---
title: "ISODARCO Course 2027 — Andalo (Trento) | Model Diplomat"
description: "65th ISODARCO Course – ISODARCO 2027 Winter Course is a professional conference in Andalo (Trento), Italy, Jan 10–17, 2027."
url: "https://modeldiplomat.com/conferences/professional/65th-isodarco-course-isodarco-2027-winter-course-2027"
---

# 65th ISODARCO Course – ISODARCO 2027 Winter Course

Jan 10–17, 2027[Andalo (Trento), Italy](https://www.google.com/maps/search/?api=1\&query=Andalo%20\(Trento\)%2C%20Italy)In-person

[Registration open](https://www.isodarco.it/65th-isodarco-course/)

The 65th ISODARCO Winter Course, held in Andalo (Trento), ITA, offers an intensive program focused on critical issues in arms control and international security. This event brings together experts and participants from around the globe to engage in discussions and analyses of contemporary challenges in the field. The course structure is designed to foster deep understanding and collaborative problem-solving, reflecting the complex nature of global security. Participants will delve into topics ranging from nuclear disarmament to emerging security threats, benefiting from a format that encourages interaction and diverse perspectives. The setting in Andalo (Trento), ITA, provides a conducive environment for focused study and networking among professionals dedicated to peace and security.

## Committees & topics

- Topics

  Nuclear Dynamics in a Multipolar Order · Political Extremism and Security · Nuclear Strategy and Deterrence Doctrine · Nuclear Proliferation Pressures · Disarmament after the Bilateral Era · Strategic Stability in a Three-Body Problem · Disruptive Technologies and Strategic Risk · Domestic Politics of Nuclear and Security Policy

## Why it matters

This course is particularly relevant in the current geopolitical climate, where traditional arms control frameworks are under increasing strain and new technologies introduce unprecedented challenges to global stability. The discussions at ISODARCO contribute to a more informed understanding of these dynamics, which is crucial for effective policy-making and diplomatic engagement. By convening a diverse group of stakeholders, the course facilitates the exchange of ideas that can lead to innovative approaches to conflict prevention and resolution.

The emphasis on both established and emerging threats underscores the comprehensive nature of the program. From the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to the implications of cyber warfare, the topics covered are central to maintaining international peace and security. The insights gained and connections made at this course can significantly impact future efforts to mitigate risks and build a more secure world. The neutral setting in Andalo (Trento), ITA, further enhances the ability of participants to engage in frank and productive dialogue, free from the immediate pressures often associated with more politically charged venues.

## How to prepare

To maximize the benefit from the ISODARCO Winter Course, participants should prepare by familiarizing themselves with foundational concepts in arms control and international relations. Reviewing key treaties, historical disarmament efforts, and current geopolitical flashpoints will provide a solid basis for engaging with the course material. Understanding the nuances of different countries' security doctrines, particularly those of major powers like USA, RUS, and CHN, will be beneficial.

Consider exploring the concept of \<a href="/learn/lessons/engagement-strategies">[Engagement Strategies](https://modeldiplomat.com/learn/lessons/engagement-strategies)\</a> to better understand how various states approach international security dialogues. Additionally, a grasp of \<a href="/learn/lessons/dynamic-analysis">Dynamic Analysis\</a> can help in evaluating the evolving nature of threats and responses. Participants might also find it useful to research the specific security challenges faced by nations like PRK, IND, and PAK, as these often feature prominently in discussions on proliferation and regional stability. Reflecting on the role of non-state actors and emerging technologies in shaping the security landscape will also enhance preparedness for the course's advanced discussions.

## Country perspectives

Where the most-relevant 6 countries stand on the core issues in play. Click through for the full country profile.

