Religion, secularism & communal harmony
Indian secularism's constitutional architecture, the principle of principled distance, communalism's roots and the imperative of communal harmony for UPSC GS-1.
Secularism the Indian Way
Indian secularism is constitutionally distinct from the Western 'wall of separation' model articulated in the U.S. case Everson v. Board of Education (1947). Where the American First Amendment mandates strict non-establishment, the Indian Constitution adopts what political theorist Rajeev Bhargava termed 'principled distance': the state keeps a flexible distance from all religions, intervening or abstaining depending on whether the goal of liberty and equality is served.
The word 'secular' was inserted into the Preamble by the 42nd Amendment (1976), but the Supreme Court in S.R. Bommai v. Union of India (1994) held that secularism was always part of the Constitution's basic structure, even before the textual insertion. The architecture rests on:
- Article 25 — freedom of conscience and the right to freely profess, practise and propagate religion, subject to public order, morality and health.
- Article 26 — freedom of religious denominations to manage their own affairs.
- Article 27 — no compulsion to pay taxes for promotion of any religion.
- Article 28 — no religious instruction in wholly state-funded educational institutions.
- Articles 29 and 30 — cultural and educational rights of minorities, including the right to establish and administer institutions.
Equal Respect, Not Strict Separation
Unlike the French laïcité model that privatises religion, the Indian state engages religion. It funds the Haj pilgrimage subsidy (phased out in 2018), administers temples through state Endowment Boards, and reformed Hindu personal law through the Hindu Code Bills (1955–56). The Constitution itself sanctions intervention: Article 17 abolishes untouchability, and Article 25(2)(b) opens Hindu religious institutions of a public character to all classes of Hindus.
The doctrine of essential religious practices, evolved from The Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v. Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt (1954), lets courts decide which practices are integral to a faith and hence protected. It was applied in Sabarimala (Indian Young Lawyers Association v. State of Kerala, 2018) to admit women of menstruating age, and debated in the Sardar Syedna Taher Saifuddin (1962) and Ismail Faruqui cases. Critics argue this turns judges into theologians.
This model balances two impulses: respecting India's deep religiosity and protecting individual rights against oppressive practices. It explains why the same state can both protect the right to convert (Rev. Stainislaus v. State of M.P., 1977, upholding limits on fraudulent conversion) and reform discriminatory customs.