What It Is
The Free and Open (FOIP) was first articulated systematically by Japanese PM Shinzo Abe in 2016 and adopted by the Trump administration in 2017. The framework provides the strategic vocabulary for the Indo-Pacific concept and shapes how the US, Japan, Australia, India, and other Indo-Pacific actors describe their regional engagement.
Three Core Elements
FOIP's three core elements:
- Freedom of the seas, , , and peaceful settlement of disputes: the maritime-law dimension, implicitly addressing Chinese behavior in the South China Sea.
- Economic prosperity through quality infrastructure investment, , and protection of intellectual property: the economic dimension, providing an alternative framing to Chinese BRI.
- Commitment to peace and stability including counter-proliferation: the security dimension, framing regional cooperation in security-cooperative terms.
National Variations
Different Indo-Pacific powers have adopted FOIP with national emphases:
- Japan's version emphasizes infrastructure and connectivity, including 'quality infrastructure' as a counter to BRI.
- The US emphasizes military presence and democratic values, with a stronger China-balancing tilt.
- Australia adopts similar framing to the US but with greater emphasis on Pacific Island engagement and economic dimensions.
- France, UK, EU, Germany, Netherlands, and Canada have released their own Indo-Pacific strategies, each with variations in emphasis.
- India uses the framing while emphasizing strategic autonomy and SAGAR (Security and Growth for All in the Region).
The national variations show that FOIP is a flexible framework that different powers can adapt to their specific strategic contexts.
The ASEAN Variant
ASEAN's Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP) accepts the framework but emphasizes 'ASEAN centrality' and inclusivity over confrontation with China. The AOIP framing:
- Includes all regional actors including China.
- Emphasizes cooperative rather than competitive engagement.
- Centers ASEAN as the regional convener.
- Avoids the explicit anti-China implications of the FOIP framing.
The ASEAN variant illustrates how the same vocabulary can be used to different strategic ends.
Why It Matters
FOIP has become the dominant strategic vocabulary in the Indo-Pacific over a decade. The framework's adoption by multiple major powers has shaped how regional issues are discussed and has provided implicit alignment among Indo-Pacific democracies on key questions.
The framework's structural feature — framing China-balancing in positive 'free and open' language rather than explicitly anti-China terms — has been politically useful. Partners that don't want to publicly oppose China can engage with FOIP without committing to anti-China positioning.
Critiques
FOIP has faced critiques:
- Vagueness: critics argue the framework is too vague to drive concrete policy.
- Anti-China implicit framing: despite the positive language, FOIP is implicitly anti-China, which some regional states find problematic.
- Limited delivery: FOIP-related initiatives (IPEF, Quad) have not yet delivered at the scale the framework's ambition suggests.
- Western-dominant framing: the framework is sometimes seen as a Western imposition on regional vocabulary.
Common Misconceptions
FOIP is sometimes confused with specific initiatives like the Quad or IPEF. FOIP is the strategic framework; specific initiatives are implementations of that framework.
Another misconception is that FOIP has formal institutional structure. It does not — it is a vocabulary used across various forums and initiatives rather than a discrete institutional framework.
Real-World Examples
Abe's 2016 'Confluence of the Two Seas' speech in India articulated the foundational FOIP framing. The 2017 US National Security Strategy formally adopted the Indo-Pacific framing and the FOIP vocabulary. The 2024 between US-Japan-Korea formalized FOIP-aligned coordination in Northeast Asia.
Example
Japan's FOIP framework now includes the Partnership for Quality Infrastructure providing $200 billion+ for connectivity projects across the Indo-Pacific — explicitly framed as an alternative to BRI.