Hungary, Jan 21, 2026." url: "https://modeldiplomat.com/conferences/professional/a-pivotal-year-israel-the-middle-east-the-us-and-europe-come-2026" --- # A Pivotal Year: Israel, the Middle East, the US, and Europe Come 2026 Jan 21, 2026[Budapest, Hungary](https://www.google.com/maps/search/?api=1\&query=Budapest%2C%20Hungary)In-person [Registration open](https://danubeinstitute.hu/en/events/a-pivotal-year-israel-the-middle-east-the-us-and-europe-come-2026) This conference, hosted in Budapest, HUN, will convene experts to analyze the complex geopolitical landscape involving ISR, the Middle East, USA, and Europe as it projects into 2026. The event aims to provide a comprehensive understanding of the evolving dynamics and potential shifts in international relations concerning these critical regions and actors. Participants will delve into various facets of this intricate web, offering insights into anticipated challenges and opportunities. ## Committees & topics - Topics Rebuilding a Middle East Security Architecture · The Future of the Abraham Accords · Europe's Role in the Middle East · Hungary–Israel Relations · A Central European Coalition · Mass Irregular Migration · The Fight Against Radical Islam · Bias in International Institutions ## Why it matters The interplay between ISR, the broader Middle East, USA, and Europe is a cornerstone of global stability. Understanding the trajectories of these relationships in 2026 is crucial for anticipating geopolitical shifts, economic impacts, and security implications worldwide. The region's inherent volatility, coupled with the strategic interests of major global powers, necessitates continuous analysis and foresight. Changes in any of these relationships can ripple across continents, affecting everything from energy markets to international alliances. The conference's focus on the year 2026 underscores the need for proactive engagement and strategic planning in an environment characterized by rapid change. By bringing together diverse perspectives, the event seeks to illuminate potential pathways for cooperation and mitigate risks. ## How to prepare To prepare effectively for this conference, delegates should engage in a thorough review of the current geopolitical situation in the Middle East, paying close attention to the relationships between ISR and its neighbors, as well as the broader regional power dynamics. Understanding the historical context and recent developments is paramount for grasping the complexities that will be discussed. Delegates should also familiarize themselves with the foreign policy stances of USA and major European powers towards the Middle East and ISR. This includes understanding their strategic interests, diplomatic engagements, and security concerns in the region. A strong grasp of these positions will enable more informed participation in discussions and a deeper appreciation of the challenges and opportunities presented. Consider applying frameworks such as \Dynamic Analysis\ and \What Is Stakeholder Mapping?\ to dissect the various actors and their evolving interests. Identifying \[Hidden Stakeholders](https://modeldiplomat.com/learn/lessons/hidden-stakeholders)\ and understanding their influence can provide a more nuanced perspective. Furthermore, exploring \[Engagement Strategies](https://modeldiplomat.com/learn/lessons/engagement-strategies)\ will be beneficial for understanding how different international actors interact within this complex environment. ## Country perspectives Where the most-relevant 3 countries stand on the core issues in play. Click through for the full country profile. [Hungary](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/hungary) [As the host nation, HUN provides a neutral European venue for critical geopolitical discussions, reflecting its broader interest in regional stability and international dialogue.](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/hungary) [Role in topic](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/hungary) [HUN serves as the geographical and diplomatic host for this significant conference, offering a European perspective on the complex interactions between the Middle East, USA, and Europe. Its role is primarily facilitative, providing a platform for expert analysis and discussion in Budapest.](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/hungary) [Israel](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/israel) [ISR is a central actor in Middle Eastern geopolitics, with its security and diplomatic relations being a key focus of regional and international discussions.](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/israel) [Role in topic](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/israel) [ISR's strategic position and ongoing security challenges make it a pivotal subject of discussion. Its relationships with neighboring countries, the USA, and European powers are critical to understanding regional stability and future trajectories in the Middle East.](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/israel) [United States](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/united-states) [The USA maintains significant strategic interests and influence in both the Middle East and Europe, acting as a key diplomatic and security partner.](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/united-states) [Role in topic](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/united-states) [The USA's foreign policy and security engagements are central to the geopolitical landscape of both the Middle East and Europe. Its role in mediating conflicts, supporting allies, and addressing regional threats will be a major theme in discussions concerning 2026.](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/united-states) ## Topics & background The background behind each topic and the