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Two Safeguards (两个维护)

Updated May 23, 2026

The Two Safeguards is a Chinese Communist Party discipline formula requiring members to uphold Xi Jinping's core status and the Central Committee's centralized authority.

The Two Safeguards (两个维护, liǎng gè wéihù) is a binding political-discipline formula of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) requiring every member to "resolutely safeguard General Secretary Xi Jinping's core status on the Party Central Committee and in the Party as a whole" (坚决维护习近平总书记的核心地位、坚决维护党中央权威和集中统一领导) and to "resolutely safeguard the authority and centralized, unified leadership of the Party Central Committee." The formula consolidated in its current form at the 19th Party Congress in October 2017 and was incorporated into the revised Party Constitution adopted at that congress. It builds on the earlier designation of Xi as the "core" (核心) of the Party leadership at the Sixth Plenum of the 18th Central Committee in October 2016, and on the "Four Consciousnesses" (四个意识) promulgated in January 2016. Together with the Four Consciousnesses, the Four Self-Confidences (四个自信), and the Two Safeguards, the formula forms a cluster of disciplinary slogans collectively abbreviated as "四个意识、四个自信、两个维护."

Operationally, the Two Safeguards function as a measurable criterion of cadre loyalty enforced through the Party's discipline-inspection system. The Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI, 中央纪委) and its provincial and ministerial counterparts evaluate officials against the formula during routine inspection tours (巡视), annual democratic-life meetings (民主生活会), and case investigations. A finding that an official has "failed to implement the Two Safeguards" (不落实两个维护) constitutes a serious political infraction under the CCP's "Regulations on Disciplinary Actions" (中国共产党纪律处分条例), most recently revised in December 2023, which devotes its opening "political discipline" chapter to violations against Central Committee authority. Sanctions range from intra-Party warnings and demerits to expulsion and referral to state prosecutors for criminal handling under Article 102 (subversion) or corruption statutes.

The formula is operationalized through written self-criticisms, loyalty pledges, and the requirement that all major policy decisions by ministries, state-owned enterprises, provincial governments, and People's Liberation Army units be reported to the Central Committee through "request-for-instructions and reporting" procedures (请示报告制度), codified in the January 2019 Central Committee regulation of the same name. Provincial Party committees produce quarterly compliance reports. The 2018 reorganization that merged the State Supervision Commission with the CCDI extended the formula's reach beyond Party members to all public-sector employees. State media, particularly People's Daily and Qiushi, publish editorials reiterating the Two Safeguards before each plenum, and Xi Jinping Thought study sessions in Party schools test cadres on its content.

Contemporary enforcement examples illustrate the formula's bite. The October 2017 expulsion of former Chongqing Party secretary Sun Zhengcai and the March 2023 sentencing of former justice minister Fu Zhenghua both cited failure to uphold the Two Safeguards in their official indictments. The CCDI's annual communiqués from 2019 onward list "two-faced persons" (两面人) — officials who pay lip service while privately dissenting — as priority targets. Provincial cases against Inner Mongolia officials over the 2020 bilingual-education protests, and against Henan officials following the 2022 Zhengzhou bank-protest health-code scandal, invoked the formula. Within the PLA, the Central Military Commission Chairman Responsibility System (军委主席负责制) operationalizes the Two Safeguards in the armed forces, and the 2023 purges of Rocket Force commanders Li Yuchao and Liu Guangbin were framed in these terms.

The Two Safeguards should be distinguished from the Four Consciousnesses (四个意识: political consciousness, consciousness of the overall situation, core consciousness, alignment consciousness), which describe required cognitive dispositions, whereas the Two Safeguards prescribe observable conduct. It is also distinct from the Two Establishes (两个确立), formalized at the Sixth Plenum of the 19th Central Committee in November 2021, which "establish" Xi's core position and the guiding role of Xi Jinping Thought as historical achievements; the Two Establishes are foundational propositions, while the Two Safeguards are the operative duty arising from them. The formula also differs from the older Maoist "Two Whatevers" (两个凡是) of 1977, which Deng Xiaoping repudiated — though critics outside China have drawn rhetorical comparisons.

Controversy surrounds the formula's tension with the Party Constitution's nominal prohibition on personality cults, a prohibition added under Deng in 1982 and never formally removed. Internal Party scholars, including former Central Party School professor Cai Xia before her 2020 expulsion, argued that elevating a single leader's "core" status above collective leadership contradicts the post-Mao consensus codified in the 1981 Historical Resolution. The November 2021 Third Historical Resolution effectively superseded that constraint. The formula's invocation has expanded since 2022 to cover economic and foreign-policy dissent, with several finance officials disciplined in 2023–2024 for "discussing the Central Committee" (妄议中央) — a related offense codified in Article 56 of the 2015 disciplinary regulations.

For the foreign-policy practitioner, the Two Safeguards is the single most reliable indicator of where decision-making authority resides in Beijing. Diplomatic interlocutors at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the International Liaison Department, and embassies abroad operate under explicit instruction to refer substantive matters upward; expectations that ministers or ambassadors hold negotiating latitude comparable to Western counterparts are misplaced. Tracking the formula's invocation in official communiqués — particularly its pairing with the Two Establishes — signals the political space available for policy adjustment, and its appearance in disciplinary verdicts against senior officials provides one of the few public windows onto elite politics in Xi-era China.

Example

In January 2024, the CCDI's annual plenum communiqué cited the Two Safeguards as the foremost criterion for evaluating cadres, naming purged Rocket Force commander Li Yuchao among officials who had failed the standard.

Frequently asked questions

The Two Establishes (两个确立), formalized at the Sixth Plenum of the 19th Central Committee in November 2021, are foundational propositions asserting Xi Jinping's core status and Xi Jinping Thought's guiding role as historical achievements. The Two Safeguards is the operative duty arising from them — what every cadre must actively do. Party documents now routinely pair the two formulas.
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