--- title: "Forum Entreprises Défense 2027 — Satory | Model Diplomat" description: "Forum Entreprises Défense 2027 is a professional conference in Satory, France, Oct 6–7, 2027. Dates, deadlines, fees, and prep links." url: "https://modeldiplomat.com/conferences/professional/forum-entreprises-defense-2027" --- # Forum Entreprises Défense 2027 Oct 6–7, 2027[Satory, France](https://www.google.com/maps/search/?api=1\&query=Satory%2C%20France)In-person [Registration open](https://forumentreprisesdefense.fr/) The Forum Entreprises Défense is an annual event held in Satory, FRA, dedicated to fostering collaboration and innovation within the defense industry. It serves as a crucial platform for various stakeholders, including government officials, military personnel, and private sector enterprises, to engage in discussions and showcase advancements in defense technology and strategy. The forum emphasizes the importance of a robust defense ecosystem, bringing together key players to address contemporary security challenges and explore future directions in defense capabilities. This gathering in FRA is designed to facilitate networking, knowledge exchange, and strategic partnerships. Participants have the opportunity to interact directly with decision-makers and experts, gaining insights into emerging trends and policy developments in the defense sector. The event's focus on collaboration underscores the complex and interconnected nature of modern defense, where public and private entities must work in concert to ensure national and international security. ## Committees & topics - Topics Resilient Through-Life Support and Maintenance of Operational Condition (MCO) · Industry Ready for War: Scaling the Defence Industrial Base · Collective Resilience Across the Defence Ecosystem · Securing Defence Supply Chains · Crisis Management Strategies for Defence Enterprises · Digital Continuity Across the Defence Lifecycle · Cybersecurity of the Defence Industrial Base · Artificial Intelligence in Defence ## Why it matters The Forum Entreprises Défense holds significant importance as it directly influences the strategic direction and operational capabilities of defense within FRA and potentially its allies. By convening a diverse group of stakeholders, the forum enables a comprehensive review of current defense needs and future requirements. This collaborative environment is essential for identifying gaps, sharing best practices, and developing integrated solutions that address evolving threats. Furthermore, the forum plays a vital role in promoting innovation within the defense industry. It provides a stage for companies to present cutting-edge technologies and services, which can then be evaluated for their potential application in military contexts. This interaction between innovators and end-users is critical for accelerating the adoption of new solutions and maintaining a technological edge. The event also facilitates discussions on critical topics such as cybersecurity, artificial intelligence, and sustainable defense practices, shaping the discourse around these pivotal areas. The strategic location in Satory, FRA, a hub for defense activities, further amplifies the forum's impact. It reinforces FRA's position as a key player in European defense and security, influencing regional and global defense strategies. The discussions and partnerships forged at this event can have long-lasting implications for national security policies, military procurement, and international defense cooperation. ## How to prepare To effectively engage with the Forum Entreprises Défense, participants should undertake thorough preparation, focusing on the key themes and potential stakeholders. A comprehensive understanding of the current defense landscape, including geopolitical tensions and technological advancements, is paramount. Researching the specific interests and priorities of the FRA Ministry of Defense and major defense contractors attending the event will allow for more targeted and impactful interactions. Delegates should consider conducting a \stakeholder mapping\ exercise to identify key individuals and organizations whose objectives align with their own. This involves understanding their roles, influence, and potential contributions to defense initiatives. Developing tailored \[engagement strategies](https://modeldiplomat.com/learn/lessons/engagement-strategies)\ for different stakeholder groups will be beneficial, ensuring that interactions are productive and lead to meaningful outcomes. For instance, approaches for government officials might differ significantly from those for private sector innovators. Given the forum's emphasis on collaboration, preparing compelling proposals or presentations that highlight potential partnerships and innovative solutions is advisable. These should clearly articulate the value proposition and demonstrate an understanding of the defense sector's unique challenges. Additionally, staying informed about recent policy changes and defense spending priorities in FRA will enable participants to frame their contributions within the broader strategic context. ## Country perspectives Where the most-relevant 4 countries stand on the core issues in play. Click through for the full country profile. [France](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/france) [FRA is the host nation and a primary beneficiary of the forum, seeking to strengthen its defense industrial base and foster international partnerships.](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/france) [Role in topic](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/france) [As the host, FRA plays a central role in organizing and shaping the agenda of the Forum Entreprises Défense. The nation utilizes this platform to showcase its defense capabilities, attract investment, and collaborate with other countries and defense companies. FRA's strategic interests in European security and its position as a leading defense exporter are key drivers for its involvement.](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/france) [Germany](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/germany) [DEU is likely to participate to explore opportunities for defense cooperation and technology exchange with FRA.](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/germany) [Role in topic](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/germany) [DEU, a