Constitutional Convention

A constitutional convention has two distinct meanings in political science, and careful researchers should distinguish them.

1. A formal assembly to draft or revise a constitution. This is a body of delegates—often elected, sometimes appointed—convened specifically to write a new constitution or substantially amend an existing one. The archetypal example is the Philadelphia Convention of 1787, which produced the United States Constitution. Other notable cases include the French Constituent Assembly of 1789, the South African Constitutional Assembly that drafted the 1996 post-apartheid constitution, and Iceland's 2010–2013 constitutional reform process, which experimented with crowdsourced input. In the United States, Article V also provides for a convention called by two-thirds of state legislatures to propose amendments, though this mechanism has never been used.

2. An unwritten rule of constitutional practice. In the Westminster tradition—particularly in the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand—a constitutional convention is a binding political norm that is not legally enforceable by courts but is treated as obligatory by political actors. Classic examples include the convention that the British monarch grants royal assent to bills passed by Parliament, that the Prime Minister must command the confidence of the House of Commons, and that the Governor-General acts on the advice of ministers. The Canadian Supreme Court explored this concept extensively in the Patriation Reference (1981), distinguishing conventions from legal rules while acknowledging their political force.

Both senses matter for delegates and researchers. The first describes a moment of constitutional creation, often following revolution, independence, or regime collapse. The second describes the ongoing informal architecture that fills gaps in written constitutional texts. Confusing the two can produce serious analytical errors—for instance, treating a UK-style convention as judicially enforceable, or assuming every constitutional reform requires a dedicated convention rather than ordinary legislative amendment.