Maritime disputes & periphery diplomacy (South China Sea, India)

The Nine-Dash Line and Competing Claims

China asserts "indisputable sovereignty" over roughly 90% of the South China Sea, demarcated by the nine-dash line first published on official Republic of China maps in 1947 and inherited by the People's Republic. The claim encompasses the Paracel (Xisha) Islands, the Spratly (Nansha) Islands, the Pratas (Dongsha), and Scarborough Shoal (Huangyan Dao). Overlapping claims are pressed by Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei, and Taiwan. China seized the western Paracels from South Vietnam in the January 1974 battle and took Johnson South Reef from Vietnam in March 1988.

From 2013 onward China conducted large-scale island-building, reclaiming over 3,000 acres across seven Spratly features—Fiery Cross, Subi, and Mischief Reefs now host runways, radar, and surface-to-air missile installations. President Xi Jinping told the Rose Garden in September 2015 that China did not "intend to pursue militarization," a pledge contradicted by subsequent deployments.

UNCLOS and the 2016 Arbitral Award

The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS, 1982), which China ratified in 1996, grants a 200-nautical-mile Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) from coastal baselines and distinguishes "islands" (entitled to an EEZ, Article 121(1)) from "rocks" (which cannot sustain human habitation, Article 121(3)) and low-tide elevations (no entitlement).

In January 2013 the Philippines initiated arbitration under UNCLOS Annex VII. The Permanent Court of Arbitration tribunal at The Hague issued its award on 12 July 2016. It held that the nine-dash line had no legal basis as a claim to "historic rights" beyond UNCLOS entitlements; that none of the Spratly features qualifies as an island generating an EEZ; and that China's reclamation at Mischief Reef (within the Philippine EEZ) and its harassment of Filipino fishermen at Scarborough Shoal violated the Convention. China declared the award "null and void" and refused to participate, invoking its 2006 Article 298 declaration excluding maritime-delimitation disputes from compulsory arbitration—a declaration the tribunal ruled inapplicable.

ASEAN, the Code of Conduct, and Freedom of Navigation

China and ASEAN signed the non-binding Declaration on the Conduct of Parties (DOC) in 2002 and have negotiated a binding Code of Conduct (COC) since 2017, repeatedly delayed. Beijing prefers bilateral negotiation, splitting the ASEAN bloc; the July 2012 Phnom Penh summit failed to issue a communiqué for the first time, widely attributed to Cambodian deference to Beijing. The United States conducts Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPs) challenging excessive maritime claims, intensified since 2015, while reiterating it takes no position on sovereignty. The 2023–24 confrontations at Second Thomas Shoal, where China's coast guard used water cannon against Philippine resupply missions to the grounded BRP Sierra Madre, mark the sharpest flashpoint, tested against the 1951 US–Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty.

Periphery Diplomacy and the China–India Boundary

China's concept of "periphery diplomacy" (周边外交), elevated at the October 2013 Work Forum on Diplomacy toward the Periphery, frames relations with the fourteen contiguous neighbors as the priority arena of statecraft, organized around the slogan of "amity, sincerity, mutual benefit, and inclusiveness" (亲、诚、惠、容). India is the largest and most consequential of these neighbors, and the relationship is defined by an unresolved 3,488-km Line of Actual Control (LAC).

The boundary dispute spans the western sector (Aksai Chin, ~38,000 sq km held by China, claimed by India as part of Ladakh) and the eastern sector (Arunachal Pradesh, ~90,000 sq km claimed by China as "South Tibet"/Zangnan). The McMahon Line, drawn at the 1914 Simla Convention, is rejected by China as a colonial imposition. The 1962 Sino-Indian War ended in a Chinese victory and unilateral withdrawal but settled nothing.

From Confidence-Building to Galwan

A series of agreements sought to stabilize the LAC: the 1993 Agreement on Maintenance of Peace and Tranquillity, the 1996 Agreement on Confidence-Building Measures (which barred firing within 2 km of the LAC), and the 2005 Protocol and "Political Parameters and Guiding Principles." These held until the Doklam standoff of June–August 2017, triggered by Chinese road construction on a plateau disputed between China and Bhutan, where India intervened citing the 1949/2007 India–Bhutan treaty relationship.

The gravest rupture came in the Galwan Valley clash of 15 June 2020, the first combat deaths on the boundary since 1975—20 Indian soldiers and an acknowledged 4 Chinese killed. Following multiple rounds of Corps Commander-level talks, partial disengagement occurred at Pangong Tso (February 2021) and elsewhere, with a broader patrolling agreement announced in October 2024 around Depsang and Demchok, enabling the Xi–Modi meeting on the margins of the Kazan BRICS summit.

Strategic Friction Beyond the Border

India is the principal holdout against the Belt and Road Initiative, boycotting both Belt and Road Forums (2017, 2019) primarily because the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) traverses Gilgit-Baltistan, territory India claims. China has repeatedly blocked India's bid for membership of the Nuclear Suppliers Group and, until May 2019, used technical holds at the UN Security Council 1267 Committee to shield Jaish-e-Mohammed chief Masood Azhar from listing. India counters through the Quad (with the US, Japan, Australia), revived in 2017, and deepening Indo-Pacific cooperation—while continuing to coordinate with China inside BRICS and the SCO, the dual-track logic central to understanding Indian strategy.

Why This Matters for the Exam

For the Guokao international section, maritime disputes and periphery diplomacy are tested as the concrete application of China's grand strategy—where the abstract principles of the earlier lessons (sovereignty, non-interference, a "community of common destiny") collide with hard interests and rival powers. Expect this material in the 申论 (Shenlun) essay component and in objective questions on international relations and current affairs.

How It Is Tested

Three angles recur. First, the legal-institutional angle: candidates must know that China ratified UNCLOS in 1996, the substance and date of the 12 July 2016 arbitral award, and China's position that the award is "null and void" because maritime delimitation was excluded under its Article 298 declaration of 2006. An essay may ask you to reconcile China's defense of international law in trade (WTO) with its rejection of the UNCLOS tribunal—the expected framing is the distinction between binding adjudication China accepts and "compulsory" jurisdiction it argues infringes sovereignty.

Second, the diplomatic-management angle: the DOC (2002), the ongoing COC negotiations since 2017, and China's preference for bilateral over multilateral resolution to prevent ASEAN bloc unity. Retain the 2012 Phnom Penh communiqué failure as the textbook instance of China's influence fracturing ASEAN.

Third, the periphery-strategy angle: the October 2013 Periphery Diplomacy Work Forum and its four-character slogan, the China–India LAC, Galwan (15 June 2020), Doklam (2017), and the October 2024 patrolling agreement that reopened high-level engagement at Kazan. A strong answer connects these to BRI dynamics—India's boycott over CPEC and Gilgit-Baltistan—and to the Quad.

High-Yield Facts to Retain

• Nine-dash line: 1947 ROC origin; ~90% of the South China Sea.
• Paracels seized 1974; Johnson South Reef 1988; reclamation from 2013.
• UNCLOS Article 121 island/rock distinction; 200-nm EEZ.
• 2016 PCA award: nine-dash line no "historic rights"; no Spratly feature is an island.
• 1962 war; 1993/1996 CBM agreements; 2017 Doklam; 2020 Galwan (20 Indian dead).
• Frame every answer around the tension between China's professed multilateralism and its selective compliance, and India's dual-track hedging.