What It Means in Practice
Weaponized interdependence is a theoretical introduced by Henry Farrell and Abraham Newman in a 2019 International Security article. It explains how globalization — once seen as a force that would pacify international relations by making war costly — can instead be used coercively by states that control critical network 'chokepoints.' Where classical interdependence theorists (Keohane, Nye) saw deep economic ties as constraints on conflict, Farrell and Newman show those same ties create asymmetric points of leverage.
The framework identifies two main mechanisms. The panopticon effect is gathering intelligence through privileged network access — reading the messages, watching the flows, harvesting the data that pass through a network because of who controls its infrastructure. The chokepoint effect is denying network access to coerce behavior — , export controls, dollar-clearing restrictions, telecommunications cutoffs.
Why It Matters
The framework reframes globalization as a structural source of power rather than as a constraint on it. This has major implications for how states think about both economic strategy and security. If networks confer power, then controlling networks becomes a strategic objective; if dependency creates vulnerability, then reducing dependency becomes a national security imperative.
This reframing has practical consequences. It explains why the US has invested heavily in maintaining dollar dominance, centrality, and chip-equipment chokepoints — these are sources of asymmetric leverage that translate to national power. It also explains why China, the EU, Russia, and India have all built (or tried to build) alternatives: CIPS, Instex, Mir, UPI — each is an attempt to reduce exposure to US-controlled chokepoints.
How Chokepoints Get Built
Not all networks are equally weaponizable. Farrell and Newman identify three conditions for a network to be a usable chokepoint:
- Centralization — the network has hubs through which much of the activity passes. The internet, dollar clearing, and SWIFT are highly centralized; commodity shipping is not.
- Asymmetric jurisdiction — one state holds disproportionate legal authority over the hub. The US holds asymmetric authority over the dollar-clearing system because most of it runs through US correspondent banks.
- Resilient infrastructure — the network has stable, hard-to-replace technical foundations.
Where all three conditions are met (dollar clearing, undersea cables, advanced lithography, GPS), the controlling state has potent coercive options. Where they are not met (commodity trade, container shipping), weaponization is harder.
US vs Chinese Weaponization
The US dominates current chokepoints because the dollar, SWIFT, the global ICT backbone, and advanced semiconductors all run through US jurisdiction or US-allied jurisdictions. The result: secondary sanctions, OFAC SDN designations, and export controls have global reach.
China is the rising challenger via three vectors: (1) the Belt and Road 's physical infrastructure (ports, railways, telecoms), which positions China as a chokepoint over its participants; (2) CIPS, the renminbi-clearing system, slowly building alternative financial plumbing; (3) dominance in rare-earth and battery-input processing, giving China chokepoint leverage over the green-. Whether China's chokepoints will mature into US-comparable instruments is the central strategic question of the 2020s–2030s.
Common Misconceptions
Weaponized interdependence is sometimes equated with . Sanctions are one application of the framework, but they are not the whole. Surveillance through network access, technology-standards capture, and infrastructure dependencies are also forms of weaponized interdependence that don't fit the sanctions box.
Another misconception is that weaponization is irreversible. It is not — the more aggressively the US weaponizes its chokepoints, the harder targets work to build alternatives, slowly degrading the chokepoints themselves. This 'overuse' problem is increasingly visible in dollar diplomacy: every aggressive sanctions action incentivizes Russia, China, Iran, and others to build CBDC-based payment systems, RMB-clearing networks, and non-SWIFT financial messaging.
Real-World Examples
The 2014 SWIFT cutoff of Iranian banks is a textbook chokepoint operation — SWIFT is technically Belgian-based, but US influence over the consortium and the dollar-clearing infrastructure of its largest member banks gave Washington effective control.
The 2022 US export controls on advanced chips and chip equipment to China weaponized the chokepoint that US, Dutch, and Japanese firms hold over the global semiconductor supply chain.
The Snowden disclosures (2013) revealed the US panopticon effect in operation — the NSA's exploitation of US-controlled ICT infrastructure for global signals intelligence collection. The disclosures spurred several countries to invest in data-localization regimes specifically to reduce panopticon exposure.
Russia's natural gas leverage over Europe before 2022 was a weaponization of energy chokepoint position — one that Moscow misjudged badly, leading to its loss of the chokepoint as Europe diversified at unprecedented speed.
Example
The 2022 US-EU decision to disconnect Russian banks from SWIFT is the highest-profile weaponized-interdependence operation to date.