[United States](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/united-states)

[Advocates for non-proliferation and strategic arms reduction, often emphasizing verifiable treaties and international cooperation.](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/united-states)

[Role in topic](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/united-states)

[As a major nuclear power, USA plays a central role in arms control negotiations and setting international norms. Its policies significantly influence global security architecture.](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/united-states)

[Russia](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/russia)

[Emphasizes strategic stability and often views arms control through the lens of its own security interests and geopolitical standing.](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/russia)

[Role in topic](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/russia)

[Another key nuclear power, RUS is a critical actor in bilateral and multilateral arms control agreements, particularly concerning strategic weapons.](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/russia)

[China](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/china)

[Maintains a 'no first use' policy and generally supports disarmament while modernizing its own nuclear capabilities.](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/china)

[Role in topic](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/china)

[CHN's growing military and economic influence makes its stance on arms control increasingly important for regional and global stability.](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/china)

[North Korea](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/north-korea)

[Pursues nuclear weapons development as a deterrent, often leading to international condemnation and sanctions.](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/north-korea)

[Role in topic](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/north-korea)

[PRK's nuclear program is a significant proliferation concern and a major topic in discussions about regional security in Northeast Asia.](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/north-korea)

[India](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/india)

[Possesses nuclear weapons and maintains a 'no first use' policy, but is not a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/india)

[Role in topic](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/india)

[IND's status as a nuclear power outside the NPT framework presents unique challenges and considerations for global arms control efforts.](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/india)

[Pakistan](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/pakistan)

[Possesses nuclear weapons as a deterrent against regional threats, also not a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/pakistan)

[Role in topic](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/pakistan)

[PAK's nuclear arsenal and its regional security dynamics are a frequent subject in discussions on proliferation and strategic stability in South Asia.](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/pakistan)

## Topics & background

The background behind each topic and the actors that shape it.

1

### Nuclear Dynamics in a Multipolar Order

The contemporary nuclear landscape has shifted decisively from the bipolar US–Soviet rivalry of the Cold War to a more complex multipolar configuration. The collapse of the INF Treaty in 2019, the lapse of Open Skies, and uncertainty over the future of New START (set to expire in February 2026) have dismantled much of the bilateral arms control architecture that stabilized US–Russian relations for decades. Simultaneously, China's ongoing expansion of its nuclear arsenal — including new ICBM silo fields in its western deserts — has introduced a genuine three-way nuclear dynamic for which no existing arms control framework was designed. Regional nuclear dynamics have intensified in parallel. North Korea has institutionalized its arsenal through doctrine and law, India and Pakistan continue to modernize, and Israel's undeclared capability remains a fixture of Middle Eastern security calculations. Russia's nuclear signaling during the war in Ukraine, including the suspension of New START participation and deployment of tactical weapons to Belarus, has further normalized nuclear coercion as an instrument of statecraft. Together these trends raise fundamental questions about how nuclear-armed states will manage risk, communication, and escalation in the years ahead.

Key players

- [United States](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/united-states)

  [Largest deployed arsenal; anchor of NATO extended deterrence and bilateral arms control with Russia.](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/united-states)
- [Russia](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/russia)

  [Co-equal nuclear superpower; suspended New START participation and uses nuclear signaling in Ukraine.](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/russia)
- [China](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/china)

  [Rapidly expanding arsenal, transforming the strategic balance into a three-way problem.](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/china)
- [North Korea](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/north-korea)

  [Codified nuclear-weapon-state status; tests delivery systems and refuses denuclearization.](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/north-korea)
- [India](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/india)

  [Modernizing triad balancing both Pakistan and China.](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/india)
- [Pakistan](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/pakistan)

  [Expanding tactical nuclear capabilities to offset Indian conventional superiority.](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/pakistan)

