I2U2 Outputs and West Asia Strategy
How to read I2U2 deliverables, IMEC architecture, and the MEA's compartmentalized West Asia strategy from Gulf bilaterals to Chabahar.
From the International Forum for Economic Cooperation to I2U2
The I2U2 grouping — India, Israel, the United Arab Emirates, and the United States — was formally launched at the leaders' summit on 14 July 2022, convened virtually during President Joseph Biden's visit to Jerusalem. The configuration grew directly out of the 18 October 2021 meeting of foreign ministers S. Jaishankar, Yair Lapid, Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed, and Antony Blinken, originally branded the 'International Forum for Economic Cooperation.' The rebrand to I2U2 deliberately evoked the Quad's shorthand, signaling that New Delhi viewed West Asia as a parallel theater of plurilateral, issue-driven minilateralism rather than a region defined by Cold War-era hyphenations.
The political precondition was the Abraham Accords of 15 September 2020, which normalized Israel-UAE relations and removed the diplomatic friction that had previously prevented India from operating openly in a single bilateral lane with both Jerusalem and Abu Dhabi. India's own bilateral architecture supplied the second precondition: the India-UAE Comprehensive Strategic Partnership (2017), the India-UAE Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement signed 18 February 2022, and the upgrading of India-Israel ties to a 'Strategic Partnership' during Prime Minister Narendra Modi's July 2017 visit — the first by an Indian premier to Israel.
Stated Agenda and Deliverables
The July 2022 joint statement identified six focus areas: water, energy, transportation, space, health, and food security. Two flagship deliverables were announced at launch. First, a US$2 billion UAE-funded project to develop integrated food parks across India, with US private capital and Israeli agricultural technology — explicitly tied to climate-resilient crop yields and reduction of food waste. Second, a 300 MW hybrid renewable energy project (wind and solar) in Gujarat with a battery storage system, with the US Trade and Development Agency funding a feasibility study and Israeli and Emirati firms positioned as technology and capital partners.
Subsequent ministerial-level engagements have layered on additional verticals. The I2U2 Business Forum, inaugurated in Abu Dhabi on 22 February 2023, formalized a private-sector track, and a Joint Space Venture concept was announced the same year. The grouping has consistently avoided security language in its public deliverables, though analysts read it as the economic complement to the broader US-led West Asian security re-architecture.
Reading the Indian Position
For the Ministry of External Affairs, I2U2 performs three functions simultaneously. It operationalizes 'Link West' — the term Modi used at the 2018 Raisina Dialogue to parallel 'Act East' — by embedding India in a Gulf-centered economic platform without requiring a formal alliance commitment. It diversifies India's technology partnerships beyond the Quad's Indo-Pacific frame, particularly in agri-tech and renewables where Israeli firms hold patents and Emirati sovereign wealth funds hold capital. And it provides a hedge against Chinese economic penetration of the Gulf, especially after Beijing brokered the Saudi-Iran rapprochement of 10 March 2023.
The MEA's official readouts on I2U2 are notably terse compared to Quad statements — a deliberate signal that New Delhi wishes to keep the grouping below the threshold that would attract Iranian or Russian objection. India retains the Chabahar Port lease (renewed via the 13 May 2024 India Ports Global Limited–Port and Maritime Organization of Iran agreement) and continues to participate in the International North-South Transport Corridor alongside Russia and Iran, requiring the MEA to compartmentalize its West Asia portfolio with unusual care.