actors that shape it. 1 ### Rebuilding a Middle East Security Architecture The Middle East has lacked a coherent regional security architecture since the collapse of the Cold War-era alignments and the unraveling of post-2003 Iraq. Successive frameworks — from the 1991 Madrid Conference's Arms Control and Regional Security working group, to the JCPOA of 2015, to various Gulf security dialogues — have failed to produce durable structures binding Israel, the Gulf states, Iran, and Turkey into a common framework. Instead, the region has been organized around competing axes: a US-aligned bloc of Israel and Gulf monarchies, an Iran-led 'Axis of Resistance' encompassing Hezbollah, Hamas, the Houthis, and Shia militias in Iraq and Syria, and a more autonomous Turkish posture. The October 7, 2023 Hamas attack and the ensuing war in Gaza, combined with direct Israel-Iran missile exchanges in 2024 and the collapse of the Assad government in late 2024, have shattered prior assumptions. Hezbollah has been significantly degraded, Iran's regional reach has contracted, and a new Syrian government under HTS-linked leadership has reordered the Levant. The US under a second Trump administration has signaled a transactional approach emphasizing burden-sharing with Gulf partners, while questions persist over the future of the Iranian nuclear program after Israeli and US strikes in 2025. The core dispute is how — and whether — to translate Iran's weakened position into a stable order: through an expanded Abraham Accords framework, a renewed nuclear arrangement, Gulf-led regional dialogue, or continued reliance on US deterrence. Saudi-Israeli normalization remains the pivotal but unresolved variable, conditioned on a credible Palestinian political horizon. Key players - [Israel](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/israel) [Central security actor seeking to consolidate post-2023 military gains](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/israel) - [Iran](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/iran) [Weakened but still pivotal challenger to US-aligned order](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/iran) - [Saudi Arabia](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/saudi-arabia) [Gatekeeper of broader normalization and Gulf security framework](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/saudi-arabia) - [United States](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/united-states) [External security guarantor recalibrating regional commitments](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/united-states) - [Turkey](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/turkey) [Independent power with growing influence in post-Assad Syria](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/turkey) - [United Arab Emirates](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/united-arab-emirates) [Architect of Gulf-Israel integration and economic connectivity](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/united-arab-emirates) 2 ### The Future of the Abraham Accords The Abraham Accords, signed in September 2020, normalized relations between Israel and the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain, with Morocco and Sudan joining shortly after. Brokered by the first Trump administration, the Accords broke a decades-long Arab consensus that recognition of Israel should follow, not precede, resolution of the Palestinian question. They quickly produced tangible economic, technological, and defense cooperation, particularly between Israel and the UAE, and were widely viewed as a stepping stone to a historic Saudi-Israeli normalization that was reportedly close in 2023. The October 7 attacks and the Gaza war placed the Accords under acute strain. Signatory governments faced domestic pressure over civilian casualties in Gaza, yet none formally withdrew, demonstrating the framework's resilience. Saudi-Israeli talks were suspended but not abandoned, with Riyadh now conditioning normalization on an irreversible pathway to Palestinian statehood. The India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC), announced at the 2023 G20, illustrated the geoeconomic logic underpinning the Accords even amid conflict. The debate today centers on whether 2026 can deliver expansion — particularly to Saudi Arabia and possibly Indonesia or post-Assad Syria — and what political concessions on Palestinian governance, reconstruction, and sovereignty would be required. A parallel question is whether the Accords can evolve from bilateral normalization deals into a genuine regional bloc with security and economic institutions. Key players - [Israel](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/israel) [Core party seeking expansion without Palestinian preconditions](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/israel) - [United Arab Emirates](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/united-arab-emirates) [Lead Arab signatory and economic anchor of the framework](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/united-arab-emirates) - [Saudi Arabia](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/saudi-arabia) [Most consequential potential entrant](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/saudi-arabia) - [United States](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/united-states) [Principal broker and security underwriter](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/united-states) - [Bahrain](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/bahrain) [Founding signatory aligning Gulf security cooperation](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/bahrain) - [Morocco](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/morocco) [North African signatory linking the Accords to the Maghreb](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/morocco) 