significant European power, often seeks to enhance its defense capabilities through international collaboration. Participation in the forum would allow DEU to explore joint projects with FRA, particularly in areas of shared strategic interest such as aerospace and land systems, and to assess new defense technologies.](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/germany) [United Kingdom](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/united-kingdom) [GBR would engage to maintain strong defense ties with FRA and explore avenues for post-Brexit defense industrial collaboration.](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/united-kingdom) [Role in topic](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/united-kingdom) [Despite Brexit, GBR maintains close defense relations with FRA. The forum provides an opportunity for GBR to reinforce these ties, discuss common security challenges, and identify areas for industrial cooperation, particularly in advanced defense technologies and joint military exercises.](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/united-kingdom) [United States](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/united-states) [USA would likely attend to strengthen NATO alliances and explore opportunities for defense technology sales and partnerships.](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/united-states) [Role in topic](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/united-states) [The USA, as a global defense leader, uses such forums to reinforce its alliances, particularly within NATO. Participation would allow US defense contractors to showcase their products, identify potential markets, and explore collaborative research and development initiatives with FRA and other European partners.](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/united-states) ## Topics & background The background behind each topic and the actors that shape it. 1 ### Resilient Through-Life Support and Maintenance of Operational Condition (MCO) Maintien en Condition Opérationnelle (MCO) — the through-life maintenance and support of military equipment — has become a strategic priority in France and across NATO since the late 2010s. France's 2018 reform created the Direction de la Maintenance Aéronautique (DMAé) and later restructured the naval (SSF) and land (SIMMT) support chains in response to chronic availability problems on platforms such as the NH90, Tigre, and A400M. The 2024-2030 Loi de Programmation Militaire roughly doubled MCO budgets, recognising that fleet availability, not just inventory, defines combat power. The return of high-intensity warfare in Ukraine has reframed MCO as a question of resilience: spare-parts stockpiles, dispersed industrial repair capacity, additive manufacturing, sovereign access to technical data, and the ability to sustain operations under attrition and cyber disruption. European partners face similar pressures, with Germany, the UK and the US all reviewing sustainment doctrines after observing Russian and Ukrainian attrition rates. Today the debate centres on contractualisation with industry (verticalised PBL-style contracts vs. state-controlled models), sovereignty over IP and software, and the integration of predictive maintenance and AI into support chains. Key players - [France](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/france) [Leads MCO reform through DMAé, SSF and SIMMT; principal customer and doctrine-setter](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/france) - [Germany](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/germany) [Co-operator of major European platforms (A400M, Tigre, NH90) and partner in joint support arrangements](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/germany) - [United Kingdom](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/united-kingdom) [Reference model for availability-based contracting and through-life support in Europe](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/united-kingdom) - [United States](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/united-states) [Originator of Performance-Based Logistics and major OEM influence over Western fleets](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/united-states) - [Italy](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/italy) [Partner on naval and rotary-wing MCO via Leonardo and Fincantieri industrial bases](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/italy) 2 ### Industry Ready for War: Scaling the Defence Industrial Base The phrase 'économie de guerre', used by President Macron at Eurosatory 2022, signalled a doctrinal shift: European defence industries, optimised since the 1990s for low-rate, export-oriented production, must now be able to surge output under sustained attrition. Ukraine's consumption of artillery shells — at peaks exceeding European annual production several times over — exposed the limits of just-in-time supply, single-source components (notably nitrocellulose, energetics, and microelectronics), and lengthy qualification cycles. France compressed Caesar production times, raised 155mm shell output, and accelerated MBDA missile lines, while the EU launched ASAP and EDIP to subsidise capacity expansion. The debate now extends beyond munitions to drones, electronic warfare, air defence, and the workforce and energy required to sustain wartime tempo. Key tensions include the financing of dormant capacity, dual-use vs. dedicated military lines, export rules that underwrite economies of scale, and the role of SMEs and ETIs in the supply pyramid. Banks' reluctance to finance defence, ESG classification debates, and skills shortages in welding, pyrotechnics, and systems engineering remain structural bottlenecks. Key players - [France](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/france) [Champion of 'économie de guerre' doctrine and host of major primes (KNDS, Nexter, MBDA, Thales, Dassault)](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/france) - [Germany](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/germany) [Largest European defence spender with Rheinmetall-led munitions expansion](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/germany) - [United States](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/united-states) [Sets benchmark via Defense Production Act