2

### Political Extremism and Security

Political extremism — encompassing violent jihadism, far-right and far-left movements, ethnonationalist insurgencies, and accelerationist networks — has evolved substantially since the post-9/11 era of state-led counterterrorism. While the territorial defeat of the Islamic State in 2019 reduced one form of mass-casualty threat, affiliates in the Sahel, Afghanistan (ISKP), and Southeast Asia have grown. At the same time, Western intelligence services since roughly 2017 have flagged transnational right-wing extremism — including white-supremacist and neo-Nazi networks — as a rising terrorist threat, with attacks in Christchurch, El Paso, Halle, and Buffalo illustrating the pattern. The digital environment has reshaped recruitment and radicalization. Encrypted messaging, gaming platforms, and algorithmic amplification on mainstream social media have lowered the threshold for self-radicalization and enabled stochastic, leaderless violence. The Russian invasion of Ukraine has also created a battlefield drawing foreign volunteers from both far-right and far-left milieus, raising future blowback concerns reminiscent of Afghanistan in the 1980s. Governments now confront the dual challenge of protecting civil liberties and free expression while disrupting networks that increasingly blur the line between online subculture, organized politics, and political violence.

Key players

- [United States](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/united-states)

  [Confronts domestic violent extremism alongside global CT operations; major influence on platform regulation.](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/united-states)
- [Germany](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/germany)

  [Leading European response to far-right networks within state institutions and the Reichsbürger milieu.](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/germany)
- [France](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/france)

  [Targeted by jihadist attacks and active in Sahel counterterrorism.](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/france)
- [Russia](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/russia)

  [State sponsor of extremist proxies abroad while criminalizing domestic opposition as 'extremist'.](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/russia)
- [Afghanistan](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/afghanistan)

  [Taliban-controlled territory hosting al-Qaeda remnants and contested by ISKP.](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/afghanistan)
- [Nigeria](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/nigeria)

  [Frontline state against Boko Haram and ISWAP in the Lake Chad Basin.](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/nigeria)

3

### Nuclear Strategy and Deterrence Doctrine

Nuclear strategy has returned to the center of great-power planning after a post-Cold War period in which many analysts considered it a legacy concern. The United States' 2022 Nuclear Posture Review reaffirmed the centrality of nuclear deterrence while declining to adopt no-first-use; Russia revised its deterrence doctrine in November 2024 to lower the threshold for nuclear use, including in response to conventional attacks backed by nuclear powers. China, historically committed to minimum deterrence and no-first-use, is widely assessed to be moving toward a launch-on-warning posture as its arsenal grows, though Beijing publicly maintains its longstanding pledges. Doctrinal innovation is occurring alongside arsenal modernization. Debates over the integration of conventional and nuclear operations, the role of low-yield weapons, the credibility of extended deterrence in Europe and East Asia, and the implications of missile defense and conventional precision strike for first-strike stability are all active. Allied capitals from Warsaw to Seoul are increasingly questioning whether the US extended deterrent will remain robust, fueling renewed discussion of nuclear sharing, indigenous capabilities, or hedging strategies.

Key players

- [United States](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/united-states)

  [Provides extended deterrence to NATO and East Asian allies; under pressure to adapt to a two-peer environment.](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/united-states)
- [Russia](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/russia)

  [Lowered nuclear-use thresholds in 2024 doctrine; integrates nuclear signaling with conventional war.](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/russia)
- [China](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/china)

  [Doctrinal evolution accompanies arsenal growth; ambiguity over no-first-use credibility.](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/china)
- [France](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/france)

  [Independent deterrent with an explicit European dimension to its declaratory policy.](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/france)
- [United Kingdom](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/united-kingdom)

  [Continuous-at-sea deterrent committed to NATO; modernizing Dreadnought-class SSBNs.](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/united-kingdom)
- [North Korea](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/north-korea)

  [Doctrine of preemptive use codified in 2022 law shapes Northeast Asian deterrence calculations.](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/north-korea)

