Cross-strait relations & the Taiwan question

The constitutional and historical baseline

The Taiwan question is, in Beijing's framing, the unfinished business of the Chinese Civil War (1945–1949), after which the Kuomintang government relocated to Taipei in December 1949 while the Chinese Communist Party founded the People's Republic of China (PRC) on 1 October 1949. The PRC's position rests on the one-China principle: there is one China, Taiwan is part of China, and the PRC government is the sole legal government of China. This principle is codified domestically in the Preamble of the 1982 PRC Constitution, which calls Taiwan 'part of the sacred territory of the People's Republic of China,' and in the Anti-Secession Law of 14 March 2005, whose Article 8 authorises 'non-peaceful means' if Taiwan secedes, if a major incident entailing secession occurs, or if possibilities for peaceful reunification are exhausted.

The Cairo–Potsdam–San Francisco thread

Beijing anchors its sovereignty claim in wartime declarations. The Cairo Declaration of 1 December 1943 stated that territories Japan had 'stolen from the Chinese,' including Formosa (Taiwan) and the Pescadores, should be restored to the Republic of China. The Potsdam Declaration of 26 July 1945 affirmed that Cairo's terms would be carried out, and Japan accepted them in its Instrument of Surrender of 2 September 1945. Beijing treats this chain as dispositive. Critics note the San Francisco Peace Treaty of 8 September 1951 had Japan renounce Taiwan without naming a recipient — the source of the 'undetermined status' argument that Beijing rejects outright.

The UN moment and diplomatic isolation

The decisive multilateral turn came with UN General Assembly Resolution 2758 of 25 October 1971, which recognised the PRC's representatives as 'the only legitimate representatives of China to the United Nations' and expelled 'the representatives of Chiang Kai-shek.' Beijing reads 2758 as settling Taiwan's status in international law; Washington and Taipei argue it addressed only UN representation, not sovereignty. This interpretive gap is now a live contest, as Taiwan and the US push the reading that 2758 does not bar Taiwan's participation in UN bodies.

The PRC has steadily compressed Taipei's diplomatic space: the Republic of China maintained over 20 formal partners into the 2010s but, after switches by Panama (2017), the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, the Solomon Islands and Kiribati (2019), Nicaragua (2021) and Honduras (2023), held only about a dozen by the mid-2020s. The one-China principle is also the entry condition for diplomatic relations with Beijing — every state establishing ties must, at minimum, 'acknowledge' or 'recognise' the PRC position on Taiwan.

The US framework: deliberate ambiguity

United States policy is the structural variable in cross-strait relations and rests on three pillars. First, three joint communiqués with the PRC: the Shanghai Communiqué (28 February 1972), in which the US 'acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China'; the Normalisation Communiqué (1 January 1979), recognising the PRC as the sole legal government; and the 17 August 1982 Communiqué on phasing down arms sales. Second, the Taiwan Relations Act (Public Law 96-8, 10 April 1979), which commits the US to provide Taiwan defensive arms and to regard any non-peaceful effort to determine Taiwan's future as 'of grave concern.' Third, the Six Assurances of 1982. The composite posture is 'strategic ambiguity' — deterring both a PRC attack and a unilateral Taiwanese declaration of independence.

Cross-strait politics since the 1990s

The 1992 Consensus — an oral understanding of 'one China, respective interpretations' reached between the Straits Exchange Foundation and the Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits — underpinned the warming of the Ma Ying-jeou era, culminating in the Xi–Ma meeting in Singapore on 7 November 2015, the first encounter of leaders from both sides since 1949. The election of the Democratic Progressive Party's Tsai Ing-wen in 2016, and her refusal to endorse the 1992 Consensus, froze official channels. Tensions escalated with US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi's visit on 2–3 August 2022, after which the PLA conducted unprecedented live-fire drills encircling Taiwan, and again following the January 2024 election of William Lai (Lai Ching-te), whom Beijing brands a 'separatist.'

The exam frame: why this matters

For the Guokao international section, the Taiwan question is tested both as legal-doctrinal knowledge (one-China principle versus US 'one-China policy'; the meaning of UNGA 2758; the Anti-Secession Law) and as current-affairs analysis (PLA grey-zone pressure, diplomatic ally switches, arms sales). Shenlun-style argumentative essays may ask candidates to explain why the one-China principle is the 'political foundation' of China's relations with all states, or to assess external interference. High-yield retention: distinguish Beijing's one-China principle (Taiwan IS part of the PRC) from Washington's one-China policy (acknowledging, not endorsing, the PRC claim) — this distinction is the single most commonly mishandled point. Memorise the four dates that recur in objective questions: 1971 (Resolution 2758), 1972 (Shanghai), 1979 (Normalisation + Taiwan Relations Act), and 2005 (Anti-Secession Law). Be able to name three post-2017 ally switches and cite Article 8 of the Anti-Secession Law verbatim in substance. Examiners reward precise differentiation of legal instruments from political slogans.