and large-scale industrial mobilisation](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/united-states) - [Ukraine](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/ukraine) [Real-world testbed driving European production targets and feedback on combat performance](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/ukraine) - [Poland](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/poland) [Fastest-growing European procurer, reshaping eastern-flank industrial demand](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/poland) - [Italy](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/italy) [Major contributor through Leonardo and Fincantieri to European capacity ramp-up](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/italy) 3 ### Collective Resilience Across the Defence Ecosystem Collective resilience has emerged as a central concept in French and EU strategic documents, from the 2022 Revue Nationale Stratégique to the European Preparedness Union Strategy (2025) and the Niinistö report on civil-military preparedness. It refers to the ability of states, armed forces, industry, critical infrastructure operators, and civilian populations to absorb shocks — kinetic, cyber, informational, or logistical — and continue functioning. The COVID-19 pandemic, the 2022 energy crisis, and observed Russian targeting of Ukrainian power, transport and telecoms infrastructure have all reinforced the case for a whole-of-society approach. For the defence community, collective resilience means integrating industrial continuity plans, dual-use civilian infrastructure (ports, rail, hospitals), reservist mobilisation frameworks, stockpiling of strategic goods, and territorial dispersion of critical capacities. Disagreements persist on burden-sharing between state and private actors, on the legal frameworks for requisition, and on how to communicate threats to populations without inducing fatigue or alarm. Nordic and Baltic models (Sweden's Totalförsvar, Finland's comprehensive security) are increasingly studied as templates. Key players - [France](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/france) [Anchors resilience doctrine via SGDSN and the Revue Nationale Stratégique](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/france) - [Finland](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/finland) [Reference model for comprehensive security and civil-military integration](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/finland) - [Sweden](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/sweden) [Reviver of Totalförsvar (total defence) framework adopted across Europe](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/sweden) - [Estonia](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/estonia) [Pioneer of cyber and societal resilience following 2007 attacks](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/estonia) - [Germany](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/germany) [Driving Zeitenwende-era civil protection and Bundeswehr reorientation](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/germany) 4 ### Securing Defence Supply Chains Defence supply chains have come under unprecedented stress since 2020. COVID-19 exposed dependencies on Asian semiconductors, the war in Ukraine cut off Russian and Ukrainian sources of titanium, neon and energetics precursors, and the Red Sea crisis from late 2023 disrupted maritime logistics. France's 2022 mapping exercise identified several thousand 'critical' suppliers, many SMEs vulnerable to foreign takeover, cyberattack, or bankruptcy. The EU's Critical Raw Materials Act (2024) and the US CHIPS and Science Act reflect a parallel push to onshore or 'friend-shore' strategic inputs. Key vulnerabilities include rare earths and processed minerals dominated by China, advanced semiconductors concentrated in Taiwan and South Korea, energetics chemistry, optics, and specialist alloys. Debate today centres on stockpiling strategies, mandatory transparency of tier-2/3 suppliers, foreign direct investment screening (the French IEF regime, EU FDI Regulation), and the trade-off between cost and sovereignty. Industrial cybersecurity of the supply chain — particularly after attacks on subcontractors of major primes — is now treated as inseparable from physical resilience. Key players - [France](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/france) [Coordinates supplier mapping and FDI screening through DGA and Bercy](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/france) - [China](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/china) [Dominant supplier of rare earths and processed critical minerals](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/china) - [United States](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/united-states) [Drives friend-shoring through CHIPS Act, IRA and ITAR-controlled flows](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/united-states) - [Taiwan](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/taiwan) [Critical node for advanced semiconductors underpinning defence electronics](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/taiwan) - [Germany](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/germany) [Major industrial partner with shared supplier base and FDI screening regime](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/germany) - [Australia](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/australia) [Emerging Western source of critical minerals via partnerships and AUKUS](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/australia) 5 ### Crisis Management Strategies for Defence Enterprises Crisis management for defence firms has shifted from episodic business continuity planning to a permanent posture. The combination of pandemic disruption, cyberattacks on industrial primes and their suppliers (including ransomware incidents on European defence SMEs), sabotage incidents attributed to Russian-linked actors against European logistics, and geopolitical export-control shocks has forced companies to integrate operational, cyber, legal, and reputational risk under unified command. France's SGDSN, ANSSI and the DGA work alongside industry to test scenarios, while NIS2 and DORA at EU level impose new obligations. The core questions concern governance (who decides, and how fast), exercising (red-teaming, war-gaming