4

### Nuclear Proliferation Pressures

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, in force since 1970, remains the cornerstone of the global nonproliferation regime but faces compounding strains. Iran's nuclear program advanced significantly after the 2018 US withdrawal from the JCPOA, with the IAEA reporting uranium enrichment up to 60% — a short technical step from weapons-grade. North Korea's continued nuclear and missile testing, its codification of nuclear doctrine in 2022, and its deepening military relationship with Russia have effectively ended any near-term denuclearization prospect. The 2022 and 2026 NPT Review Conferences have struggled to produce consensus outcomes, exposing deep divisions over disarmament obligations. Proliferation pressure is also visible in latent or hedging behavior. South Korean polling consistently shows majority public support for an indigenous arsenal; Saudi officials have linked their nuclear posture to Iran's; and Poland and others have floated nuclear-sharing arrangements. The AUKUS naval nuclear propulsion arrangement, while not a weapons program, has provoked debate about the precedent of transferring highly enriched uranium-fueled reactors to a non-nuclear-weapon state. Together these trends suggest the regime is under its most serious strain since the 1960s.

Key players

- [Iran](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/iran)

  [Advanced enrichment program and reduced IAEA cooperation drive Middle Eastern proliferation risk.](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/iran)
- [North Korea](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/north-korea)

  [Active proliferator and recipient of strategic cooperation from Russia.](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/north-korea)
- [United States](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/united-states)

  [Lead architect of sanctions regimes and security guarantees that dampen allied proliferation.](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/united-states)
- [South Korea](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/south-korea)

  [NPT member with rising domestic debate over indigenous nuclear options.](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/south-korea)
- [Saudi Arabia](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/saudi-arabia)

  [Has linked its nuclear posture to Iran; pursuing civilian nuclear cooperation.](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/saudi-arabia)
- [Israel](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/israel)

  [Undeclared nuclear state outside the NPT; central to regional proliferation calculus.](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/israel)

5

### Disarmament after the Bilateral Era

Formal nuclear disarmament has effectively stalled. The bilateral US–Russian process that produced INF, START, and New START is in collapse: INF terminated in 2019, Russia suspended participation in New START in 2023, and the treaty is scheduled to expire in February 2026 with no successor agreed. The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty has yet to enter into force nearly thirty years after opening for signature, and Russia withdrew its ratification in 2023. The Conference on Disarmament in Geneva has not produced a substantive agreement since the CTBT. In parallel, a coalition of non-nuclear-weapon states drove the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) into force in 2021. The nuclear-armed states and most US allies have rejected the TPNW, arguing it bypasses the NPT and ignores security realities, while supporters frame it as a moral and legal challenge to deterrence orthodoxy. Bridging the gap between this humanitarian disarmament movement and the step-by-step approach favored by the P5 remains one of the central unresolved tensions in contemporary arms control.

Key players

- [United States](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/united-states)

  [Defends step-by-step disarmament via the NPT; opposes the TPNW.](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/united-states)
- [Russia](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/russia)

  [Suspended New START and de-ratified CTBT, effectively closing the bilateral track.](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/russia)
- [China](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/china)

  [Resists trilateral arms control until US and Russia reduce to comparable levels.](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/china)
- [Austria](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/austria)

  [Diplomatic leader of the TPNW and humanitarian initiative.](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/austria)
- [Mexico](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/mexico)

  [Core member of the New Agenda Coalition pushing disarmament obligations.](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/mexico)
- [Japan](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/japan)

  [Sole atomic-bombed state, bridging humanitarian advocacy with US extended deterrence.](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/japan)

6

### Strategic Stability in a Three-Body Problem

Strategic stability — the condition in which no nuclear-armed state has incentives to strike first or to engage in destabilizing arms racing — was historically theorized around a bilateral US–Soviet dyad with rough numerical parity and a stable second-strike capability on both sides. The emergence of China as a third major nuclear power, combined with advances in missile defense, hypersonic glide vehicles, dual-use precision strike, and space and cyber capabilities, has created what analysts increasingly call a 'three-body problem' for stability. Key concerns include the entanglement of nuclear and conventional command-and-control assets, the compression of decision time under hypersonic and space-based threats, and the erosion of crisis communication channels. The US–Russia strategic stability dialogue collapsed after Russia's invasion of Ukraine, and US–China strategic dialogue has been intermittent and shallow. Regional dyads — India–Pakistan, India–China, the Korean Peninsula — add further layers, and there are no functioning multilateral mechanisms for managing escalation risk across this denser, more technologically diverse environment.

