The Second Intifada and the Barrier Wall

The Collapse of Oslo's Promise

The period between the Oslo Accords (1993) and the Second Intifada (2000) was supposed to build confidence and prepare for a final peace agreement. Instead, it produced deepening disillusionment on both sides.

For Palestinians, the Oslo years brought a Palestinian Authority with limited self-governance but no sovereignty. The number of Israeli settlers in the West Bank and Gaza nearly doubled from roughly 110,000 in 1993 to over 200,000 by 2000. Checkpoints multiplied. The Palestinian economy deteriorated. The PA, under Arafat, became increasingly authoritarian and corrupt. Many Palestinians felt that Oslo had created a system of permanent interim arrangements — responsibility without power — while Israel continued to create facts on the ground.

For Israelis, the Oslo years were punctuated by devastating suicide bombings. Hamas and Islamic Jihad carried out a series of attacks on buses and in public spaces — notably the Dizengoff Center bombing (1994), the Beit Lid junction attack (1995), and a wave of bombings in February-March 1996 that killed dozens. Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, who had signed the Oslo Accords, was assassinated by a Jewish extremist in November 1995. The Israeli public grew skeptical that the Palestinians were a reliable peace partner.

The Second Intifada Erupts

On September 28, 2000, Israeli opposition leader Ariel Sharon visited the Temple Mount / Haram al-Sharif in Jerusalem, accompanied by a large security contingent. The visit was seen by Palestinians as a deliberate provocation at Islam's third-holiest site. Protests erupted the next day and quickly escalated into widespread violence.

Unlike the First Intifada's stones and strikes, the Second Intifada rapidly militarized. Palestinian armed groups — Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and the Al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades (linked to Fatah) — carried out suicide bombings targeting Israeli civilians. Between 2000 and 2005, approximately 1,000 Israelis were killed, the majority civilians. Israel responded with massive military force: tank incursions into Palestinian cities, targeted assassinations of militant leaders, air strikes, home demolitions, and prolonged curfews. Approximately 3,000-4,500 Palestinians were killed, including many civilians.

The most controversial Israeli military operation was Operation Defensive Shield in April 2002, launched after a suicide bombing at a Passover seder in Netanya killed 30 people. Israeli forces reoccupied major West Bank cities, and the battle of Jenin refugee camp became a flashpoint: Palestinians initially claimed a massacre of hundreds, which investigation later showed to be inaccurate (52 Palestinians and 23 Israeli soldiers were killed), but the extensive destruction was real.

The Second Intifada devastated Palestinian society and transformed Israeli politics. The Israeli left, which had championed Oslo, collapsed electorally. Ariel Sharon, elected prime minister in 2001, pursued a strategy of unilateral action rather than negotiation.

The Separation Barrier

In 2002, Israel began constructing a physical barrier between Israel and the West Bank. The Israeli government called it a 'security fence' and justified it as necessary to prevent suicide bombers from entering Israel. Palestinians called it an 'apartheid wall' and saw it as a land grab.

Both descriptions contain elements of truth. The barrier — roughly 700 kilometers when completed, consisting of concrete walls (notably the 8-meter-high wall through urban areas like Bethlehem and Qalqilya) and electronic fences — did dramatically reduce suicide bombings. Israeli civilian deaths from terrorism fell by over 90% after the barrier's construction.

But the barrier did not follow the 1967 Green Line. Approximately 85% of it was built inside the West Bank, incorporating major settlement blocs and fertile agricultural land on the Israeli side. It separated Palestinian farmers from their fields, students from their schools, and patients from hospitals. Entire communities were trapped in 'seam zones' between the barrier and the Green Line, requiring military permits to access their own property.

In 2004, the International Court of Justice issued an advisory opinion declaring the barrier illegal under international law, insofar as it was built on occupied territory. Israel rejected the opinion, arguing that the ICJ had failed to account for the security threat. The UN General Assembly voted overwhelmingly to demand Israel comply with the ruling; Israel did not.

The barrier remains one of the most visceral symbols of the conflict: for Israelis, a necessary security measure that saved lives; for Palestinians, a physical manifestation of apartheid that fragments their territory and forecloses a viable state.