The Supreme Court & judicial review

Constitutional Foundation and Composition

The Supreme Court of India is established by Article 124 of the Constitution and sits at the apex of an integrated single judiciary—a deliberate departure from the American dual-court model. As originally enacted, the Court comprised a Chief Justice and seven other judges; Parliament, exercising its power under Article 124(1), has progressively raised the sanctioned strength, most recently to 34 judges (the CJI plus 33) by the Supreme Court (Number of Judges) Amendment Act, 2019.

Judges are appointed by the President under Article 124(2). The literal text requires only 'consultation,' but the meaning of that word has been judicially rewritten. In S.P. Gupta v. Union of India (1981)—the First Judges Case—'consultation' did not mean concurrence and primacy lay with the executive. The Second Judges Case (SCAOR Association v. Union of India, 1993) reversed this, holding that 'consultation' means 'concurrence' and inventing the Collegium system. The Third Judges Case (1998 Presidential Reference) fixed the Collegium as the CJI plus four senior-most judges. The NJAC judgment (2015), in Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Association v. Union of India, struck down the 99th Constitutional Amendment and the National Judicial Appointments Commission Act for violating judicial independence as part of the basic structure.

The Court's Jurisdictions

The Supreme Court exercises five distinct heads of jurisdiction:

• Original jurisdiction (Article 131): exclusive authority over federal disputes between the Centre and States or between States.
• Writ jurisdiction (Article 32): itself a Fundamental Right, empowering the Court to issue habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, certiorari and quo warranto for the enforcement of Part III rights. Dr. Ambedkar called Article 32 the 'heart and soul of the Constitution.'
• Appellate jurisdiction: constitutional (Article 132), civil (Article 133) and criminal (Article 134) appeals, plus the wide discretionary Special Leave Petition under Article 136.
• Advisory jurisdiction (Article 143): the President may refer questions of law or fact, as in the Berubari (1960), Special Courts (1978) and Third Judges (1998) references; such opinions are not binding.
• A Court of Record (Article 129): with power to punish for contempt of itself.

Under Article 141, the law declared by the Supreme Court is binding on all courts within India, establishing vertical stare decisis. Article 137 confers review power, and Article 142 grants the extraordinary authority to pass any order necessary for 'complete justice'—invoked in the Babri Masjid–Ayodhya verdict (2019) and the Bhopal settlement (1989). Together these articles make the Court not merely an adjudicator but the authoritative interpreter and guardian of the Constitution.

Judicial Review and the Basic Structure Doctrine

Judicial review is the power of the courts to examine the constitutionality of legislative enactments and executive orders and to declare them void if they contravene the Constitution. Though the phrase is not expressly used, the power flows from Articles 13, 32, 131–136, 143, 226 and 246. Article 13(2) is the textual anchor: the State shall make no law that takes away or abridges Fundamental Rights, and any such law is void. The doctrine was inherited from Marbury v. Madison (US, 1803) but acquired an Indian dimension through the basic structure controversy.

The pivotal contest was the amending power under Article 368 versus Part III. In Shankari Prasad (1951) and Sajjan Singh (1965) the Court held that constitutional amendments were not 'law' under Article 13 and could abridge Fundamental Rights. Golak Nath (1967) reversed this, ruling that Fundamental Rights could not be amended at all. Parliament retaliated with the 24th and 25th Amendments (1971).

Kesavananda Bharati and After

The decisive verdict came in Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala (1973), decided 7–6 by a 13-judge bench—the largest ever. It overruled Golak Nath, upheld Parliament's power to amend any part of the Constitution including Fundamental Rights, but held that Parliament cannot alter the 'basic structure' or essential features of the Constitution. Features identified across cases include the supremacy of the Constitution, the rule of law, separation of powers, judicial review, federalism, secularism, free and fair elections, and the independence of the judiciary.

The doctrine was promptly deployed. In Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain (1975) the Court struck down Clause 4 of the 39th Amendment, which sought to immunise the Prime Minister's election from judicial scrutiny. In Minerva Mills v. Union of India (1980) the Court invalidated parts of the 42nd Amendment, holding that limited amending power is itself basic structure and that the balance between Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles cannot be destroyed. In Waman Rao (1981) the Court fixed 24 April 1973—the date of Kesavananda—as the cut-off for testing Ninth Schedule entries, a position consolidated in I.R. Coelho v. State of Tamil Nadu (2007), which held that laws placed in the Ninth Schedule after 1973 are open to basic-structure review.

Judicial review thus operates at three levels—reviewing constitutional amendments, ordinary legislation, and administrative action. Its limits are real: the Court cannot review the wisdom of policy, and matters declared non-justiciable (such as the proclamation under Article 74's aid-and-advice, pre-1976) constrain its reach. Yet the basic structure doctrine remains India's most distinctive constitutional contribution and the firewall against majoritarian constitutional vandalism.

Why This Matters for the Exam

The Supreme Court and judicial review constitute the single most heavily examined cluster in UPSC polity, cutting across both Prelims (GS Paper I) and Mains GS-2, which expressly lists 'Structure, organization and functioning of the Executive and the Judiciary' and 'Separation of powers between various organs.'

The Prelims Angle

Prelims tests precision on numbers, articles and case sequences. High-yield retention points: the current sanctioned strength is 34 (CJI + 33); Article 124 establishes the Court; Article 32 is itself a Fundamental Right while Article 226 (High Courts' writ power) is wider and not a Fundamental Right; Article 137 is review and Article 142 is 'complete justice.' Examiners love to test the difference between Article 131 (original federal disputes) and Article 136 (SLP discretion), and which writs lie against whom. The four Judges Cases and their years (1981, 1993, 1998, 2015) are recurrent matching fodder.

The Mains Angle

Mains demands analytical treatment of three live debates. First, judicial review versus parliamentary sovereignty—frame it through Kesavananda (1973) and Minerva Mills (1980), arguing that India adopts neither British parliamentary supremacy nor American judicial supremacy but a synthesis of constitutional supremacy. PYQ 2019 asked whether the basic structure doctrine has come to be a 'safety valve' for democracy—the expected answer affirms it while noting its judge-made, undefined character. Second, the Collegium versus NJAC debate on judicial appointments and accountability; the 2015 NJAC verdict and the recurring Memorandum of Procedure stalemate are essential current-affairs hooks. Third, judicial activism versus judicial overreach, illustrated through PIL expansion since the 1980s and Article 142's expansive use.

A repeated trap is conflating judicial review with judicial activism: review is the constitutional power; activism is its assertive exercise. Another is assuming the basic structure list is closed—it is illustrative and evolving, as Coelho (2007) confirmed. Write answers that name the case, the year, the bench strength where decisive (Kesavananda's 13-judge bench), and the constitutional article. Examiners reward this density of authority over generic commentary, and a crisp diagram of the five jurisdictions or a timeline of the amendment-versus-rights saga lifts a Mains answer into the top band.