The Situation Room

Japan thanks the Chair, and thanks the French delegation for its constructive draft. We are mindful that the mechanism proposed will require precise operational definitions before this Council can meaningfully engage. We would respectfully suggest, in a footnote to the underlying discussion, that any humanitarian observation mission’s mandate, funding, and chain of command be agreed upon in the draft text itself, so that we do not simply trade one ambiguity for another. We stand ready to assist with the translation of that language into a text we can all review.

France thanks the Chair for their leadership and, in the spirit of the urgency already noted by several colleagues, formally tables draft resolution S/2026/7—the deconfliction and humanitarian observation mechanism, as my delegation announced it. We have circulated the text in the three working languages. … If the Council will allow me a moment: the mechanism is time-limited to twelve months, reports monthly with an independent verification annex, and explicitly does not pre-judge attribution. We look forward to a first reading.

We thank the Chair for their leadership. South Africa has heard the distinguished representatives of France and Russia debate the law, and of Germany and the United States debate the grammar. With respect, this chamber has been here before — in Libya, in Syria, in situations the Council does not need me to list. Each time, we agreed on a verification mechanism, and each time that mechanism was rendered useless by the very parties who demanded it. So before we debate whether a humanitarian observation mission should exist, perhaps we could agree on who verifies the verifiers, and whether the permanent members will accept findings that are inconvenient to them.

I thank the Chair for their leadership. My French colleague has tabled a mechanism under Chapter VII, though never before has a permanent member invoked the chapter of last resort to unfurl humanitarian corridors for an adversary it is airstriking. Russia will not legitimize, through logistics, actions that the Council did not authorize. Before we vote on a mechanism of monitoring, we ought to vote on a mechanism of accountability.

We thank the Chair for their leadership. My delegation has been listening carefully, and we note — as we have noted three times before in this chamber on prior conflict items — that the Council's last resolution on a comparable theater included a verification mechanism with the word 'shall' in it. No mechanism was established. The record will show that the Charter is not held hostage by a permanent member; it is quietly abandoned by all of us when the language, however binding, is inconvenient to enforce. The Republic of South Africa will ask the French delegation, when its text arrives, one question: 'What happens in week two?' Because that is the week the cameras leave, and the week this body begins to revise its own commitments.

We thank the Chair for their leadership. Ambassador Belmont's draft language is welcome, but Nigeria asks a practical question that no one else has yet put on the table: who exactly will staff and protect this humanitarian observation mission? Every Council member here has invoked the suffering of civilians, yet no one has volunteered a single battalion, a single unarmed observer, or a single encrypted radio frequency for deconfliction. Until we agree on the troops on the ground and the rules of engagement for those troops, we are drafting poetry, not policy. Nigeria will examine the French text, but we will not vote for a mechanism that exists only on paper while the strikes continue.

We thank the Chair. Russia has heard the French delegation's offer of draft language, and we will review it with the seriousness it deserves. But let us be precise: France proposes a mechanism under Chapter VII, and the United States has just informed this Council that it will not be corralled by an amendment dressed as concern. One permanent member has told us it will act as it sees fit; another proposes to build a fence around that action. Russia will not be the one to hold the hammer while the anvil is still being forged. We will block the French mechanism unless and until the Council first defines the legal basis of this conflict — a definition that, to our knowledge, has not yet been offered by anyone in this chamber. Until then, this debate remains a rehearsal for a drama whose script has not been written.

We thank the Chair for their leadership. Mexico has listened carefully to the French proposal, and we ask our distinguished colleague from France one practical question: who will staff this observation mission, who will protect it, and who will pay for it when the parties to this conflict decide, as they invariably will, that the mission's presence is an inconvenience? Mexico has seen this Council authorize missions before. We have seen the mandates, and we have seen the exit strategies. We will support a mechanism that can be verified on the ground, not one that exists only in the text of a resolution we will spend the next month negotiating.

We thank the Chair. China notes the French draft with interest, and we will examine its operational definitions with the care they deserve. However, we must record our observation that a deconfliction mechanism, however well-intentioned, presumes a conflict that one permanent member has already acknowledged. China will not lend its vote to legitimizing a war that this Council never authorized, regardless of the humanitarian packaging.

We thank the Chair for their leadership. My delegation has heard the French draft language referenced, and we are grateful for it. But Nigeria has a practical question that must be answered before we can support any mechanism: who will staff this humanitarian observation mission, and who will pay for it? We have seen too many resolutions that create a mandate in this chamber and then ask the region to shoulder the cost in blood and treasure. If France is serious about a deconfliction mechanism, let us see the operational details—the command structure, the funding line, the rules of engagement. Otherwise, we are drafting poetry while missiles are falling.