3 ### Europe's Role in the Middle East Europe's engagement in the Middle East has historically combined commercial interest, colonial legacy, and Mediterranean security concerns. The European Union is collectively the largest trading partner of Israel and a major donor to the Palestinian Authority, UNRWA, and reconstruction efforts in Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq. Yet Europe has rarely matched its economic weight with strategic influence, ceding the lead role on security to the United States and on diplomacy to regional powers. Internal divisions — between France's more activist posture, Germany's historically pro-Israel orientation, and Central European skepticism of Brussels-led foreign policy — have repeatedly limited common positions. The Gaza war exposed and deepened these divisions. Ireland, Spain, Norway, and Slovenia recognized a Palestinian state in 2024, while Germany, Austria, Hungary, and the Czech Republic maintained strong support for Israel. France pursued an active Lebanon-focused diplomacy after the Israel-Hezbollah war, while EU sanctions debates over settler violence and arms transfers fractured along familiar lines. The ICC arrest warrant against Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu in November 2024 forced European states to take public positions on enforcement. Looking to 2026, Europe faces a strategic question: whether to consolidate around a unified policy on Israel-Palestine, Iran, and regional reconstruction, or to accept that member states will pursue divergent national approaches. Energy security after the loss of Russian gas, migration management, and counterterrorism cooperation all give Europe strong incentives for engagement, even as transatlantic coordination becomes less predictable. Key players - [Germany](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/germany) [Largest EU economy with historically firm support for Israel](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/germany) - [France](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/france) [Most active European diplomatic actor in the Levant](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/france) - [United Kingdom](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/united-kingdom) [Post-Brexit security and intelligence partner shaping Gulf policy](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/united-kingdom) - [Italy](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/italy) [Mediterranean power leading UNIFIL and migration diplomacy](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/italy) - [Spain](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/spain) [Leading voice for Palestinian recognition within the EU](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/spain) - [Hungary](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/hungary) [Central European dissenter on EU consensus toward Israel](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/hungary) 4 ### Hungary–Israel Relations Hungary and Israel have developed an unusually close partnership over the past decade, anchored by Prime Minister Viktor Orbán's strategic alignment with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. Despite Hungary's complicated WWII history and Orbán's controversial domestic rhetoric concerning financier George Soros, bilateral ties have deepened through shared positions on migration, sovereignty, and skepticism toward Brussels and progressive international institutions. Hungary moved its trade representation to Jerusalem in 2019 and has consistently blocked or watered down EU statements critical of Israel. Since October 7, 2023, Hungary has been among Israel's most steadfast European defenders. Budapest opposed the ICC arrest warrant against Netanyahu and, in April 2025, formally announced its intention to withdraw from the Rome Statute during Netanyahu's state visit to Hungary — a step taken by no other EU member. Hungary has repeatedly vetoed or diluted EU Foreign Affairs Council conclusions on Gaza and settler sanctions, leveraging its unanimity requirement to constrain collective European action. The relationship illustrates how a single member state can shape EU foreign policy, and how 'illiberal' governments find common cause with Israeli right-wing coalitions on questions of sovereignty, security, and civilizational identity. Debate centers on the sustainability of this alignment under future governments in either country, and on whether it represents a durable Central European model or an Orbán-era anomaly. Key players - [Hungary](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/hungary) [Israel's most consistent defender within EU institutions](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/hungary) - [Israel](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/israel) [Beneficiary of Hungarian vetoes and diplomatic cover in Europe](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/israel) - [United States](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/united-states) [Shared strategic partner amplifying the bilateral axis](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/united-states) - [Germany](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/germany) [Principal EU counterweight on policy coordination toward Israel](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/germany) - [Austria](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/austria) [Neighboring partner with parallel pro-Israel orientation](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/austria) 5 ### A Central European Coalition Central Europe has emerged in the 2020s as a distinct foreign-policy bloc within the EU, though its cohesion is contested. The Visegrád Four (Hungary, Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia) historically coordinated on migration, EU budget negotiations, and skepticism toward deeper integration, but Russia's invasion of Ukraine fractured this unity: Poland and the Czech Republic took hawkish anti-Moscow positions, while Hungary and, after 2023, Slovakia under Robert Fico pursued more accommodating stances. Poland's 2023 government change under Donald Tusk further reoriented Warsaw toward Brussels and away from the Orbán-led illiberal axis. On Middle East policy, Central European states have nonetheless shown notable convergence in favor of Israel and against EU recognition of Palestine. Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Austria (often grouped with Central Europe on these issues) have consistently been among Israel's strongest European supporters, citing shared concerns about radical Islam, migration, and what they view as anti-Israel bias in multilateral bodies. The Czech Republic maintains a diplomatic office in Jerusalem and was among the first to oppose the ICC warrant. The question for 2026 is whether a coherent Central European coalition can be articulated on Middle East policy — encompassing support for Israel, restrictive migration policies, and resistance to ICC and UN human-rights mechanisms — or whether national politics, especially Polish reorientation and Slovak volatility, will prevent durable bloc formation. Key players - [Hungary](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/hungary) [Ideological anchor of the illiberal-aligned grouping](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/hungary) - [Czechia](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/czechia) [Long-standing pro-Israel voice in Central Europe](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/czechia) - [Poland](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/poland) [Largest regional power, post-2023 reoriented toward Brussels](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/poland) - [Slovakia](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/slovakia) [Swing state under Fico's more sovereignty-focused government](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/slovakia) - [Austria](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/austria) [Aligned partner on migration and Middle East policy](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/austria) 6 ### Mass Irregular Migration Europe has experienced successive waves of irregular migration since the 2015 crisis, when over a million people — predominantly from Syria, Afghanistan, and Iraq — arrived via the Eastern Mediterranean and Balkan routes. The Dublin Regulation, which assigns asylum responsibility to the country of first entry, has proved inadequate, and EU efforts at burden-sharing through mandatory relocation quotas collapsed under opposition led by Hungary and Poland. Subsequent agreements with Turkey (2016) and Libya effectively externalized border control, drawing humanitarian criticism but reducing arrivals. The Central Mediterranean route reactivated after 2020, and the Russia-Belarus 'hybrid warfare' weaponization of migrants on the Polish and Baltic borders in 2021 introduced a security framing. The Gaza war, regional instability in Lebanon and Syria, and the Sudanese civil war have created new displacement pressures, while Sahel coups have disrupted European cooperation with transit states like Niger and Mali. The EU's New Pact on Migration and Asylum, adopted in 2024, introduced mandatory solidarity mechanisms but remains contested. The debate now combines humanitarian, demographic, security, and identity dimensions. Central and Eastern European governments frame migration as an existential and civilizational threat tied to radical Islam, while Mediterranean states demand greater EU solidarity, and Northern European states tighten previously liberal asylum regimes. The link between Middle East stability and European migration flows makes this a core issue for transatlantic and EU-Middle East relations in 2026. Key players - [Italy](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/italy) [Frontline state driving externalization deals with North Africa](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/italy) - [Germany](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/germany) [Largest destination country reshaping asylum policy](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/germany) - [Hungary](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/hungary) [Architect of border-fence model and opponent of EU relocation](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/hungary) - [Turkey](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/turkey) [Key transit state holding leverage over EU through 2016 deal](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/turkey) - [Greece](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/greece) [Eastern Mediterranean gateway for Aegean arrivals](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/greece) - [Libya](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/libya) [Principal departure hub on the Central Mediterranean route](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/libya) 7 ### The Fight Against Radical Islam Counterterrorism against jihadist movements has been a defining feature of Western and Middle Eastern security policy since 9/11. The campaign evolved from the post-2001 war in Afghanistan and the 2003 Iraq war, through the rise of the Islamic State in 2014 and its territorial defeat by the US-led coalition in 2019, to a more dispersed phase characterized by ISIS affiliates in the Sahel (ISIS-Sahel), Afghanistan (ISIS-K), and Mozambique, alongside an Al-Qaeda network that retains capability in Yemen, Somalia, and the Sahel. The 2021 Taliban return to power in Kabul reshuffled the landscape. The Gaza war revived debate over Hamas, Hezbollah, and