Palestine.

Palestinian foreign policy is built around one priority: preserving the international claim to Palestinian statehood while trying to convert diplomatic recognition into pressure on Israel to end the occupation and accept a two-state settlement on the 1967 lines with East Jerusalem as the capital [Palestinian Basic Law via Palestinian Legislative Council archive](https://www.palestinianbasiclaw.org/basic-law/2003-amended-basic-law) [Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Expatriates of the State of Palestine](https://www.mfae.gov.ps/) [UN General Assembly Resolution 67/19](https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/792954). The formal line is multilateralist and legalist: Palestine seeks UN membership, wider bilateral recognition, and accountability through the International Court of Justice and International Criminal Court rather than military balancing, in part because the Palestinian Authority does not control borders, airspace, or a conventional army [UN General Assembly Resolution 67/19](https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/792954) [International Criminal Court, State of Palestine](https://www.icc-cpi.int/palestine) [ICJ, Legal Consequences arising from the Policies and Practices of Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem](https://www.icj-cij.org/case/186). Decision-making is fragmented: President Mahmoud Abbas remains chairman of the PLO Executive Committee and president of the State of Palestine, while Prime Minister Mohammad Mustafa heads the Palestinian Authority government formed in March 2024, but the PLO and presidency still dominate the external file [Palestinian News & Info Agency (WAFA), decree on formation of government](https://english.wafa.ps/Pages/Details/142588) [PLO Executive Committee](http://www.plo.ps/en/).

Its interests pyramid is unusually clear. Survival means preventing permanent territorial fragmentation of the West Bank and Gaza and resisting any diplomatic formula that treats Gaza separately from the rest of the occupied Palestinian territory [UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Occupied Palestinian Territory](https://www.ochaopt.org/) [State of Palestine MFAE](https://www.mfae.gov.ps/). Regime security comes next: the Ramallah-based leadership needs continued external recognition of the PLO/PA as the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, especially as Hamas contests authority domestically and regionally [International Crisis Group, The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict in 2024](https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/east-mediterranean-mena/israelpalestine) [PLO](http://www.plo.ps/en/). Economic interests are largely defensive because the Palestinian economy is structurally constrained by occupation, clearance revenue dependence, and donor financing; the World Bank reported GDP collapsed sharply in Gaza after October 2023 and the PA’s fiscal position remained under severe stress from reduced revenues and rising arrears [World Bank, Economic Monitoring Report to the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee](https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/westbankandgaza/publication/economic-monitoring-report-to-the-ad-hoc-liaison-committee) [IMF, West Bank and Gaza Staff Report](https://www.imf.org/en/Countries/WBG). Status matters because symbolic upgrades generate real legal tools: UNESCO membership in 2011 and UN non-member observer state status in 2012 expanded Palestine’s treaty access and courtroom options [UNESCO, Palestine](https://www.unesco.org/en/member-states/palestine) [UN General Assembly Resolution 67/19](https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/792954).

Its most important bilateral relationships are unequal and functional. Jordan and Egypt matter because each controls a critical geographic and political gateway: Jordan is the custodian of Muslim and Christian holy sites in Jerusalem under its peace treaty arrangements and remains a key diplomatic partner on Jerusalem and refugees, while Egypt mediates Gaza ceasefires, hostage and prisoner talks, and Palestinian reconciliation efforts [Jordan Ministry of Foreign Affairs](https://mfa.gov.jo/en) [Egypt State Information Service](https://sis.gov.eg/). Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Türkiye, and the UAE all back Palestinian statehood but with different instruments: Qatar has financed humanitarian and civil-salary support in Gaza, Saudi diplomacy has tied normalization with Israel to a credible path to Palestinian statehood, and Türkiye frames support in highly visible political terms [Qatar Fund for Development](https://www.qatarfund.org.qa/) [Saudi Ministry of Foreign Affairs](https://www.mofa.gov.sa/en) [Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Foreign Affairs](https://www.mfa.gov.tr/default.en.mfa). Europe is crucial because the EU is the largest provider of external assistance to the Palestinians, even though member states remain divided on recognition and sanctions policy [European Commission, Palestine*](https://neighbourhood-enlargement.ec.europa.eu/european-neighbourhood-policy/countries-region/palestine_en). The United States is the essential adversarial-interlocutor: Palestinian leaders oppose U.S. protection of Israel in the Security Council, but they still need Washington involved in any end-state diplomacy because no other actor can extract Israeli concessions at scale [U.S. Department of State, Office of Palestinian Affairs](https://www.state.gov/offices/office-of-palestinian-affairs/) [UN Security Council meeting records](https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/).

Multilaterally, Palestine has compensated for weak hard power with dense forum participation. It is a non-member observer state at the UN, a full member of UNESCO, the League of Arab States, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, and the Group of 77 and China, and it has acceded to major treaties and organizations including the ICC [UN General Assembly Resolution 67/19](https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/792954) [League of Arab States](https://www.lasportal.org/en/) [Organisation of Islamic Cooperation](https://www.oic-oci.org/) [Group of 77](https://www.g77.org/) [ICC, State of Palestine](https://www.icc-cpi.int/palestine). In the UN system, Palestine aligns strongly with Arab, Islamic, and Global South blocs on self-determination, decolonization, refugee rights, and opposition to Israeli settlements and annexation, and it consistently backs resolutions invoking international humanitarian law in the occupied Palestinian territory [UN Digital Library, State of Palestine voting and resolutions record](https://digitallibrary.un.org/) [UN General Assembly emergency special session records on Palestine](https://www.un.org/en/ga/sessions/emergency.shtml). Its diplomacy also leans heavily on advisory and contentious proceedings: Palestine welcomed the ICJ’s advisory process on the legal consequences of Israeli policies