The Original Sin Hypothesis was developed by economists Barry Eichengreen and Ricardo Hausmann in a 1999 paper presented at the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City's Jackson Hole symposium, and later expanded in joint work with Ugo Panizza in the early 2000s. The phrase refers to the historical inability of most developing countries to borrow abroad in their own currency, or even to borrow long-term domestically at fixed rates.
This creates a structural vulnerability. When a government or firm earns revenue in local currency (say, Argentine pesos or Turkish lira) but services debt in dollars, euros, or yen, a depreciation of the domestic currency immediately enlarges the real debt burden. The result is a currency mismatch on national balance sheets that amplifies the damage of any external shock, capital-flow reversal, or confidence crisis.
Eichengreen and Hausmann argued that original sin was not primarily caused by weak domestic policies or poor institutions — many countries with reasonable fiscal records still could not place long-term local-currency debt internationally. Instead, they emphasized structural features of global capital markets, including network externalities favoring a few reserve currencies and transaction-cost economies of scale.
Key implications include:
- Limited monetary autonomy: central banks fear floating exchange rates because depreciation balloons foreign-currency liabilities (the "fear of floating" identified by Calvo and Reinhart, 2002).
- Procyclical policy: governments tighten in downturns to defend the currency, deepening recessions.
- Crisis amplification: original sin helped explain the severity of the 1997 Asian financial crisis, the 1998 Russian default, and Argentina's 2001–2002 collapse.
Since the mid-2000s, several emerging markets — notably Brazil, Mexico, South Africa, and Indonesia — have substantially developed local-currency sovereign bond markets attractive to foreign investors, a shift Hausmann and others have called the "redemption" from original sin. However, the underlying currency risk is partly transferred to foreign creditors rather than eliminated, and many smaller frontier economies remain fully exposed.
Example
During Argentina's 2001–2002 crisis, the peso's collapse against the dollar inflated the real value of dollar-denominated sovereign and corporate debt, illustrating the original-sin dynamic Eichengreen and Hausmann had described two years earlier.
Frequently asked questions
Barry Eichengreen and Ricardo Hausmann introduced it in a 1999 paper, later developed with Ugo Panizza in subsequent work during the early 2000s.
Keep learning