Venezuela and Cuba: Comprehensive Programs
A close reading of the U.S. comprehensive sanctions programs against Venezuela and Cuba — statutory bases, OFAC general licenses, and enforcement geometry.
The Venezuela Sanctions Regime
The U.S. sanctions architecture against Venezuela is built on a layered foundation of executive orders issued under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA, 50 U.S.C. §§1701–1708) and the National Emergencies Act. The cornerstone is Executive Order 13692 of March 8, 2015, which declared a national emergency with respect to the situation in Venezuela and authorized blocking sanctions against persons undermining democratic processes, engaging in public corruption, or committing human rights abuses. Subsequent orders dramatically expanded the program's scope.
Executive Order 13808 (August 24, 2017) prohibited dealings in new debt and equity issued by the Government of Venezuela, including Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A. (PdVSA). Executive Order 13827 (March 19, 2018) banned transactions in the Maduro government's digital currency, the Petro. Executive Order 13835 (May 21, 2018) prohibited the purchase of Venezuelan public-sector debt and equity owned by the government. The most consequential measure, Executive Order 13850 (November 1, 2018), authorized sanctions on actors in Venezuela's gold sector and was later used to designate PdVSA on January 28, 2019. Executive Order 13884 (August 5, 2019) imposed a comprehensive blocking of the Government of Venezuela, transforming the program from a targeted regime into a country-based one resembling the Cuba model.
OFAC's Regulatory Toolkit
The Venezuela Sanctions Regulations are codified at 31 C.F.R. Part 591. OFAC administers the program through a dense system of general licenses (GLs) that carve out specific authorized activities. GL 5, repeatedly amended, governs dealings in the PdVSA 2020 8.5% bond. GL 8, first issued in 2019 and renewed many times, authorized specified U.S. oil companies — Chevron, Halliburton, Schlumberger, Baker Hughes, and Weatherford — to maintain limited operations. In November 2022, OFAC issued GL 41 permitting Chevron to resume oil production in Venezuela through its joint ventures with PdVSA, a concession tied to the Barbados Agreement negotiations between Maduro and the opposition Unitary Platform.
GL 44, issued October 18, 2023, suspended sanctions on Venezuela's oil and gas sector for six months in exchange for electoral commitments. After Maduro reneged on those commitments, OFAC declined to renew GL 44 on April 17, 2024, replacing it with the narrower GL 44A wind-down authorization expiring May 31, 2024. The episode illustrates the conditional, reversible character of sanctions relief as a diplomatic instrument.
Designation Cascades and Recognition Politics
The Venezuela program is distinctive for its entanglement with U.S. recognition policy. From January 23, 2019 until 2023, the United States recognized Juan Guaidó's interim government, and OFAC treated the National Assembly's appointees as the legitimate representatives of the Government of Venezuela for purposes of EO 13884. This produced unusual interpretive questions: blocked Venezuelan sovereign assets, including CITGO (PdVSA's U.S. refining subsidiary), were placed under the operational control of Guaidó-appointed boards. The Crystallex litigation in the District of Delaware (Crystallex Int'l Corp. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela) eventually produced a court-supervised sale process for PDV Holding shares, requiring an OFAC specific license to consummate any transfer.
Secondary designations have reached Rosneft Trading S.A. (February 18, 2020) and TNK Trading International S.A. (March 12, 2020), both Russian intermediaries facilitating PdVSA oil exports. The program's extraterritorial reach is anchored in 31 C.F.R. §591.407, which treats facilitation by U.S. persons as a prohibited act, and in the secondary sanctions authorities embedded in EO 13850 §1(a)(iii).