Parliamentary committees in depth (PAC, Estimates, DRSCs)

Why this matters for the exam

Parliamentary committees are a perennial UPSC favourite because they sit at the intersection of three Mains GS-2 themes: parliamentary oversight of the executive, the separation/blending of powers, and the working of accountability institutions. They are described as a 'mini-Parliament' precisely because they let the legislature scrutinise the executive away from the floor's partisan theatre—a point the Second Administrative Reforms Commission (2nd ARC) and the National Commission to Review the Working of the Constitution (NCRWC, 2002) both pressed.

The PYQ footprint is heavy. UPSC has asked directly: 'Department-related Standing Committees... have led to reduced oversight of the executive by the Parliament. Comment' (Mains GS-2). It has asked candidates to distinguish the roles of the Public Accounts Committee and the Estimates Committee, and to evaluate whether committees are losing relevance as fewer Bills are referred to them. Prelims regularly tests crisp factual hooks: the membership numbers, which House the chairperson comes from, why a minister cannot be a member, and which committee examines the report of the Comptroller and Auditor-General (CAG).

The constitutional and procedural anchors you must cite. Committees draw authority from Articles 105 (powers and privileges) and 118 (each House makes its own rules of procedure), and exist under the Rules of Procedure of the Lok Sabha and Rajya Sabha rather than by name in the Constitution's text—except where the Constitution references specific instruments such as the CAG's reports under Article 151. Memorise the financial trio (PAC, Estimates, Public Undertakings), the timeline (PAC 1921, Estimates 1950, COPU 1964), and the watershed of 1993, when 17 Department-Related Standing Committees (DRSCs) were created, later expanded to 24 (16 serviced by the Lok Sabha, 8 by the Rajya Sabha).

How it is tested. Expect (i) a Prelims MCQ pinning a single fact—e.g., 'post-audit vs. pre-audit' for PAC, or that the Estimates Committee draws all 30 members from the Lok Sabha only; (ii) a Mains analytical question on declining legislative scrutiny, asking you to marshal data (the steep fall in the share of Bills referred to committees across recent Lok Sabhas) and remedies; and (iii) an essay-adjacent demand to weigh executive efficiency against accountability. Retain the high-yield contrasts—PAC looks backward at spent money; Estimates looks forward at proposed economy; DRSCs cut across the budget, Bills and policy of assigned ministries. A candidate who can quote the membership, the chair convention, and one concrete instance (such as PAC's examination of the 2G spectrum CAG report, 2010-11) writes a top-decile answer.

The financial committees: PAC, Estimates and COPU

Public Accounts Committee (PAC). First constituted in 1921 under the Government of India Act 1919, the PAC is Parliament's premier financial watchdog. It has 22 members—15 from the Lok Sabha and 7 from the Rajya Sabha, elected annually by proportional representation through the single transferable vote. By a convention established in 1967, the chairperson is from the Opposition (appointed by the Speaker), reinforcing its non-partisan auditing role. A minister cannot be a member—a rule shared by all three financial committees—to prevent the executive from policing itself. The PAC conducts post-mortem (ex post) scrutiny: it examines the Appropriation Accounts and the CAG's audit reports laid under Article 151, satisfying itself that money was spent for the purpose sanctioned and within the authorised grant. Its limits are real: it cannot question policy as such, intervenes only after expenditure, and its recommendations are advisory. The CAG acts as its 'friend, philosopher and guide.' High-yield instance: the PAC's examination of the CAG's 2G spectrum report (2010-11).

Estimates Committee. Constituted in 1950 on the initiative of John Mathai, it is the largest committee with 30 members, all drawn from the Lok Sabha only—no Rajya Sabha representation. Its chairperson is appointed by the Speaker and is invariably from the ruling party. It conducts prospective (ex ante) scrutiny: it examines the estimates in the budget and suggests 'economies, improvements in organisation, efficiency and administrative reform', in effect recommending alternative policies to bring efficiency and economy in administration. It is styled a 'continuous economy committee.' Crucially, it works on estimates already voted by the House and cannot question the policy laid down by Parliament.

Committee on Public Undertakings (COPU). Created in 1964 on the recommendation of the Krishna Menon Committee, it has 22 members (15 Lok Sabha, 7 Rajya Sabha) and examines the reports and accounts of public-sector undertakings and the CAG's reports on them. It checks whether PSUs are managed on sound business principles and prudent commercial practices—again excluding day-to-day administration and matters of major government policy.

The shared logic and the contrasts to memorise

All three are financial standing committees, exclude ministers, and tender advisory reports. The clean exam contrasts: PAC = backward-looking audit of spent money; Estimates = forward-looking review of proposed spending; COPU = the audit-plus-efficiency lens on public enterprises. Remember the asymmetry that examiners love: only the Estimates Committee is wholly Lok Sabha; PAC and COPU are bicameral (15+7). Note also that COPU partly relieves both PAC and the Estimates Committee of scrutiny over public undertakings, dividing labour among the trio. Together they embody the principle that the executive proposes and spends, but the legislature, through delegated expert bodies, audits and recommends—without crossing into governance.

The Department-Related Standing Committees (DRSCs)

The DRSC system was introduced in 1993 with 17 committees, on the recommendations flowing from the Rules Committee and the experience of the earlier subject committees; it was reorganised in 2004 into the present 24 committees. Sixteen are serviced by the Lok Sabha Secretariat and eight by the Rajya Sabha Secretariat, but every committee straddles both Houses. Each DRSC has 31 members—21 from the Lok Sabha (nominated by the Speaker) and 10 from the Rajya Sabha (nominated by the Chairman)—and members hold office for one year. As with the financial committees, a minister cannot be nominated, and the chairperson of a Rajya Sabha-serviced committee is drawn from that House.

Threefold mandate. A DRSC, covering one or more ministries, (i) considers the Demands for Grants of its ministries and reports before they are voted—though it cannot suggest cut motions; (ii) examines Bills referred to it by the presiding officer; and (iii) considers the ministry's annual reports and national basic long-term policy documents. It does not consider day-to-day administration or matters under the jurisdiction of other committees. Their great virtue is continuity, subject expertise and depth—scrutiny insulated from the floor's partisanship, in line with the 2nd ARC's emphasis on strengthening parliamentary oversight.

Reform debates and limitations

The headline criticism, which UPSC has lifted almost verbatim into a question, is declining referral: fewer Bills now go to DRSCs, so 'oversight of the executive by Parliament' weakens. Other limits: committee reports are recommendatory, attendance is often thin, the one-year tenure undercuts specialised continuity, and committees lack technical research staff. The NCRWC (2002) recommended that all major Bills be referred to committees and that reports carry greater weight; the 2nd ARC urged stronger committee secretariats and research support. Reform proposals worth citing: making committee referral the default for substantive Bills, longer tenures, a dedicated Parliamentary Budget Office-type research arm, and time-bound government action-taken reports.

Exam-ready synthesis. Frame DRSCs as the structural answer to a structural problem—Parliament cannot scrutinise vast budgets and complex Bills on the floor, so it delegates to expert mini-Parliaments that work year-round, in private, with civil servants and stakeholders before them. Then deploy the critique: the design is sound but underused, and reviving the committee route is the single highest-leverage reform for legislative accountability. A candidate who pairs the 31-member composition and 24-committee figure with the referral-decline data and a named reform body delivers both the factual rigour Prelims rewards and the analytical balance Mains demands.