with state authorities), information sharing across competitors, and the integration of strategic communications. Hybrid threats — combining kinetic, cyber and informational pressure — blur the line between corporate crisis and national security, raising questions of legal authority, liability, and the protection of dual-use facilities and personnel. Key players - [France](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/france) [Hosts SGDSN-led interministerial crisis architecture and industry exercises](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/france) - [United States](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/united-states) [Reference for public-private crisis coordination via CISA and DoD](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/united-states) - [United Kingdom](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/united-kingdom) [Mature crisis-management ecosystem through NCSC and COBR mechanisms](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/united-kingdom) - [Germany](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/germany) [Building federal crisis frameworks post-Zeitenwende, including industrial protection](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/germany) - [Russia](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/russia) [Principal source of hybrid threats targeting European defence industry](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/russia) 6 ### Digital Continuity Across the Defence Lifecycle Digital continuity — the unbroken, traceable flow of data across design, production, deployment and through-life support — has become a strategic capability. Programmes such as France's SCAF/FCAS, MGCS, and the FDI frigate class rely on shared digital twins, model-based systems engineering, and PLM environments linking dozens of partners across borders. The promise is faster iteration, predictive maintenance and reduced lifecycle costs; the risk is exposure of sensitive data, vendor lock-in to foreign cloud providers, and fragility under cyber or connectivity disruption. The debate sits at the intersection of industrial policy and sovereignty: how to enforce data sovereignty (SecNumCloud, EUCS), how to ensure interoperability between national and allied digital environments, and how to maintain continuity when classified networks must connect with commercial tools. Generative AI, secure collaborative platforms, and sovereign cloud offerings are reshaping the landscape, with French and European actors seeking to avoid full dependence on US hyperscalers. Key players - [France](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/france) [Drives sovereign cloud (SecNumCloud) and digital-twin policy for major programmes](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/france) - [Germany](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/germany) [Co-leads cross-border digital continuity on FCAS and MGCS](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/germany) - [United States](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/united-states) [Dominant provider of MBSE, PLM and cloud tools shaping global standards](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/united-states) - [Spain](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/spain) [Third FCAS partner integrating into shared digital environments](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/spain) - [Italy](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/italy) [Key GCAP partner advancing digital-thread practices with UK and Japan](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/italy) 7 ### Cybersecurity of the Defence Industrial Base Cyber threats to the defence industrial base have intensified since the mid-2010s, with documented intrusions by state-linked actors (APT28, APT29, APT31, North Korean groups) and a surge of ransomware against subcontractors. France's ANSSI has repeatedly warned that primes are well defended but tier-2 and tier-3 suppliers — often SMEs — constitute the weak link. The EU's NIS2 Directive, transposed in 2024-2025, extends obligations to a much wider set of defence-relevant entities, while the US CMMC framework imposes layered certification on DoD suppliers. Current challenges include securing OT/ICS environments in factories, protecting classified information across multinational programmes, managing post-quantum cryptographic transitions, and defending against AI-enabled phishing and influence operations. The debate covers certification burdens on SMEs, the role of sovereign cybersecurity providers, intelligence sharing between states and industry, and the militarisation of cyberspace — including offensive cyber as a deterrent. Key players - [France](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/france) [Sets national doctrine through ANSSI and ComCyber, leading EU certification efforts](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/france) - [United States](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/united-states) [Imposes CMMC standards and shares threat intelligence via Five Eyes](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/united-states) - [Russia](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/russia) [Primary state-linked threat actor against European defence firms](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/russia) - [China](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/china) [Persistent cyber-espionage threat targeting defence technology IP](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/china) - [North Korea](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/north-korea) [Active in financially motivated and disruptive attacks on industry](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/north-korea) - [Israel](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/israel) [Major source of commercial cyber capabilities used across the defence ecosystem](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/israel) 8 ### Artificial Intelligence in Defence Artificial intelligence has moved from research demonstrators to operational programmes across Western forces. France's 2019 AI Defence Strategy was updated in 2024 with dedicated funding under the LPM, an AMIAD agency (Agence ministérielle pour l'IA de défense) created in 2024, and concrete applications in image intelligence, predictive