other Islamist movements categorized variously as terrorist organizations, resistance movements, or political actors. ISIS-K's March 2024 Moscow Crocus City Hall attack and several disrupted plots in Europe reminded policymakers that the threat persists. In Europe, the discussion increasingly fuses external counterterrorism with domestic concerns over radicalization, integration of Muslim communities, and political Islam — particularly Muslim Brotherhood-linked networks — with France, Austria, and Germany pursuing more assertive policies on 'political Islam' or 'separatism.' The central tensions are how to balance security with civil liberties and religious freedom, how to distinguish religious conservatism from extremism, and how to coordinate with Middle Eastern partners — including Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Egypt — whose own definitions of radical Islam often encompass political opposition. Israeli, Indian, and Central European governments increasingly converge on a broad framing that links domestic policy, migration, and foreign policy. Key players - [United States](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/united-states) [Lead counterterrorism actor with global posture under review](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/united-states) - [France](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/france) [European leader on counter-jihadist policy and 'separatism' laws](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/france) - [Israel](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/israel) [Frontline state against Hamas, Hezbollah, and regional Islamist networks](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/israel) - [Saudi Arabia](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/saudi-arabia) [Influential Sunni power leading deradicalization and reform efforts](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/saudi-arabia) - [Egypt](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/egypt) [Key partner suppressing Muslim Brotherhood and Sinai insurgents](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/egypt) - [United Arab Emirates](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/united-arab-emirates) [Strong proponent of confronting political Islam regionally](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/united-arab-emirates) 8 ### Bias in International Institutions Critiques of bias in international institutions long predate the current moment, but have sharpened around several flashpoints: the UN Human Rights Council's standing Agenda Item 7 dedicated to Israel; the disproportionate volume of UN General Assembly resolutions concerning Israel relative to other conflicts; UNRWA's mandate and conduct, particularly after Israeli allegations in early 2024 that some staff participated in the October 7 attacks; and the roles of the International Criminal Court and International Court of Justice in the Gaza war. South Africa's ICJ genocide case against Israel and the ICC arrest warrants against Israeli and Hamas leaders in November 2024 brought these institutions into the political spotlight. Defenders argue that international institutions apply universal standards and that Israel's prominence reflects ongoing occupation and the volume of unresolved Security Council resolutions. Critics — including the United States, Israel, Hungary, Argentina, and increasingly some Central European and Gulf states — contend that institutional outputs reflect bloc voting (notably the OIC and Non-Aligned Movement), structural double standards, and the capture of human rights mechanisms by authoritarian states. The 2025 US withdrawal from the UN Human Rights Council and reduction of funding to several UN agencies has intensified the debate. The practical question for 2026 is whether reform is possible from within — through procedural changes, funding leverage, and coalition-building — or whether parallel institutions and bilateral mechanisms will increasingly substitute for multilateral bodies viewed as compromised. The legitimacy and universality of the post-1945 order is genuinely at stake. Key players - [United States](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/united-states) [Principal funder and critic reshaping engagement with UN bodies](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/united-states) - [Israel](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/israel) [Central subject of institutional scrutiny and reform demands](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/israel) - [Hungary](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/hungary) [Vocal European critic, withdrawing from the Rome Statute](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/hungary) - [South Africa](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/south-africa) [Lead petitioner at the ICJ and voice of the Global South framing](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/south-africa) - [China](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/china) [Rising shaper of UN human-rights and development discourse](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/china) - [Russia](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/russia) [Permanent member resisting Western-led institutional norms](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/russia) ## Resources News, lessons, and country profiles to prep for A Pivotal Year: Israel, the Middle East, the US, and Europe Come 2026. Recent reporting to ground your prep [China's New Strategy for Taiwan and Japan](https://modeldiplomat.com/story/china-adjusts-taiwan-and-japan-strategy-amid-middle-east-crisis) [Arming an archipelago: Is time running out for Europe's oldest DMZ? | Euronews](https://modeldiplomat.com/story/ala-arming-an-archipelago-is-time-running-out-for-europes-oldest-dmz-euronews) [Comprehensive