The People's Liberation Army & the Central Military Commission

The Foundational Principle: The Party Commands the Gun

The defining axiom of China's civil-military relations was articulated by Mao Zedong at the Sixth Plenum of the Sixth Central Committee in November 1938: "Political power grows out of the barrel of a gun," coupled with its corollary, "the Party commands the gun, and the gun must never be allowed to command the Party." The People's Liberation Army (PLA) is therefore not a national army in the Western constitutional sense; it is the armed wing of the Communist Party of China (CPC), founded on 1 August 1927 at the Nanchang Uprising (commemorated as Army Day).

Constitutional and Party-Charter Basis

Two parallel authorities anchor military command. First, the CPC Constitution (most recently amended at the 20th Party Congress, October 2022) establishes the Central Military Commission of the Central Committee and stipulates the system of "absolute Party leadership over the armed forces" and the practice of the CMC Chairman responsibility system (军委主席负责制), under which the Chairman has final decision-making authority over all military affairs.

Second, the 1982 State Constitution, in Articles 93 and 94, created a state Central Military Commission, composed of a chairman, vice-chairmen and members, elected by and accountable to the National People's Congress (NPC). The state CMC chairman is chosen by the NPC, serves a term concurrent with it, and—uniquely among top offices after the 2018 constitutional amendment removed presidential term limits—has never been subject to a two-term cap.

The 'Two Commissions, One Institution' Reality

In practice the Party CMC and the state CMC share identical membership and a single working body. This is the doctrine of "one institution, two nameplates" (一个机构、两块牌子). The Party CMC, ratified by the Central Committee, is the substantive locus of power; the state CMC is its constitutional reflection, giving the same command a legal-state face. Xi Jinping has chaired both since November 2012 (Party CMC) and March 2013 (state CMC).

This duality matters because it reveals the architecture of Chinese power: real authority flows through Party organs, with state organs supplying constitutional legitimacy. The PLA swears loyalty not to the constitution or the nation but to the CPC. The 2015 reform reaffirmed that the CMC Chairman responsibility system is the "fundamental implementation" of absolute Party leadership, and the principle was written into the Party Charter at the 19th Congress (2017). Candidates should be able to distinguish the PLA (the party-army), the People's Armed Police (PAP, brought under sole CMC command in 2018, removing State Council dual leadership), and the militia—the three components of China's armed forces under Article 22 of the 2020 National Defense Law as revised.

The 2015–2016 Structural Overhaul

The most consequential reorganization of the PLA since 1949 was launched by Xi Jinping in late 2015 and implemented through 2016. It dismantled the old system of four General Departments (General Staff, General Political, General Logistics, General Armament) that had accreted autonomous bureaucratic power, replacing them with 15 functional departments, commissions and offices directly under the CMC. This concentrated authority in the CMC itself and, by extension, in its Chairman.

From Military Regions to Theater Commands

The reform abolished the seven Military Regions (军区) and created five Theater Commands (战区) on 1 February 2016: Eastern, Southern, Western, Northern and Central. The logic was joint operations: theater commands are responsible for warfighting and operational command, while the services are responsible for force construction—the principle summarized as "CMC leads, theater commands fight, services build" (军委管总、战区主战、军种主建).

A New Service and a New Branch

The PLA's services were clarified into the Army (PLAA, which gained its own separate headquarters for the first time in December 2015), Navy (PLAN), Air Force (PLAAF) and Rocket Force (PLARF, elevated from the Second Artillery Corps on 31 December 2015 to command China's land-based nuclear and conventional missiles). A new Strategic Support Force was created the same day to integrate space, cyber and electronic-warfare capabilities; it was dissolved and reorganized in April 2024 into three direct CMC-subordinate arms—the Aerospace Force, Cyberspace Force and Information Support Force—alongside the Joint Logistic Support Force.

Why This Matters for the Exam

For the Guokao political-theory paper (政治理论), this lesson serves the section on the state structure and the system of Party leadership (党的领导制度体系). Examiners test the candidate's grasp of absolute Party leadership over the armed forces as one of the defining features distinguishing China's system from constitutional democracies; expect objective questions pinpointing the CMC Chairman responsibility system and short-answer items asking you to explain why the PLA is a party-army.

High-yield facts to retain: the dual CMC structure (Party CMC under the Central Committee; state CMC under Articles 93–94 elected by the NPC); the founding date 1 August 1927; the 2015–16 shift from seven Military Regions to five Theater Commands; the Rocket Force elevation (31 December 2015); and the 2018 transfer of the People's Armed Police to sole CMC command. The PYQ angle frequently couples the PLA with the broader theme "坚持党对一切工作的领导" (upholding Party leadership over all work) from the 19th and 20th Congress reports. Frame answers around the principle, the institutional mechanism, and a dated reform instance.