Pakistan-US, Pakistan-China & Afghanistan policy

The Arc of Pakistan-US Relations

Pakistan-US ties form one of the most heavily examined foreign-policy clusters in the CSS Pakistan Affairs paper because they oscillate between alliance and estrangement. The relationship has been described as 'transactional' and 'episodic' precisely because it has tracked US strategic needs rather than a durable partnership.

Alliance Era (1954-1965)

Pakistan entered the US security architecture through the Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement of 19 May 1954, then joined SEATO (8 September 1954) and the Baghdad Pact (1955), which became CENTO in 1959. The Bilateral Agreement of Cooperation of 5 March 1959 committed Washington to act against aggression on Pakistan. The Badaber airbase near Peshawar hosted US U-2 reconnaissance; the U-2 incident of 1 May 1960, when Gary Powers was shot down over Soviet territory after departing Peshawar, exposed Pakistan to Soviet retaliation threats. The 1965 war, during which the US imposed an arms embargo on both India and Pakistan, taught Pakistan that alliance did not guarantee support against India.

Cold War Rounds Two and Three

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan (December 1979) revived the relationship. After Zia ul-Haq famously dismissed Carter's offer of $400 million as 'peanuts', the Reagan administration delivered a $3.2 billion package (1981) and a second $4.02 billion package (1986), plus F-16s, making Pakistan a frontline state channelling aid to the Afghan mujahideen. The Pressler Amendment (1985) required annual presidential certification that Pakistan possessed no nuclear device; in October 1990 President George H. W. Bush withheld certification, triggering sanctions that froze F-16 deliveries.

Post-9/11 and Estrangement

After 9/11, Pakistan became a 'major non-NATO ally' (designated 2004) and received Coalition Support Funds. The Kerry-Lugar-Berman Act (Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act, 2009) authorised $7.5 billion in civilian aid over five years but its conditionalities provoked a sovereignty backlash. Relations collapsed over the Raymond Davis affair (January 2011), the Abbottabad raid on Osama bin Laden (2 May 2011), and the Salala/NATO strike (26 November 2011) that killed 24 soldiers and led Pakistan to close NATO supply routes until July 2012. The US suspension of security assistance in January 2018, and Pakistan's role in facilitating the Doha Agreement (29 February 2020) between the US and the Taliban, frame the contemporary relationship.

Retain the pattern examiners reward: engagement during three Cold War/anti-terror phases, punctuated by sanctions tied to the nuclear programme (Symington, Glenn, Pressler amendments) and crises of trust.

The China Pillar and the Afghan Question

Pakistan-China: 'All-Weather' Strategic Partnership

Pakistan recognised the People's Republic on 4 January 1950 (among the first non-communist states). The boundary agreement of 2 March 1963, settling the frontier in the Karakoram and ceding the Shaksgam tract, anchored strategic alignment against shared concern over India. The Karakoram Highway, begun 1966 and completed 1979 (opened 1986), physically linked the two states. China's support during the 1965 and 1971 wars, and its assistance to Pakistan's nuclear and missile programmes, deepened ties.

The centrepiece today is the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), launched in April 2015 during Xi Jinping's visit with an initial portfolio of roughly $46 billion (later expanded toward $62 billion), a flagship of the Belt and Road Initiative. CPEC links Gwadar port (operated by China Overseas Port Holding since 2013) to Kashgar in Xinjiang, addressing China's 'Malacca dilemma'. Examiners expect candidates to weigh CPEC's promise (energy, infrastructure) against debt-sustainability and security concerns (attacks on Chinese nationals, the special security division raised to protect projects).

Afghanistan Policy: From Strategic Depth to Reluctant Neighbour

Pakistan's Afghan policy has pivoted on the doctrine of 'strategic depth', articulated by General Mirza Aslam Beg around 1988-89, seeking a friendly Kabul to avoid a two-front threat and counter Indian influence. The Durand Line (1893 Durand Agreement) remains contested by successive Afghan governments, none of which formally recognise it as an international border; Afghanistan was the sole state to oppose Pakistan's UN admission in 1947.

Pakistan backed the mujahideen through the 1980s, then key factions, and was one of only three states (with Saudi Arabia and the UAE) to recognise the Taliban government in 1996. After 9/11 it reversed course under US pressure (the Musharraf government's seven demands). The return of the Taliban in August 2021 has, contrary to expectations of a friendly border, produced friction: the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) has escalated attacks after its November 2022 ceasefire collapse, and Pakistan launched mass deportations of undocumented Afghans from November 2023. Pakistan now manages a paradox: a Taliban Kabul that it long sought, yet which harbours the TTP threatening Pakistani security.

The Triangulation Logic

The high-yield analytical point: Pakistan balances a deepening China partnership against a fluctuating US relationship while seeking a stable western frontier. Each pillar is interdependent — US-China rivalry, Afghan instability and the Kashmir-India dimension constrain Pakistan's room for manoeuvre.

Why This Matters for the Exam

This topic sits at the heart of the Foreign Policy segment of the CSS Pakistan Affairs compulsory paper, and it recurs in International Relations and Current Affairs papers. The Federal Public Service Commission has repeatedly set questions demanding a comparative, analytical treatment rather than narration.

How It Is Tested

Past-year questions cluster around three formats. First, the comparative essay: 'Pakistan's relations with the US have been transactional while those with China are strategic — discuss.' Second, the policy evaluation: 'Critically examine CPEC as a game-changer for Pakistan's economy and security.' Third, the regional crisis question: 'Analyse the implications of the Taliban's return to Kabul (2021) for Pakistan's security.' The 2018, 2019 and 2021 papers carried variants of these.

What Examiners Reward

A top script does four things. It periodises — Pakistan-US ties in distinct phases (1954-65 alliance, 1979-89 jihad, 2001-18 war on terror, 2018-present drift). It cites instruments and dates — the 1954 MDAA, 1959 Bilateral Agreement, Pressler Amendment (1985), Kerry-Lugar-Berman (2009), the 1963 Sino-Pak boundary agreement, CPEC (2015), the Doha Agreement (29 February 2020). It deploys concepts — 'strategic depth', 'all-weather friendship', the 'Malacca dilemma', 'major non-NATO ally', and the 'do more' mantra. Finally, it renders a judgement grounded in national interest rather than slogans.

High-Yield Retention Set

Memorise: SEATO (1954), CENTO (1959), U-2 incident (1960), the 'peanuts' rejection (1980), Pressler sanctions (1990), Abbottabad raid and Salala incident (2011), suspension of aid (January 2018); recognition of PRC (1950), boundary pact (1963), Karakoram Highway (1979), CPEC (2015), Gwadar; Durand Agreement (1893), strategic depth (c.1988), Taliban recognition (1996), Doha Agreement (2020), Taliban return (August 2021), TTP resurgence. Pair every claim with a date and you convert narration into analysis — exactly the discriminator between an average and a distinction-grade answer.