approach to security: Federal Council launches consultation on Switzerland's security policy strategy](https://modeldiplomat.com/story/che-comprehensive-approach-to-security-federal-council-launches-consultation-on) [Europe's June Heatwave: Infrastructure Crisis](https://modeldiplomat.com/story/europes-june-heatwave-infrastructure-crisis) Lessons Bite-sized lessons to build the basics [Hidden Stakeholders](https://modeldiplomat.com/learn/lessons/hidden-stakeholders) [Engagement Strategies](https://modeldiplomat.com/learn/lessons/engagement-strategies) [Dynamic Analysis](https://modeldiplomat.com/learn/lessons/dynamic-analysis) [Stakeholder Mapping Workshop](https://modeldiplomat.com/learn/lessons/stakeholder-workshop) Courses Guided courses that go deeper on the topic [Media & Press Relations](https://modeldiplomat.com/learn/courses/media-press) [Advanced Negotiation](https://modeldiplomat.com/learn/courses/advanced-negotiation) [Multilateral Negotiation](https://modeldiplomat.com/learn/courses/multilateral-negotiation) [Policy Brief Writing](https://modeldiplomat.com/learn/courses/policy-brief) The states in play, with the data that shapes their stance [Hungary](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/hungary) [Country dossier](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/hungary) [Israel](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/israel) [Country dossier](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/israel) [Iran](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/iran) [Country dossier](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/iran) [Saudi Arabia](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/saudi-arabia) [Country dossier](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/saudi-arabia) [United States](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/united-states) [Country dossier](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/united-states) [Turkey](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/turkey) [Country dossier](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/turkey) [United Arab Emirates](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/united-arab-emirates) [Country dossier](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/united-arab-emirates) [Bahrain](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/bahrain) [Country dossier](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/bahrain) [Morocco](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/morocco) [Country dossier](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/morocco) [Germany](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/germany) [Country dossier](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/germany) [France](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/france) [Country dossier](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/france) [United Kingdom](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/united-kingdom) [Country dossier](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/united-kingdom) [Italy](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/italy) [Country dossier](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/italy) [Spain](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/spain) [Country dossier](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/spain) [Austria](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/austria) [Country dossier](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/austria) [Czechia](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/czechia) [Country dossier](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/czechia) [Poland](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/poland) [Country dossier](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/poland) [Slovakia](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/slovakia) [Country dossier](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/slovakia) [Greece](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/greece) [Country dossier](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/greece) [Libya](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/libya) [Country dossier](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/libya) [Egypt](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/egypt) [Country dossier](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/egypt) [South Africa](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/south-africa) [Country dossier](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/south-africa) [China](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/china) [Country dossier](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/china) [Russia](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/russia) [Country dossier](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/russia) ## Frequently asked questions - - Free account Save conferences, research any topic with AI, build position papers, and keep your daily prep streak — free. [Create free account](https://modeldiplomat.com/sign-up?next=%2Fconferences%2Fprofessional%2Fa-pivotal-year-israel-the-middle-east-the-us-and-europe-come-2026) Already a member? [Log in](https://modeldiplomat.com/sign-in?next=%2Fconferences%2Fprofessional%2Fa-pivotal-year-israel-the-middle-east-the-us-and-europe-come-2026) Free account Save conferences, research any topic with AI, build position papers, and keep your daily prep streak — free. [Create free account](https://modeldiplomat.com/sign-up?next=%2Fconferences%2Fprofessional%2Fa-pivotal-year-israel-the-middle-east-the-us-and-europe-come-2026) Already a member? [Log in](https://modeldiplomat.com/sign-in?next=%2Fconferences%2Fprofessional%2Fa-pivotal-year-israel-the-middle-east-the-us-and-europe-come-2026)