For the complete documentation index, see llms.txt.
Skip to main content
New

Article 27 (UN Charter Voting)

Updated May 23, 2026

Article 27 of the UN Charter governs Security Council voting, requiring nine affirmative votes including the concurring votes of the five permanent members on non-procedural matters.

Article 27 of the Charter of the United Nations, adopted at San Francisco on 26 June 1945 and entered into force on 24 October 1945, codifies the voting formula of the Security Council. In its original 1945 text, the Article required seven affirmative votes out of eleven Council members; following the Charter amendment that took effect on 31 August 1965 (enlarging the Council to fifteen members under General Assembly Resolution 1991 A (XVIII)), the threshold was raised to nine. The Article comprises three paragraphs: paragraph 1 grants each member one vote; paragraph 2 sets the threshold for procedural matters at nine affirmative votes from any members; and paragraph 3 imposes the same nine-vote threshold for all other matters but adds the decisive requirement that those nine include "the concurring votes of the permanent members" — China, France, Russia (as successor to the USSR), the United Kingdom, and the United States. This last clause is the textual foundation of what diplomatic practice calls the veto.

The procedural mechanics flow from the President of the Council, an office that rotates monthly in English alphabetical order. After a draft resolution is tabled and "in blue" (the term for a draft circulated in provisional form awaiting action), the President calls for a vote by show of hands. Members vote "yes," "no," or "abstain." For a procedural decision — such as the adoption of the agenda, the invitation of non-members to participate under Rule 37, or the suspension of a meeting — nine affirmative votes from any combination of members suffice, and a negative vote by a permanent member does not block adoption. For substantive decisions, including resolutions under Chapter VI (pacific settlement), Chapter VII (enforcement), and recommendations on membership or the appointment of the Secretary-General under Article 97, nine affirmative votes are again required, but a single negative vote by any of the P5 defeats the resolution regardless of the overall tally.

A critical interpretive gloss concerns abstention. The literal text of Article 27(3) requires the "concurring votes" of the permanent members, which would suggest that abstention or absence by a P5 member defeats a substantive measure. In practice, beginning with Council action on the Iran question in 1946 and consolidated by the Soviet absence during the Korea votes of June and July 1950 (Resolutions 82, 83, and 84), abstention and even non-participation have been treated as non-obstructive. The International Court of Justice confirmed this customary reading in its 1971 Advisory Opinion on Namibia, holding that voluntary abstention by a permanent member does not constitute a bar to adoption. A separate doctrine — the so-called "double veto" — allows a permanent member to first vote that a question is substantive (itself a substantive determination) and then veto the underlying resolution, though this device has fallen into desuetude. Article 27(3) also contains an obligatory abstention clause: a party to a dispute under Chapter VI must abstain, a rule honoured inconsistently in practice.

Contemporary examples illustrate the Article's continuing centrality. On 25 February 2022, Russia vetoed a draft resolution condemning its invasion of Ukraine (S/2022/155), with eleven members voting in favour, three abstaining (China, India, the United Arab Emirates), and Russia opposed; the United States and Albania were the principal co-sponsors. China and Russia jointly vetoed multiple draft resolutions on Syria between 2011 and 2023, including the chemical-weapons accountability mechanism in 2017. The United States has vetoed numerous drafts concerning Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including a 18 October 2023 Brazilian-drafted text and a 20 February 2024 Algerian draft on Gaza. France and the United Kingdom have not cast a veto since 1989 (the joint Franco-UK-US veto on Panama).

Article 27 should be distinguished from the General Assembly voting rules under Article 18, which require either a simple majority or, for "important questions," a two-thirds majority of members present and voting, with no veto. It should also be distinguished from the Uniting for Peace procedure (Resolution 377 A (V) of 3 November 1950), which permits the General Assembly to consider matters when the Council is paralysed by veto but yields only non-binding recommendations. Within Council practice, Article 27 voting is further distinct from the "presidential statement" (PRST) and "press elements," which are adopted by consensus and carry no binding legal force under Article 25.

Reform of Article 27 has been a perennial agenda item. The Accountability, Coherence and Transparency (ACT) Group's Code of Conduct (2015) and the France-Mexico initiative on veto restraint in cases of mass atrocities have attracted over 100 and 100-plus signatories respectively, but bind no permanent member legally. General Assembly Resolution 76/262 of 26 April 2022, the "veto initiative" tabled by Liechtenstein, now requires the Assembly to convene within ten working days of any veto to debate the situation — a procedural innovation that operates alongside, not within, Article 27. Proposals to amend the Article itself founder on Article 108, which requires ratification by two-thirds of UN members including all five permanent members for any Charter amendment.

For the working practitioner — desk officer, mission legal adviser, or Council reporter — fluency in Article 27 is indispensable. Drafting strategy in New York revolves around the question of whether a text can survive P5 scrutiny: penholders calibrate operative paragraphs to avoid triggering a veto, negotiate "silence procedures" on language, and time tabling decisions to coincide with favourable monthly presidencies. Understanding the procedural-substantive distinction, the abstention doctrine, and the post-2022 Assembly debate mechanism is the baseline competence for anyone operating in or around the Council chamber on the 38th floor of UN Headquarters.

Example

On 25 February 2022, Russia invoked Article 27(3) to veto draft resolution S/2022/155 condemning its invasion of Ukraine, defeating a text supported by eleven of the fifteen Council members.

Frequently asked questions

No. Although Article 27(3) textually requires the 'concurring votes' of the permanent members, established practice since 1946 and the ICJ's 1971 Namibia Advisory Opinion confirm that voluntary abstention or absence by a P5 member does not prevent adoption. Only a negative vote — a veto — defeats a substantive draft.
Talk to founder