Climate economics & the energy transition
Climate economics and the energy transition: carbon pricing, externalities, the Paris Agreement, climate finance, CBAM and the green industrial race.
The Externality at the Core
Climate change is, in economic terms, the largest market failure in history—the verdict of the Stern Review on the Economics of Climate Change (2006), commissioned by the UK Treasury and authored by Sir Nicholas Stern. Greenhouse-gas emissions are a negative externality: the emitter bears none of the social cost (crop loss, sea-level rise, mortality) imposed on third parties and future generations. The Pigouvian remedy, named for Arthur Pigou (The Economics of Welfare, 1920), is to internalise that cost through a tax equal to the marginal social damage—the social cost of carbon. The US EPA in 2023 revised its central estimate to roughly USD 190 per tonne of CO2.
Two Instruments: Tax versus Cap-and-Trade
Governments deploy two carbon-pricing tools. A carbon tax fixes the price and lets quantity adjust; Sweden's carbon tax, introduced in 1991, reached about SEK 1,200/tonne and is the world's highest. A cap-and-trade system (emissions trading) fixes the quantity of permits and lets the market set the price—the logic of the Coase theorem (Ronald Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 1960), which holds that with defined property rights and low transaction costs, parties bargain to an efficient outcome regardless of who holds the right.
The flagship cap-and-trade scheme is the EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS), launched in 2005 under Directive 2003/87/EC, covering power, industry and aviation. China launched its national ETS in 2021, the world's largest by covered emissions. The US has no federal price but operates the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI, 2009) and California's cap-and-trade (2013).
Marginal Abatement and Double Dividend
Efficient policy equalises the marginal abatement cost across all emitters—abatement happens wherever it is cheapest, which a uniform carbon price delivers automatically. The marginal abatement cost curve (popularised by McKinsey, 2009) ranks options from negative-cost efficiency measures to expensive carbon capture. The double-dividend hypothesis argues that recycling carbon revenue to cut distortionary taxes (on labour or capital) yields a second welfare gain. British Columbia's revenue-neutral carbon tax (2008) is the textbook case.
Yet carbon pricing confronts political economy limits. The French gilets jaunes protests of November 2018, triggered by a fuel-tax rise, demonstrated the regressivity problem: carbon taxes hit low-income households hardest as a share of income. The remedy is a carbon dividend—lump-sum rebates returning revenue per capita, endorsed in the 2019 Economists' Statement on Carbon Dividends signed by 28 Nobel laureates. Without distributional cushioning, climate policy fails the ballot box even where it passes the efficiency test.