We thank the Chair for their leadership. South Africa has heard, with grave concern, the acknowledgment by a permanent member that the Council's role is to manage, not to prevent. That acknowledgment is not new—it is the same conclusion this body has reached in every previous chapter of this conflict. We are therefore not introducing a new objection; we are recording a repetition. Until this Council is prepared to discuss verification and enforcement of its own decisions, South Africa will not participate in drafting language that amounts to a theatre exercise. We withdraw from these proceedings and will return when the body is prepared to be bound by its own words.

We thank the Chair. The distinguished representative of France speaks of drafting language within the hour. China will read it. But let us be clear on one point of procedure: a mechanism drafted under Chapter VII presumes a threat to the peace that has been determined by this Council. No such determination has been made. Should France wish to proceed, it must first table a resolution on that finding. We will not lend our vote to a mechanism built on a presumption we have not accepted.

We thank the Chair for their leadership. Before we entertain the French draft, Nigeria must ask the question that has not yet been put on the table: who will pay for these humanitarian corridors, and who will keep them open when the strikes resume? The Council has a long history of authorizing missions that were never funded, never staffed, and never allowed to reach the people they were meant to protect. If France's mechanism is a serious offer, let it include a burden-sharing formula and a mandate that does not require the permission of the belligerents to move a single truck.

We thank the Chair for their leadership. Nigeria has listened carefully to the distinguished representatives of France and the United States, and we are grateful for their candour. But we must ask the practical question: when the deconfliction mechanism is tabled, who will staff it, who will fund it, and who will guarantee the safety of the observers on the ground? Because the last time this Council established a humanitarian observation mission in a live theater, it took eleven months to deploy and the parties had moved the front lines twice. We are asking for a date, a budget, and a chain of command, before we vote on poetry.

We thank the Chair for their leadership. Nigeria has heard a great deal about corridors, mechanisms, and legal frameworks. What we have not heard is who will staff the observation mission, who will pay for it, and what happens when the parties deny access to the inspectors we all know they will deny. We ask the distinguished representative of France to clarify these operational details before we commit to a text that may be as unenforceable as it is elegant.

We thank the Chair. The French delegation has offered a chapter and verse solution to a problem that is not, strictly speaking, a legal one. Before we spend the hour on the noble architecture of a deconfliction mechanism, Russia would be grateful for a clarification: does the proposed mechanism extend to the naval assets of all permanent members currently operating in the Persian Gulf, or only to those whose presence is inconvenient to the drafters? Our vessels are there, as are the Chinese delegation's. We would hate for the first test of this Council's new mechanism to be a selective one.

We thank the Chair for their leadership. South Africa has heard the distinguished representatives of France and Germany speak of mechanisms and amendments, of corridors and clarity. We have heard these words before — in 2011, in 2015, in 2023 — and we have watched each mechanism become a monument to this Council's unwillingness to enforce its own decisions. The question before us is not whether the United States will invade Iran. The question is whether this body will once again mistake a resolution for a solution. South Africa will withdraw from these proceedings until the Council is prepared to discuss enforcement, not optics. We will return when the draft language on the table includes a mechanism that this body is actually willing to back with something other than a vote.

We thank the Chair for their leadership. Brazil has heard the French proposal described as both a tool for regrouping and a wall against a fait accompli. My delegation is open to examining the draft — but the word 'observation' carries no weight unless it includes a mechanism for verification that is independent of the parties to this conflict. We would ask: who will monitor the monitors? Without an answer, Brazil will treat the language as a statement of intent, not a commitment.

We thank the Chair for their leadership. My distinguished colleague from France speaks of a humanitarian observation mission and a deconfliction mechanism, and we welcome that language. But I must ask the question no one has yet posed: who will staff this mission, and who will pay for it? We have heard elegant drafts and procedural corrections, but Nigeria has not heard a single word about the logistics of delivering food and medicine to the civilians we all claim to protect. The Council has a habit of authorizing what it does not fund. Let us table that question alongside the French text.

We thank the Chair for their leadership, and for the clarity of the last several interventions, which have—if I may say so—been unusually frank. Nigeria appreciates the French draft, and we appreciate the President's refusal to accept the premise. But my delegation has a practical question for the record, and it is this: when this Council adopts a deconfliction mechanism or a humanitarian observation mission, who pays for it, and who shoots back when it comes under fire? We have heard the legal arguments. We have heard the moral arguments. We have not heard from a single delegation what its actual, assigned, resourced contribution will be. Until we have that answer, the draft before us is a piece of paper that will be read aloud at a funeral.

