Right against Exploitation & Freedom of Religion (Articles 23-28)

The constitutional text: Articles 23 and 24

The Right against Exploitation comprises just two articles, but both are heavily litigated and high-yield for UPSC.

Article 23 prohibits (1) traffic in human beings, (2) begar (forced labour without payment), and (3) other similar forms of forced labour. Crucially, Article 23(1) is enforceable against both the State and private individuals — one of the few Fundamental Rights that operates horizontally. Parliament gave it teeth through the Suppression of Immoral Traffic in Women and Girls Act, 1956 (renamed the Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, 1956) and the Bonded Labour System (Abolition) Act, 1976.

Article 23(2) carves out an exception: the State may impose compulsory service for public purposes (such as military conscription or compulsory social service), but in doing so it shall not discriminate on grounds only of religion, race, caste or class.

The Supreme Court expanded "forced labour" decisively in People's Union for Democratic Rights v. Union of India (1982) — the Asiad Workers' case. Justice P.N. Bhagwati held that paying less than the statutory minimum wage amounts to forced labour under Article 23, because economic compulsion is itself a form of force. In Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India (1984), the Court read Article 23 with Article 21 to direct identification and rehabilitation of bonded labourers, treating a PIL letter as a writ petition.

Article 24: prohibition of child labour

Article 24 bars employment of any child below 14 years in any factory, mine, or other hazardous employment. Note the precise scope: Article 24 does not ban all child labour, only hazardous work. Non-hazardous employment of children is regulated by statute, not by Article 24 itself.

The enabling legislation is the Child Labour (Prohibition and Regulation) Act, 1986, amended in 2016 to prohibit employment of children below 14 in all occupations (except helping family enterprises after school hours and in entertainment), and to create the category of "adolescent" (14-18) barred from hazardous work. The landmark ruling is M.C. Mehta v. State of Tamil Nadu (1996) — the Sivakasi fireworks case — where the Court ordered employers of children in hazardous industries to pay ₹20,000 per child into a Child Labour Rehabilitation-cum-Welfare Fund, with the government contributing ₹5,000 and providing an adult member of the family alternative employment.

Remember the constitutional architecture: Article 24 is buttressed by Article 21A (free and compulsory education for 6-14, inserted by the 86th Amendment, 2002) and the Directive Principle in Article 39(e) and (f), which directs the State to protect children's health and against exploitation. The shift of children's education from a Directive Principle to a Fundamental Right reflects the Unni Krishnan (1993) logic that education is implicit in the right to life.

High-yield distinction: Article 23 protects everyone (citizens and non-citizens) and binds private parties; Article 24 sets an absolute floor against hazardous child labour.

Articles 25-28: the structure of religious freedom

India is a secular State (a feature affirmed by the Preamble after the 42nd Amendment, 1976, and held part of the basic structure in S.R. Bommai v. Union of India, 1994). Articles 25-28 give that secularism a concrete shape.

Article 25 guarantees, to all persons, freedom of conscience and the right freely to profess, practise and propagate religion — subject to public order, morality and health. "Propagate" means to transmit or spread one's faith; in Rev. Stainislaus v. State of Madhya Pradesh (1977), the Court held it does not include a right to convert another person, upholding anti-conversion laws. Article 25(2) preserves the State's power to (a) regulate secular activity associated with religious practice and (b) provide for social welfare and reform — including throwing open Hindu religious institutions to all classes, which is how temple-entry laws are validated. Explanation II clarifies that references to Hindus include Sikhs, Jains and Buddhists.

Article 26 grants every religious denomination the right to (a) establish and maintain institutions for religious and charitable purposes, (b) manage its own affairs in matters of religion, (c) own and acquire property, and (d) administer property in accordance with law. The crucial limiting doctrine is the "essential religious practices" test, originating in the Shirur Mutt case (1954): only practices integral to a religion get protection, and courts decide what is essential. This was central to Indian Young Lawyers Association v. State of Kerala (2018) — the Sabarimala judgment — where the Court held the exclusion of menstruating women was not an essential practice and violated Article 25.

Articles 27 and 28: taxation and education

Article 27 prohibits compelling any person to pay taxes the proceeds of which are specifically appropriated to promote or maintain any particular religion. Note the precise wording: it bars a tax, not a fee. In Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments v. Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar (Shirur Mutt, 1954), the Court upheld a fee levied to meet the cost of regulating religious institutions, because a fee carries a quid pro quo.

Article 28 governs religious instruction in educational institutions, with a four-fold scheme:

• Institutions wholly maintained out of State funds: no religious instruction at all (28(1)).
• Institutions administered by the State but established under an endowment or trust requiring religious instruction: permitted (28(2)).
• State-recognised or State-aided institutions: religious instruction allowed, but no person can be compelled to attend without consent (and of a minor, the guardian's consent) (28(3)).

Retain the mnemonic: Article 27 = no religious tax; Article 28 = no compulsory religious teaching in fully State-funded schools.

Why this matters for the exam

Articles 23-28 are a dense, fact-rich cluster that UPSC tests in both Prelims (GS Paper I) and Mains GS-2 ("Indian Constitution — significant provisions" and "Fundamental Rights").

Prelims angle. The examiner loves the precise contours: that Article 23 binds private persons (rare among FRs); that Article 24 bars only hazardous child labour below 14, not all employment; that "propagate" in Article 25 does not include conversion (Stainislaus, 1977); and the tax-versus-fee distinction under Article 27 (Shirur Mutt, 1954). A 2017 Prelims question tested which Fundamental Rights are available to non-citizens — Articles 23, 25, 27 and 28 all apply to all persons, not just citizens, a frequent trap. Know the precise wording: Article 28(1)'s absolute bar applies only to institutions wholly maintained out of State funds.

Mains angle. The freedom-of-religion articles are the doctrinal heart of essays on secularism, constitutional morality, and the essential religious practices test. Expect questions framed around Sabarimala (2018), the conflict between Article 25 individual liberty and Article 26 group autonomy, and whether courts are competent theologians. A strong answer cites Shirur Mutt (1954), S.R. Bommai (1994), and the pending 9-judge reference, then argues that Indian secularism is "principled distance" (Rajeev Bhargava), permitting the State to intervene for reform under Article 25(2)(b) — distinguishing it from American "wall of separation".

High-yield retention list. (1) Article 23 — Asiad Workers' case (1982): below minimum wage = forced labour. (2) Article 24 — M.C. Mehta v. Tamil Nadu (1996): ₹20,000 rehabilitation fund. (3) CLPRA 1986, amended 2016 — "adolescent" 14-18. (4) Article 25 — Stainislaus: no right to convert. (5) Article 26 — essential practices test, Shirur Mutt. (6) Article 27 — tax barred, fee allowed. (7) Article 28 — four-fold scheme.

Link these to the DPSPs (Articles 39(e)-(f), 46) and to Article 21A to show the examiner you grasp the constitutional scheme as an integrated whole, not isolated articles. That synthesis is what separates a 7/10 answer from a 9/10 in GS-2.