Ceasefire Negotiations and Obstacles

The Jeddah Process

The most prominent mediation effort for Sudan's 2023 war has been the Jeddah talks, co-facilitated by Saudi Arabia and the United States. The talks began in May 2023, shortly after the war erupted, and have gone through multiple rounds. Both the SAF and RSF sent delegations, and several short-term ceasefires were announced.

Every single ceasefire was violated within hours. The pattern became grimly predictable: a ceasefire would be announced, international mediators would express cautious optimism, and fighting would continue unabated. Neither side demonstrated the capacity or willingness to control its forces on the ground, even when its leadership had nominally agreed to stop fighting.

The Jeddah process faced structural challenges from the start. Saudi Arabia, as host, had its own strategic interests in Sudan. The US brought diplomatic weight but limited leverage — Washington had few tools to impose costs on either party. The AU and regional actors felt sidelined. And the talks focused on humanitarian access and ceasefire mechanics rather than addressing the political questions at the root of the war.

Why Ceasefires Keep Failing

Multiple factors explain the serial failure of ceasefire attempts.

Neither side believes it is losing. The SAF controls the east and north; the RSF controls much of Darfur and western Sudan. Both believe time is on their side — the SAF because it retains the formal state apparatus and international recognition, the RSF because of its territorial gains and external support. When both sides believe they can still win, neither has an incentive to stop fighting.

Command and control problems. The RSF in particular is not a unified, hierarchical force. It includes tribal militias, local warlords, and fighters motivated by looting as much as politics. Even if Hemedti orders a ceasefire, his subordinates on the ground may ignore it — especially if compliance means giving up control of territory or resources they are personally profiting from.

Spoilers. Both sides contain factions that actively oppose any ceasefire. Hardliners within the SAF — including Islamist elements from the Bashir era — view the war as existential and see negotiations as betrayal. RSF commanders who control gold mines or looted property have personal financial reasons to continue fighting.

What Would It Take?

Conflict analysts have identified several conditions that would need to change for a ceasefire to hold. First, at least one side would need to conclude that it cannot achieve its goals militarily — what scholars call a 'mutually hurting stalemate.' As of 2024, neither side had reached this conclusion.

Second, external patrons would need to apply coordinated pressure. The UAE's support for the RSF and Egypt's support for the SAF have sustained both sides' capacity to fight. If external backers conditioned support on ceasefire compliance, the calculus could shift. But neither the UAE nor Egypt has shown willingness to do so.

Third, any ceasefire would need robust monitoring and enforcement mechanisms — not just a paper agreement. The OSCE model used in other conflicts, with on-the-ground monitors and real-time violation reporting, is one option, but deploying such a mechanism in Sudan's vast territory with multiple fragmented armed forces would be logistically extraordinarily difficult.

The painful reality is that many civil wars end not through negotiated ceasefires but through military victory, exhaustion, or partition. Whether Sudan's war follows one of these paths — or whether a negotiated end is still possible — remains one of the most consequential open questions in international affairs.