The Militaire Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdienst (MIVD) is the military intelligence and security service of the Netherlands, operating under the Ministry of Defence. It is one of two Dutch intelligence services, alongside the civilian AIVD (General Intelligence and Security Service), which sits under the Ministry of the Interior.
MIVD's mandate covers foreign military intelligence, counter-intelligence within the armed forces, security screenings of defence personnel, and signals intelligence on foreign targets. Its statutory basis is the Wet op de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten (Wiv), the Intelligence and Security Services Act, most recently overhauled in 2017 and amended after a 2018 consultative referendum in which a narrow majority opposed the law's bulk-interception provisions.
Oversight is provided by the CTIVD (Review Committee on the Intelligence and Security Services) and, for ex-ante authorisation of specific powers, the TIB (Investigatory Powers Commission). The parliamentary Commissie voor de Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdiensten (the "Stiekem" committee) handles classified scrutiny.
MIVD has become internationally visible through several attributions of state-linked cyber operations. In April 2018, the Dutch government publicly disclosed that MIVD had, in 2018, disrupted a close-access GRU Unit 26165 operation in The Hague targeting the OPCW (Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons); four Russian officers were expelled and their equipment seized. MIVD has also contributed to public attributions concerning Russian and Chinese cyber-espionage campaigns, including a 2024 disclosure about Chinese state-linked intrusion (the "Coathanger" malware) into a Dutch Ministry of Defence network.
MIVD cooperates closely with NATO partners and the Five Eyes-adjacent intelligence community, and is a member of the informal European intelligence club sometimes referenced as the Club de Berne counterpart for military services. It typically produces, jointly with AIVD, an annual public threat assessment outlining state and non-state risks to Dutch national security.
Example
In April 2018, MIVD publicly revealed it had foiled a Russian GRU cyber operation against the OPCW in The Hague and expelled four Russian intelligence officers.