Grand strategy & 'great changes unseen in a century'
Decodes China's grand strategy through the doctrine of 'great changes unseen in a century,' from Deng's hide-and-bide to Xi's national rejuvenation by 2049.
The phrase that frames Chinese statecraft
'Great changes unseen in a century' (百年未有之大变局, bainian weiyou zhi da bianju) is the master concept of Xi Jinping-era foreign policy. Xi first deployed it in a December 2017 address to the Central Conference on Work Relating to Foreign Affairs, and codified it at the same body's June 2018 session. By the 19th Party Congress (October 2017) and again in the 20th Party Congress Report (October 2022), the formulation had become the official lens through which the Communist Party of China (CPC) reads the international order. It asserts that the post-1945 Western-led system is in structural flux, that the global balance of power is shifting toward the developing world and 'the East,' and that this transition opens a 'period of strategic opportunity' (战略机遇期) for China's rise.
From hide-and-bide to striving for achievement
Chinese grand strategy under the People's Republic falls into discernible phases. Mao Zedong's era ran on revolution, the 1950 Sino-Soviet Treaty, and after 1972 the opening to Washington (the Shanghai Communiqué of 28 February 1972). Deng Xiaoping's 1978 reform-and-opening pivoted to economic modernization and a deliberately low profile, distilled in his 24-character guidance (韬光养晦, taoguang yanghui) — 'hide your strength, bide your time' — articulated around 1990 after the Tiananmen sanctions and the Soviet collapse. Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao sustained the 'peaceful rise / peaceful development' line, codified in the 2005 State Council White Paper on China's Peaceful Development.
Xi Jinping broke the rhetorical caution. From 2013 he substituted 'striving for achievement' (奋发有为, fenfa youwei) and 'major-country diplomacy with Chinese characteristics' (中国特色大国外交). The two centenary goals anchor the timeline: a 'moderately prosperous society' by 2021 (the CPC's centenary), and a 'modern socialist great power' fully achieving 'national rejuvenation' by 2049 (the PRC's centenary). The 19th Congress inserted an intermediate milestone — basic modernization by 2035.
The instruments and the worldview
Xi pairs the doctrine with a portfolio of concept-exports: the Belt and Road Initiative (2013), the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (operational 2016), a 'community of common destiny for mankind' (人类命运共同体), and the later Global Development Initiative (2021), Global Security Initiative (2022) and Global Civilization Initiative (2023). Underlying these is a conviction that 'the East is rising and the West is declining' (东升西降) and that multipolarity favors China. The doctrine is not merely descriptive; it is a mobilizational tool licensing greater risk-tolerance, military modernization (the PLA's 2027 and 2035 benchmarks), and a contest over the rules and narratives of global governance.