Key players

- [United States](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/united-states)

  [Seeks to maintain stable deterrence simultaneously with two near-peer competitors.](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/united-states)
- [Russia](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/russia)

  [Pursues escalation advantage through novel delivery systems and doctrine.](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/russia)
- [China](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/china)

  [Rising power whose buildup is reshaping the very definition of strategic stability.](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/china)
- [India](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/india)

  [Two-front nuclear posture vis-à-vis China and Pakistan.](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/india)
- [Pakistan](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/pakistan)

  [Full-spectrum deterrence including tactical systems shapes South Asian stability.](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/pakistan)
- [North Korea](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/north-korea)

  [Asymmetric arsenal complicating Northeast Asian crisis management.](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/north-korea)

7

### Disruptive Technologies and Strategic Risk

A cluster of emerging technologies is reshaping the conditions under which deterrence, arms control, and crisis stability operate. Artificial intelligence promises faster targeting, intelligence fusion, and potentially autonomous engagement decisions; hypersonic glide vehicles and boost-glide systems compress warning time; quantum sensing could threaten the survivability of ballistic missile submarines; and cyber operations against nuclear command, control, and communications (NC3) raise the prospect of decapitation or spoofing during crises. Commercial space, ubiquitous overhead imagery, and pervasive open-source intelligence further alter the information environment in which leaders decide. Governance has lagged behind capability. The UN GGE and Open-Ended Working Group processes on lethal autonomous weapons systems have not produced binding instruments; the 2023 REAIM summit in The Hague and follow-on processes have begun to address military AI, and the US–China statement at the November 2024 Lima APEC sidelines affirmed human control over nuclear-weapon use decisions. Yet most disruptive capabilities remain ungoverned, dual-use, and diffusing rapidly to both states and non-state actors.

Key players

- [United States](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/united-states)

  [Leading developer of military AI and hypersonics; pushing responsible-use political declarations.](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/united-states)
- [China](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/china)

  [Major investor in AI, hypersonics, and quantum technologies with explicit military applications.](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/china)
- [Russia](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/russia)

  [Fielded hypersonic systems and emphasizes asymmetric tech to offset Western advantages.](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/russia)
- [Israel](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/israel)

  [Pioneer in autonomous and loitering munition technology with combat-proven systems.](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/israel)
- [United Kingdom](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/united-kingdom)

  [Co-leads REAIM and responsible military AI initiatives.](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/united-kingdom)
- [South Korea](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/south-korea)

  [Advanced defense AI and unmanned systems developer with growing export presence.](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/south-korea)

8

### Domestic Politics of Nuclear and Security Policy

Nuclear and broader security policies are increasingly contested at the domestic level rather than insulated as elite consensus. In the United States, polarization has affected the durability of treaty commitments, as illustrated by the swings on the JCPOA between administrations and divergent congressional views on Ukraine aid. In Russia, the militarization of public discourse and the absence of political competition have removed traditional brakes on nuclear signaling. In China, Xi Jinping's consolidation of power has centralized strategic decision-making within the Central Military Commission and Politburo Standing Committee. Elsewhere, domestic politics shapes proliferation pressure and alliance reliability. South Korean and Japanese publics increasingly debate indigenous capabilities or NATO-style nuclear sharing; European publics question burden-sharing and the credibility of the US guarantee under shifting Washington administrations; and in nuclear-armed democracies such as the UK, France, India, and Pakistan, parliamentary and partisan dynamics influence modernization choices and declaratory policy. Understanding security outcomes therefore requires attention to the domestic coalitions, electoral cycles, and bureaucratic politics that produce them.