We thank the Chair for their leadership. Brazil is prepared to engage constructively with the French draft, but we must ask a practical question that goes to the heart of its enforceability. Who verifies that a deconfliction mechanism is being respected by all parties on the ground, and what happens — concretely, under this Council's rules — when it is not? Without an answer, we are negotiating a piece of paper while missiles are already in flight.

We thank the Chair for their leadership. Mexico has heard the French proposal, and we have reviewed our list. Seventeen promises, and now an eighteenth — a deconfliction mechanism — arrives with no identified authority, no defined trigger, and no consequence for non-compliance. We ask the distinguished representative of France to specify, in the text she tables, exactly who observes the observers, and what this Council does when the mechanism's first incident report names a permanent member.

We thank the Chair. Russia observes that the French draft will land on the table with the usual elegance, and we will read it with the usual care. But before we begin the solemn business of amending and re-amending, may I ask the distinguished representative of France a simple question of definition: when this Council authorizes a 'deconfliction mechanism,' does it mean the parties will deconflict with each other, or does it mean the Council will deconflict with the United States? The answer determines whether we are drafting a resolution or a eulogy for this chamber.

We thank the Chair for their leadership. South Africa has heard the French delegation's offer of corridors and observation missions, and we have heard the United States decline it in the name of operational freedom. Both positions are familiar. We have sat through the same exchange three times in the last decade — in Libya, in Syria, in Yemen — and each time the Council voted, then watched, then voted again. The draft France will table is a good draft. It will be adopted. It will be ignored. South Africa will not lend its presence to that ceremony. We withdraw from these proceedings until this body is prepared to discuss enforcement, not optics. The record will show we were present for the part that mattered.

Türkiye thanks the Chair for their leadership, and we thank the distinguished representative of France for placing a concrete text before this Council. It is a mechanism we could support in principle. But we have learned, in this chamber, that principles without operational definitions are merely poetry. We ask the French delegation to clarify, in the draft, who will man these observation posts, under whose flag they will fly, and what happens when a deconfliction call goes unanswered. We will not sign a blank check for a corridor that exists only on paper.

We thank the Chair for their leadership. Türkiye is prepared to support the French draft in principle, but we must be precise about what we are endorsing. A deconfliction mechanism that lacks a clear chain of command, a defined geographical mandate, and a credible verification component is not a mechanism; it is a press release. We will engage with the French text on these operational definitions, and we would encourage the Council to address them before we vote on language we have not yet read.

We thank the Chair for their leadership. Before we draft yet another mechanism, may I ask the distinguished representative of France one practical question? When the humanitarian corridor is established—and we all hope it will be—who precisely will be on the far end of it, and what guarantee do we have that they will be permitted to reach the civilians who need them? We have heard a great deal about deconfliction, but very little about the people we are deconflicting for.

We thank the Chair for their leadership. The distinguished representative of France has tabled a draft that presumes the existence of a 'theater' in which a mechanism for observation is required. The United States will review that text with the seriousness it no doubt deserves. But we wish to flag, for the record, that the deployment of any so-called observation mission without the consent of the states on the ground would constitute a violation of sovereignty the United States would be compelled to oppose — not as a matter of policy, but as a matter of law. We trust that the distinguished representative of France, in drafting, will be mindful of that principle.

South Africa thanks the Chair for their leadership, and we are grateful to the French delegation for tabling a text that at least engages with the mechanics of restraint. But this body has produced corridors and mechanisms before—in Gaza, in Sudan, in Tigray—and we have watched each one become a monument to our own inaction. The Council is not short of instruments; it is short of the will to enforce them. Until that changes, my delegation sees no purpose in lending our presence to a debate that has already conceded the outcome. We will withdraw from these proceedings for a short time to reconsider our participation, and we will return when the Council is prepared to discuss enforcement rather than optics.

We thank the Chair for their leadership. France has tabled a draft on humanitarian corridors and deconfliction, and we have heard a great deal of debate about the grammar of that proposal. But Nigeria would like to ask a question that has not yet been put to the chamber: who will pay for the corridors, and who will guarantee the safety of the observers who staff them? We have seen, in other theaters, that a mechanism without a budget and without a security escort is merely a paragraph. Before we vote on language, we should know the cost in money and in lives. My delegation would welcome the French text, but we will not commit to a resolution that obliges us to fund a mission we cannot protect.

