I2U2 Outputs and West Asia Strategy

From the International Forum for Economic Cooperation to I2U2

The I2U2 grouping — India, Israel, the United Arab Emirates, and the United States — was formally launched at the leaders' summit on 14 July 2022, convened virtually during President Joseph Biden's visit to Jerusalem. The configuration grew directly out of the 18 October 2021 meeting of foreign ministers S. Jaishankar, Yair Lapid, Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed, and Antony Blinken, originally branded the 'International Forum for Economic Cooperation.' The rebrand to I2U2 deliberately evoked the Quad's shorthand, signaling that New Delhi viewed West Asia as a parallel theater of plurilateral, issue-driven minilateralism rather than a region defined by Cold War-era hyphenations.

The political precondition was the Abraham Accords of 15 September 2020, which normalized Israel-UAE relations and removed the diplomatic friction that had previously prevented India from operating openly in a single bilateral lane with both Jerusalem and Abu Dhabi. India's own bilateral architecture supplied the second precondition: the India-UAE Comprehensive Strategic Partnership (2017), the India-UAE Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement signed 18 February 2022, and the upgrading of India-Israel ties to a 'Strategic Partnership' during Prime Minister Narendra Modi's July 2017 visit — the first by an Indian premier to Israel.

Stated Agenda and Deliverables

The July 2022 joint statement identified six focus areas: water, energy, transportation, space, health, and food security. Two flagship deliverables were announced at launch. First, a US$2 billion UAE-funded project to develop integrated food parks across India, with US private capital and Israeli agricultural technology — explicitly tied to climate-resilient crop yields and reduction of food waste. Second, a 300 MW hybrid renewable energy project (wind and solar) in Gujarat with a battery storage system, with the US Trade and Development Agency funding a feasibility study and Israeli and Emirati firms positioned as technology and capital partners.

Subsequent ministerial-level engagements have layered on additional verticals. The I2U2 Business Forum, inaugurated in Abu Dhabi on 22 February 2023, formalized a private-sector track, and a Joint Space Venture concept was announced the same year. The grouping has consistently avoided security language in its public deliverables, though analysts read it as the economic complement to the broader US-led West Asian security re-architecture.

Reading the Indian Position

For the Ministry of External Affairs, I2U2 performs three functions simultaneously. It operationalizes 'Link West' — the term Modi used at the 2018 Raisina Dialogue to parallel 'Act East' — by embedding India in a Gulf-centered economic platform without requiring a formal alliance commitment. It diversifies India's technology partnerships beyond the Quad's Indo-Pacific frame, particularly in agri-tech and renewables where Israeli firms hold patents and Emirati sovereign wealth funds hold capital. And it provides a hedge against Chinese economic penetration of the Gulf, especially after Beijing brokered the Saudi-Iran rapprochement of 10 March 2023.

The MEA's official readouts on I2U2 are notably terse compared to Quad statements — a deliberate signal that New Delhi wishes to keep the grouping below the threshold that would attract Iranian or Russian objection. India retains the Chabahar Port lease (renewed via the 13 May 2024 India Ports Global Limited–Port and Maritime Organization of Iran agreement) and continues to participate in the International North-South Transport Corridor alongside Russia and Iran, requiring the MEA to compartmentalize its West Asia portfolio with unusual care.

IMEC and the Post-I2U2 Layer

The India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC), announced on 9 September 2023 in a Memorandum of Understanding signed on the margins of the G20 New Delhi Summit by India, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, the European Union, France, Germany, Italy, and the United States, represents the maturation of the I2U2 logic into a transcontinental infrastructure framework. IMEC envisages an eastern corridor connecting India to the Arabian Peninsula by sea, and a northern corridor of rail and pipeline running from the UAE through Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Israel to the Mediterranean port of Haifa — controlling stake in which was acquired by the Adani Group and Israel's Gadot in January 2023 for approximately US$1.18 billion.

IMEC is not formally an I2U2 deliverable, but the political relationships that made it negotiable were rehearsed in the I2U2 format. The corridor was suspended in practical terms after the Hamas attack of 7 October 2023 and Israel's subsequent military operations in Gaza, which froze the Saudi-Israel normalization track that IMEC presupposed. The MEA's official line, restated by Jaishankar at the Munich Security Conference on 17 February 2024, is that IMEC remains 'work in progress' — a formulation that preserves the architecture without forcing premature operationalization.

West Asia Strategy as a System

India's West Asia strategy under the Modi government rests on four mutually reinforcing pillars that the diplomatic reader should track separately. First, the Gulf bilateral layer: the 13 February 2024 Bilateral Investment Treaty with the UAE, the India-Saudi Arabia Strategic Partnership Council established 29 October 2019, and the Qatar LNG supply agreement renewed on 6 February 2024 for 20 years through 2048. Second, the Israel technology and defense layer, including continued procurement of Heron drones and Barak-8 missile systems through joint production with IAI and DRDO.

Third, the Iran compartmentalization layer: Chabahar, INSTC, and selective abstention on UN votes — though India did vote in favor of UNGA Resolution ES-10/21 of 27 October 2023 calling for a humanitarian truce in Gaza, and abstained on the 12 December 2023 resolution on similar grounds, reflecting its case-by-case calibration. Fourth, the diaspora layer: approximately 8.9 million Indian nationals in the Gulf Cooperation Council states generate remittances exceeding US$38 billion annually (RBI data, 2023-24), creating a domestic political constraint that shapes evacuation operations such as Operation Ajay (October 2023) and Operation Kaveri (April 2023, Sudan).

What to Watch in MEA Signaling

Diplomatic readers should track three textual markers in MEA outputs. The phrase 'extended neighbourhood' applied to West Asia indicates a sovereign Indian framing distinct from US 'Middle East' or Arab 'West Asia and North Africa' terminology. References to 'connectivity that respects sovereignty and territorial integrity' echo the standard Indian critique of China's Belt and Road Initiative, particularly the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor traversing Pakistan-occupied Kashmir. And explicit naming of IMEC in joint statements — as in the India-US Joint Statement of 22 June 2023 during Modi's state visit to Washington — signals that the corridor remains a live commitment despite the post-October 2023 freeze. Absence of such naming, conversely, indicates that the partner is calibrating expectations downward.