---
title: "Right to Property: From Article 31 to 300A | Model Diplomat"
description: "Trace the Right to Property from a Fundamental Right under Articles 19(1)(f) and 31 to a bare constitutional right under Article 300A, via amendments and"
url: "https://modeldiplomat.com/learn/lessons/upsc-indian-polity-right-to-property-the-journey-from-article-31-to-300a"
---

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Right to Property & the journey from Article 31 to 300A

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# Right to Property & the journey from Article 31 to 300A

Trace the Right to Property from a Fundamental Right (Articles 19(1)(f) and 31) to a bare constitutional right under Article 300A, via the property amendments and landmark cases.

## The original constitutional scheme

When the Constitution came into force on 26 January 1950, the right to property occupied a central place in Part III among the Fundamental Rights. It rested on two provisions. **Article 19(1)(f)** guaranteed to every citizen the right 'to acquire, hold and dispose of property,' subject to reasonable restrictions in the interest of the general public under Article 19(5). **Article 31** guaranteed that no person could be deprived of property save by authority of law, and Article 31(2) required that any law providing for compulsory acquisition or requisition must serve a public purpose and provide for **compensation**.

## The collision with agrarian reform

The framers had inherited a feudal, zamindari-dominated land structure. Independent India's first legislative priority was abolishing intermediaries and redistributing land. But landlords challenged these laws as violating Articles 19(1)(f) and 31. The courts, reading 'compensation' as requiring a *just equivalent*, repeatedly struck down or impeded agrarian statutes. This judicial-legislative conflict drove a series of constitutional amendments that progressively hollowed out the property right.

The **First Amendment, 1951** inserted **Articles 31A and 31B** and created the **Ninth Schedule**, immunising listed laws from challenge under Part III. The **Fourth Amendment, 1955** barred courts from questioning the *adequacy* of compensation. The **Seventeenth Amendment, 1964** expanded Article 31A and added more statutes to the Ninth Schedule.

## The judicial battles

The Supreme Court interrogated these moves in a sequence of landmark cases. In **Kameshwar Singh (1952)** the Bihar zamindari abolition law was tested. In **I.C. Golaknath v. State of Punjab (1967)**, the Court held by 6:5 that Parliament could not amend Fundamental Rights, including property, prompting Parliament's counterattack. The **Twenty-fourth and Twenty-fifth Amendments, 1971** followed: the Twenty-fifth substituted the word 'compensation' with 'amount' in Article 31(2) and inserted **Article 31C**, shielding laws giving effect to the Directive Principles in Articles 39(b) and 39(c).

The decisive ruling came in **Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala (1973)**, where a 13-judge bench by 7:6 propounded the **Basic Structure doctrine**, upheld the deletion of the compensation guarantee, but struck down the part of Article 31C that ousted judicial review. Significantly, the majority held that the right to property was **not** part of the basic structure — clearing the constitutional path for its eventual removal from Part III. The **R.C. Cooper (Bank Nationalisation) case, 1970** and the **Madhav Rao Scindia (Privy Purses) case, 1971** further illustrate the Court's earlier resistance, both later neutralised by the Twenty-sixth Amendment abolishing privy purses.

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