The ACT Group Code of Conduct on Mass Atrocities is a non-binding political pledge launched in 2015 by the Accountability, Coherence and Transparency Group (ACT), a cross-regional caucus of small and mid-sized UN member states convened in 2013 under the chairmanship of Switzerland. The Code asks signatories — whether sitting on the Security Council or aspiring to a seat — to commit that they will not vote against any "credible" draft resolution before the Council that is intended to prevent or end the commission of genocide, crimes against humanity, or war crimes. The legal premise is that Article 24 of the UN Charter assigns the Council "primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security," and that the veto power conferred on the permanent five (P5) under Article 27(3) carries with it a corresponding responsibility not to obstruct atrocity-prevention action. The Code thus operates as a soft-law instrument layered atop Charter procedure, drawing political authority from the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document's articulation of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine.
Procedurally, adherence is signaled by a single act: a state transmits a letter or note verbale to the Permanent Mission of Liechtenstein in New York, which serves as the Code's depositary and maintains the official list of supporters. There is no ratification, no reservation regime, and no withdrawal clause; the commitment is unilateral and political rather than treaty-based. Once a state has signed, it is expected to apply the pledge at every stage of Council decision-making — in informal consultations, in penholder negotiations on draft texts, in the "blue" stage when a draft is put into final form, and in the public vote in the Council chamber. Crucially, the Code binds the supporter to refrain from a negative vote; it does not require an affirmative vote, leaving abstention as a permissible option for states with substantive objections short of opposition to atrocity-prevention action.
The Code's operative threshold turns on the word "credible," a qualifier the ACT Group deliberately left undefined to preserve flexibility. In practice, credibility is assessed against the factual record assembled by UN entities — reports of the Secretary-General, the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, commissions of inquiry, the Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide, and fact-finding missions established by the Human Rights Council. The Code is paired with, but distinct from, the France–Mexico Initiative announced in 2013–2015, which targets only the P5 and calls for a voluntary and collective P5 suspension of the veto in mass-atrocity situations. ACT's instrument is broader in scope (open to all 193 members) and narrower in demand (no-vote-against rather than veto-suspension), making the two initiatives complementary rather than overlapping.
As of the mid-2020s the Code has attracted well over 130 signatories spanning every regional group, including France and the United Kingdom among the P5 — though notably not China, Russia, or the United States. Liechtenstein, Switzerland, Costa Rica, Slovenia, Ireland, Norway, Mexico, and Singapore have been among the most active proponents, frequently invoking the Code in Council debates on Syria, Myanmar, Ukraine, Sudan, and the Tigray conflict in Ethiopia. After Russia's February 2022 veto of a draft resolution on its invasion of Ukraine, Liechtenstein led the General Assembly initiative that produced Resolution 76/262 of 26 April 2022 — the so-called "veto initiative" — which now requires the Assembly to convene automatically within ten working days whenever a veto is cast in the Council. That resolution is procedurally separate from the ACT Code but flows from the same accountability constituency.
The Code should be distinguished from the France–Mexico Initiative, from R2P itself, and from the Uniting for Peace procedure established by General Assembly Resolution 377(V) of 1950. R2P is a substantive doctrine about state and international responsibility; Uniting for Peace is a jurisdictional workaround that transfers a deadlocked agenda item to the Assembly; the France–Mexico text is a P5-only restraint proposal. The ACT Code, by contrast, is a behavioral pledge addressed primarily to the elected ten (E10) and to candidates for Council seats, functioning as a reputational benchmark during General Assembly elections for non-permanent membership.
Controversies surround the Code's reach and enforceability. Critics note that because no permanent member from the China–Russia–United States trio has signed, the instrument cannot prevent the very vetoes that have blocked Council action on Syria (sixteen Russian vetoes between 2011 and 2020 on Syria-related drafts) or on Israel–Palestine. Supporters counter that the Code reshapes the political cost of obstruction by creating a publicly maintained roster against which conduct can be measured, and that France's adherence formalizes a self-restraint Paris had already articulated. A further unresolved question is who adjudicates "credibility" when penholders and concerned states disagree on the characterization of underlying conduct — a recurring dispute in cases involving counterterrorism operations and internal armed conflicts.
For the working practitioner, the Code is a practical lever in three settings: lobbying capitals ahead of Council elections, where candidates' signature or non-signature is now a standard question on civil-society scorecards; drafting Council resolutions, where penholders can cite the Code to consolidate E10 support and isolate potential negative voters; and General Assembly diplomacy under Resolution 76/262, where signatory states are expected to deliver coherent explanations of vote. Desk officers tracking atrocity situations should consult Liechtenstein's published list of supporters before assessing voting math, and should note that signature commits the foreign ministry, not merely the New York mission — a point that becomes salient when instructions from capital diverge from Council-floor positioning.
Example
In March 2022, Liechtenstein invoked the ACT Code when condemning Russia's veto of a Security Council draft on the invasion of Ukraine, citing the pledge in its subsequent push for General Assembly Resolution 76/262.