Western Sahara: History, Government & Society

Western Sahara is not a sovereign state in normal diplomatic practice; it is a disputed territory whose internationally recognized status remains unresolved, with most of the territory administered by Morocco and the self-proclaimed Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic, led by the Polisario Front, controlling a smaller inland zone east of the Moroccan berm United Nations Peacekeeping MINURSO, Encyclopaedia Britannica, African Union. Politically, the territory is split between Moroccan civil-military administration in the areas Morocco calls its “Southern Provinces” and the SADR/Polisario’s government-in-exile and camp-based institutions centered in the Tindouf refugee camps in Algeria, where Polisario remains the dominant and effectively sole ruling movement MINURSO, African Union, CIA World Factbook archive entry on Western Sahara.

The key fact for delegates is that Western Sahara’s external position is defined less by conventional state capacity than by recognition politics and control on the ground. The SADR is a member of the African Union, which gives it a formal multilateral seat in Africa, but it is not a member of the United Nations, and the UN continues to treat Western Sahara as a Non-Self-Governing Territory pending a political process and an act of self-determination African Union, United Nations and Decolonization: Western Sahara, MINURSO. Morocco, by contrast, holds broader international leverage through de facto administration, investment, diplomatic support from major partners, and the 2020 U.S. recognition of Moroccan sovereignty claim, even though that position is not the UN’s legal framework U.S. Proclamation 10126, UN Decolonization.

Economically, Western Sahara is small, extractive, and structurally dependent on whoever controls access to territory, ports, and security. The main commercially significant assets are phosphate deposits at Bou Craa and rich Atlantic fisheries, both located in and around Moroccan-administered areas, while the SADR-administered zone has little comparable productive infrastructure and relies heavily on external support, especially humanitarian aid tied to the Tindouf camps Encyclopaedia Britannica, European Commission on EU-Morocco fisheries and trade litigation background, UNHCR Algeria situation pages. That asymmetry matters politically: Morocco can point to infrastructure and commercial integration, while Polisario’s leverage comes from legal contestation, AU membership, and the continuing unresolved status of sovereignty under international law UN Decolonization, African Union.

Three issues define Western Sahara’s current trajectory. First is the stalled UN process: MINURSO remains on the ground, but the core dispute over whether any settlement centers on a referendum with independence as an option or on Moroccan autonomy under Moroccan sovereignty remains unresolved UN Security Council Resolution 2756 (2024), MINURSO. Second is the security deterioration since the 1991 ceasefire broke down in 2020 after events at Guerguerat, with Polisario declaring the ceasefire over and low-intensity hostilities resuming along the berm UN Secretary-General report on Western Sahara, 2024, International Crisis Group. Third is the widening gap between diplomatic momentum and legal deadlock: more states have opened consulates in Moroccan-administered Western Sahara and backed autonomy language, while courts and UN bodies continue to distinguish Morocco from Western Sahara in legal status, especially on trade and representation questions European Court of Justice press materials on EU-Morocco/Western Sahara cases, UN Decolonization.

The practical foreign-policy read is that Western Sahara behaves less like a consolidated country than like a sovereignty dispute embedded in regional rivalry, especially between Morocco and Algeria. Polisario/SADR’s top interest is survival of its claim and institutions; Morocco’s top interest is locking in international acceptance of its control and preventing any process that could reopen an independence option International Crisis Group, UN Security Council Resolution 2756 (2024). For MUN purposes, that means debates on self-determination, resource exploitation, refugee protection, and ceasefire monitoring are not side issues here; they are the file.