Key players

- [United States](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/united-states)

  [Polarization and electoral cycles drive volatility in alliance and arms control commitments.](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/united-states)
- [Russia](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/russia)

  [Closed political system enables doctrinal shifts without meaningful domestic check.](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/russia)
- [China](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/china)

  [Centralized decision-making under Xi limits transparency on strategic policy.](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/china)
- [South Korea](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/south-korea)

  [Domestic debate over indigenous nuclear options is now mainstream political discourse.](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/south-korea)
- [Germany](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/germany)

  [Zeitenwende debate has reopened questions on defense spending and nuclear sharing.](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/germany)
- [Iran](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/iran)

  [Factional politics between hardliners and pragmatists shape nuclear negotiating posture.](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/iran)

## Resources

News, lessons, and country profiles to prep for 65th ISODARCO Course – ISODARCO 2027 Winter Course.

Recent reporting to ground your prep

[West Bengal Voter Deletion Crisis 2026](https://modeldiplomat.com/story/west-bengal-voter-deletion-crisis-ahead-of-2026-assembly-elections)

[Rahul Gandhi Defends Tamil Nadu's Autonomy](https://modeldiplomat.com/story/rahul-gandhis-stand-against-131st-amendment-bill-in-tamil-nadu)

[India's 131st Amendment Bill](https://modeldiplomat.com/story/indias-131st-amendment-bill-womens-reservation-for-2029-elections)

[West Bengal Voter Deletion Crisis](https://modeldiplomat.com/story/west-bengal-voter-deletion-crisis-27-million-affected-ahead-of-polls)

Lessons

Bite-sized lessons to build the basics

[Engagement Strategies](https://modeldiplomat.com/learn/lessons/engagement-strategies)

[Dynamic Analysis](https://modeldiplomat.com/learn/lessons/dynamic-analysis)

[Gender Dynamics Across Cultures](https://modeldiplomat.com/learn/lessons/gender-dynamics-across-cultures)

[The Power-Interest Grid](https://modeldiplomat.com/learn/lessons/power-interest-grid)

Courses

Guided courses that go deeper on the topic

[Stakeholder Mapping](https://modeldiplomat.com/learn/courses/stakeholder-mapping)

[Advanced Negotiation](https://modeldiplomat.com/learn/courses/advanced-negotiation)

[Multilateral Negotiation](https://modeldiplomat.com/learn/courses/multilateral-negotiation)

[Policy Brief Writing](https://modeldiplomat.com/learn/courses/policy-brief)

The states in play, with the data that shapes their stance

[Italy](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/italy)

[Country dossier](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/italy)

[United States](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/united-states)

[Country dossier](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/united-states)

[Russia](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/russia)

[Country dossier](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/russia)

[China](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/china)

[Country dossier](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/china)

[North Korea](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/north-korea)

[Country dossier](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/north-korea)

[India](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/india)

[Country dossier](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/india)

[Pakistan](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/pakistan)

[Country dossier](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/pakistan)

[Germany](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/germany)

[Country dossier](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/germany)

[France](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/france)

[Country dossier](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/france)

[Afghanistan](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/afghanistan)

[Country dossier](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/afghanistan)

[Nigeria](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/nigeria)

[Country dossier](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/nigeria)

[United Kingdom](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/united-kingdom)

[Country dossier](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/united-kingdom)

[Iran](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/iran)

[Country dossier](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/iran)

[South Korea](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/south-korea)

[Country dossier](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/south-korea)

[Saudi Arabia](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/saudi-arabia)

[Country dossier](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/saudi-arabia)

[Israel](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/israel)

[Country dossier](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/israel)

[Austria](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/austria)

[Country dossier](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/austria)

[Mexico](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/mexico)

[Country dossier](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/mexico)

[Japan](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/japan)

[Country dossier](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/japan)

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