maintenance, electronic warfare, and command support. The US DoD's CDAO, Project Maven, and Replicator initiative, alongside Chinese military-civil fusion efforts, have made AI a central axis of strategic competition. Combat experience in Ukraine — particularly autonomous loitering munitions and AI-assisted targeting — has accelerated doctrinal and ethical debates. Key issues include the level of autonomy granted to weapon systems (the LAWS debate at the UN CCW since 2014), data governance for training military models, sovereign access to compute and foundation models, human-machine teaming doctrine, and the export-control architecture for AI-enabled capabilities. The EU AI Act explicitly excludes defence uses, leaving regulation to member states and creating both flexibility and fragmentation across European programmes. Key players - [France](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/france) [Hosts AMIAD and integrates AI into intelligence, MCO and command systems](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/france) - [United States](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/united-states) [Sets pace through CDAO, Replicator and partnerships with leading AI labs](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/united-states) - [China](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/china) [Pursues military-civil fusion and large-scale AI for PLA modernisation](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/china) - [United Kingdom](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/united-kingdom) [Develops Defence AI Strategy and integrates AI across MoD and GCHQ](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/united-kingdom) - [Israel](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/israel) [Operational leader in AI-enabled targeting and ISR (e.g. Habsora, Lavender systems)](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/israel) - [Ukraine](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/ukraine) [Live laboratory for AI-enabled drones and autonomous systems at scale](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/ukraine) ## Resources News, lessons, and country profiles to prep for Forum Entreprises Défense 2027. Recent reporting to ground your prep [US Job Openings at 6.7M](https://modeldiplomat.com/story/us-job-openings-at-67m-implications-for-2026-elections) [Modi's Tamil Nadu Roadshow](https://modeldiplomat.com/story/modis-tamil-nadu-roadshow-bjps-bold-move-against-dmk) [Modi's NIA Strategy in Bengal](https://modeldiplomat.com/story/modis-nia-strategy-in-bengal-stakes-for-2026-elections) [Hakeem Jeffries' Strategic Move](https://modeldiplomat.com/story/hakeem-jeffries-strategic-move-no-impeachment-for-2026) Lessons Bite-sized lessons to build the basics [Hidden Stakeholders](https://modeldiplomat.com/learn/lessons/hidden-stakeholders) [Engagement Strategies](https://modeldiplomat.com/learn/lessons/engagement-strategies) [Dynamic Analysis](https://modeldiplomat.com/learn/lessons/dynamic-analysis) [Stakeholder Mapping Workshop](https://modeldiplomat.com/learn/lessons/stakeholder-workshop) Courses Guided courses that go deeper on the topic [Advanced Negotiation](https://modeldiplomat.com/learn/courses/advanced-negotiation) [Multilateral Negotiation](https://modeldiplomat.com/learn/courses/multilateral-negotiation) [Policy Brief Writing](https://modeldiplomat.com/learn/courses/policy-brief) [Conflict Resolution](https://modeldiplomat.com/learn/courses/conflict-resolution) The states in play, with the data that shapes their stance [France](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/france) [Country dossier](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/france) [Germany](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/germany) [Country dossier](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/germany) [United Kingdom](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/united-kingdom) [Country dossier](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/united-kingdom) [United States](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/united-states) [Country dossier](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/united-states) [Italy](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/italy) [Country dossier](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/italy) [Ukraine](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/ukraine) [Country dossier](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/ukraine) [Poland](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/poland) [Country dossier](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/poland) [Finland](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/finland) [Country dossier](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/finland) [Sweden](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/sweden) [Country dossier](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/sweden) [Estonia](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/estonia) [Country dossier](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/estonia) [China](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/china) [Country dossier](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/china) [Taiwan](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/taiwan) [Country dossier](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/taiwan) [Australia](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/australia) [Country dossier](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/australia) [Russia](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/russia) [Country dossier](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/russia) [Spain](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/spain) [Country dossier](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/spain) [North Korea](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/north-korea) [Country dossier](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/north-korea) [Israel](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/israel) [Country dossier](https://modeldiplomat.com/country/israel) ## Frequently asked questions - - - Free account Save conferences, research any topic with AI, build position papers, and keep your daily prep streak — free. 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