The ASEAN Factor: Southeast Asia's Impossible Balancing Act

The Art of Not Choosing

The ten members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) — Indonesia, Thailand, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, Singapore, Myanmar, Cambodia, Laos, and Brunei — share a common strategic imperative: avoid being forced to choose between the United States and China. On the Taiwan issue specifically, all ASEAN members recognize the PRC and adhere to the one-China policy, but most prefer that the status quo be maintained peacefully.

ASEAN's institutional culture of consensus, non-interference, and quiet diplomacy — sometimes called the 'ASEAN Way' — makes the bloc institutionally incapable of taking strong collective positions on contentious security issues. ASEAN has never issued a joint statement on Taiwan. Individual members' positions range from Cambodia and Laos (closely aligned with Beijing) to Vietnam and the Philippines (which have their own territorial disputes with China in the South China Sea and are more sympathetic to pushback against Chinese assertiveness).

Singapore's position is instructive. Despite being a majority ethnic-Chinese city-state, Singapore consistently opposes any unilateral change to the status quo — by either side. Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong warned in 2022 that a Taiwan conflict would be 'far more dangerous' than the Ukraine war, urging both Washington and Beijing to exercise restraint.

Why ASEAN Cannot Be Neutral

Despite their desire to stay out of the Taiwan dispute, ASEAN nations would be profoundly affected by any military conflict. The Taiwan Strait and South China Sea are among the world's busiest shipping lanes — an estimated one-third of global trade passes through the South China Sea annually. A Chinese blockade of Taiwan would disrupt shipping routes critical to every ASEAN economy.

Several ASEAN members host significant US military facilities. The Philippines, a US treaty ally, granted the US access to four new military bases under the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) in 2023, some located close to Taiwan. Singapore hosts a US naval logistics unit. These facilities would likely be involved in any US military response to a Taiwan crisis, making the host nations targets regardless of their stated neutrality.

The economic consequences would be catastrophic. ASEAN countries are deeply integrated into the same semiconductor and electronics supply chains that run through Taiwan. Vietnam, Thailand, and Malaysia are major electronics assembly hubs. A disruption to Taiwanese chip supply would halt production lines across Southeast Asia, causing widespread unemployment and economic contraction.

Hedging as Grand Strategy

ASEAN members cope with US-China rivalry through 'hedging' — simultaneously engaging both powers economically and militarily while committing fully to neither. Indonesia, for example, has conducted joint military exercises with both the US and China. Vietnam buys weapons from Russia, trains with the US, and trades heavily with China. The Philippines maintains its US alliance while accepting Chinese infrastructure investment.

This hedging breaks down in a crisis scenario. If forced to choose, most ASEAN nations would prefer to maintain access to the US security umbrella while preserving their economic relationship with China — an increasingly difficult balancing act as both powers demand greater alignment from regional partners. The 2023 ISEAS 'State of Southeast Asia' survey found that if forced to choose, 61.1% of Southeast Asian elites would align with the US over China — but the overwhelming preference (over 80%) was to not have to choose at all.