We thank the Chair for their leadership. My delegation has listened carefully to the distinguished representatives of France, Germany, and the United Kingdom debate the precise wording of a resolution that does not yet exist, while the President of the United States has told us plainly that humanitarian corridors are a tool for the adversary to regroup. So let me ask the practical question that seems to have been lost in the drafting room: who, exactly, is going to staff the observation mission the French delegation proposes? If we cannot name a single member state willing to put personnel on the ground in the theater of a live, active conflict — without a guarantee of deconfliction from all parties — then we are debating a piece of paper that will be read aloud in this chamber and ignored in the airspace over Tehran.

We thank the Chair. South Africa has heard the distinguished representative of the United States state plainly that the Council's role is, in their view, to observe rather than to act. We have also heard the distinguished representative of China acknowledge that statement with the gravity it deserves. My delegation has been here before—and we have seen the outcome of this exact dialogue in other theaters. We will not lend our presence to a circular debate in which the permanent members recite their respective positions while the instruments of war are already in motion. South Africa will withdraw from these proceedings until the agenda reflects the crisis on the ground rather than the preferences of capitals.

We thank the Chair for their leadership. Before France tables its draft, we must be clear on one point of procedure: does the motion before us, as currently phrased, constitute a question to the Council or a statement of fact? If it is a question, then the Council is being asked to speculate on the intentions of a Member State. If it is a statement, then we are debating a declaration. Either way, the Council must first decide what it is deciding.

We thank the Chair for their leadership. South Africa has listened carefully to the distinguished representatives of France, the United States, China, and others who have spoken of draft resolutions, deconfliction mechanisms, and the Charter. We have heard the same vocabulary in this chamber on three prior occasions — in the Gulf, in Libya, and in the Sahel — and in each instance, the resolution was adopted, and the humanitarian corridor was drawn, and the civilians were not saved. My delegation will not participate in the drafting of a fourth map. We will instead observe the proceedings from a distance, and we will note for the record which promises made today are broken by spring.

Russia appreciates the French delegation's willingness to draft. We will examine the text with the seriousness it warrants. But before we do, we must note a certain poetic tension in the room: the United States has denied an invasion while confirming the war, and China has heard an acknowledgment without yet drafting a veto. Both positions are, in their own way, works of art. Russia will study the French draft carefully — and will also study the minutes of this session, which will make excellent reading in Moscow.

South Africa thanks the Chair. We have heard the word 'containment' used today to describe a conflict that has already claimed civilian lives. In 2011, this Council authorized intervention in Libya on humanitarian grounds. In 2015, we were told action in Yemen was a matter of urgency. In both cases, the record of what followed is known to every delegation in this room. My capital has instructed me to listen for a mechanism that would hold this Council to its own standards. We have not heard one. South Africa will not participate further in this debate until a draft text is tabled that addresses accountability, not merely access.

Russia thanks the French delegation for its diligence. We will read the draft with the care it warrants. Yet we must observe that the Council has now spent its first hour debating the tense of a verb while the United States has spent that same hour launching strikes. Perhaps the distinguished delegate from France would consider including in his text a requirement that all permanent members—including those currently engaged in hostilities—provide the Council with a weekly accounting of civilian casualties. It is a modest request. We are curious to see how it is received.

We thank the Chair for their leadership. South Africa will not be a witness to this rehearsal. The Council has made promises in this chamber—binding promises under Chapter VII—to protect civilians in armed conflict. We have heard none of those commitments referenced today, only the grammar of escalation and the logistics of containment. My delegation will withdraw from the informal consultations on this motion until the record reflects that this body still believes in the obligations it has already undertaken. We will return for a vote, should one be forced, but we will not lend our presence to a debate that treats the war as a given and the law as an inconvenience.

Russia is grateful to the French delegation for its draft language, which we will read with interest and the customary suspicion. Yet before we discuss the mechanics of corridors, I must observe that the Council is once again being invited to manage the consequences of an act it was never asked to authorize. We will not legitimize a fait accompli by debating its humanitarian accessories. Should the French text arrive, we shall treat it as a proposal for discussion—nothing more.

We thank the Chair for their leadership. South Africa has heard the distinguished representatives of France and Germany speak of humanitarian corridors and deconfliction mechanisms, and we have heard the United States reject them. We have also heard this Council fail, repeatedly, to cite its own prior commitments to protect civilians in conflict. My delegation will not legitimize a debate that treats this war as a given while negotiating the terms of its aftermath as if we were drafting a lease agreement. We are withdrawing from the informal consultations on this motion. If a formal text is tabled, we will consider it on its merits — but we will not provide cover for a discussion that has already decided who lives and who dies.