---
title: "Great-Power Competition: China and Russia (FSOT)"
description: "Learn how US doctrine reframed China and Russia as strategic competitors and the diplomatic, economic, and military tools now deployed against each rival."
url: "https://modeldiplomat.com/learn/lessons/fsot-us-foreign-policy-great-power-competition-china-russia-the-contemporary-agenda"
---

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Great-power competition: China, Russia & the contemporary agenda

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# Great-power competition: China, Russia & the contemporary agenda

The contemporary great-power agenda: how US doctrine reframed China and Russia as strategic competitors, and the tools deployed against them.

## From Engagement to Strategic Competition

The organizing principle of US foreign policy shifted decisively between 2017 and 2022 from post-Cold War engagement to explicit great-power competition. The **2017 National Security Strategy** (December 2017), issued under President Trump, named China and Russia as 'revisionist powers' seeking to 'shape a world antithetical to US values and interests' and declared the return of inter-state strategic competition as 'the primary concern in US national security.' The accompanying **2018 National Defense Strategy** (Secretary James Mattis) operationalized this by prioritizing China and Russia over counterterrorism for the first time since 9/11.

The **2022 National Security Strategy** (October 2022), under President Biden, sharpened the distinction: China is 'the only competitor with both the intent to reshape the international order and, increasingly, the economic, diplomatic, military, and technological power to do it,' while Russia poses 'an immediate and persistent threat to international peace.' Russia is thus framed as an acute disruptor; China as the singular long-term 'pacing challenge'—a term codified in the **2022 National Defense Strategy**.

## The China Track

The pivot toward China began earlier. The **Obama 'Pivot to Asia' / 'Rebalance'** (Secretary Hillary Clinton's 'America's Pacific Century,' Foreign Policy, October 2011) sought to reallocate diplomatic and military resources to the Indo-Pacific. The Trump administration launched the **Section 301 tariffs** (USTR investigation, March 2018) on roughly $250 billion of Chinese goods over forced technology transfer and intellectual-property theft, culminating in the **Phase One trade deal** (January 2020).

Under Biden, competition became technological. The **CHIPS and Science Act** (signed August 9, 2022) appropriated $52.7 billion to reshore semiconductor manufacturing, and the **October 7, 2022 Bureau of Industry and Security export controls** restricted advanced chips and chipmaking equipment to China. The **Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF)**, launched May 2022, and the **AUKUS** pact (September 15, 2021, with the UK and Australia) and revived **Quad** (US, Japan, India, Australia) constitute the latticework of alliances designed to balance Beijing.

## The Russia Track

Russia's **annexation of Crimea (March 2014)** triggered the first wave of sectoral sanctions under **Executive Orders 13660, 13661, and 13662**. Congress codified and expanded these via the **Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA, 2017)**. The **full-scale invasion of Ukraine (February 24, 2022)** prompted unprecedented measures: removal of major Russian banks from **SWIFT**, the freezing of roughly $300 billion in Central Bank of Russia reserves, and a G7 **price cap on Russian seaborne oil** (December 2022). The US has provided tens of billions in security assistance to Ukraine, reaffirming NATO's **Article 5** commitment and welcoming Finland (2023) and Sweden (2024) into the alliance.

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