The Future of the International Order

What Is the Liberal International Order?

The 'liberal international order' — sometimes called the 'rules-based international order' — refers to the system of institutions, norms, and practices established after World War II under American leadership. Its pillars include the United Nations, the Bretton Woods financial institutions (IMF, World Bank), the GATT/WTO trading system, NATO and other alliance networks, and a set of norms including human rights, democratic governance, and the prohibition of territorial conquest by force.

This order was never truly global or consistently liberal — it coexisted with colonialism, Cold War proxy conflicts, and US support for authoritarian allies. But it provided a framework for unprecedented economic growth, the spread of democracy, and the longest period without great-power war in modern history. The question now is whether this order can survive the challenges it faces from rising powers, internal democratic erosion, and the return of geopolitical competition.

Challenges from Multiple Directions

The liberal order faces threats from outside and within. Externally, China and Russia challenge its fundamental premises. China offers an alternative governance model that decouples economic development from political liberalization. Russia has used military force to redraw borders in Europe, directly violating the post-1945 prohibition on territorial conquest.

Internally, the order's own champions are wavering. Rising populism and nationalism in the United States, the order's principal architect and guarantor, have produced skepticism about multilateral institutions, free trade, and alliance commitments. Brexit removed one of the EU's largest members. Democratic backsliding in countries from Hungary to India to the Philippines weakens the normative foundation of an order premised on democratic governance.

Structurally, the order was designed for a world where the West dominated. That world no longer exists. Institutions that do not give rising powers adequate voice will lose legitimacy. But reforming institutions requires the consent of those who currently hold disproportionate power — a classic collective action problem.

What Comes Next?

Whatever replaces the current order will need to address problems that did not exist when the current system was designed: climate change, artificial intelligence, cyber warfare, pandemic preparedness, and the governance of space and the deep sea. These challenges require cooperation among states that increasingly see each other as rivals.

The most likely outcome is not a clean replacement of one order with another but a messy, contested transition. Elements of the liberal order will persist — the UN is not going to be abolished, and most states benefit from the WTO trading system. But these institutions will operate alongside new ones created by rising powers, within a broader context of great-power competition.

The critical variable may be whether the US and China can find a modus vivendi — not friendship or alliance, but a basic framework for managing competition without catastrophic conflict. If they can, a new order reflecting 21st-century realities may emerge gradually. If they cannot, the risk of fragmentation and conflict grows dramatically. The stakes of this question are nothing less than the framework within which all other international problems will be addressed.