The 1998 Russian default was triggered on 17 August 1998, when the government of Prime Minister Sergei Kiriyenko and the Central Bank of Russia announced a three-pronged emergency package: a devaluation of the ruble (widening the trading band from roughly 6 to 9.5 per dollar), a 90-day moratorium on private foreign debt repayment, and a forced restructuring of short-term ruble-denominated treasury bills known as GKOs and longer-dated OFZs. Within weeks the ruble lost roughly two-thirds of its value against the dollar, inflation surged, and several major Russian banks (including Inkombank and SBS-Agro) collapsed.
Underlying causes included a chronic fiscal deficit, weak tax collection, a fixed exchange-rate corridor that overvalued the ruble, and heavy reliance on short-term GKO financing at increasingly punitive yields (above 100% by mid-1998). The shock from the 1997 Asian financial crisis and a sharp fall in oil and other commodity prices through 1998 drained reserves. An IMF-led rescue package of about $22.6 billion announced in July 1998 failed to restore confidence, and capital flight accelerated.
International spillovers were significant. The default contributed to the September 1998 collapse of the hedge fund Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM), prompting a Federal Reserve-coordinated private-sector rescue, and it widened emerging-market spreads worldwide. Brazil came under speculative pressure that culminated in its January 1999 devaluation.
Politically, the crisis ended the Kiriyenko cabinet, weakened President Boris Yeltsin, and paved the way for Yevgeny Primakov's government. Counter-intuitively, the devaluation boosted Russian industry by making imports expensive, and rising oil prices from 1999 onward fueled a strong recovery during Vladimir Putin's first term. The episode is now a standard case study in sovereign debt sustainability, currency-board fragility, and the limits of IMF conditionality, and it shapes Russian policy preferences for large foreign-exchange reserves and fiscal surpluses.